Infant sensitivity to figural coherence in biomechanical motions

Two experiments assessed infant sensitivity to figural coherence in point-light displays moving as if attached to the major joints of a walking person. Experiment 1 tested whether 3- and 5-month-old infants could discriminate between upright and inverted versions of the walker in both moving and static displays. Using an infant-control habituation paradigm, it was found that both ages discriminated the moving but not the static displays. Experiment 2 was designed to clarify whether or not structural invariants were extracted from these displays. The results revealed that (1) moving point-light displays with equivalent motions but different topographic relations were discriminated while (2) static versions were not, and (3) arrays that varied in the amount of motion present in different portions of the display were also not discriminated. These results are interpreted as indicating that young infants are sensitive to figural coherence in displays of biomechanical motion.     

A developmental study of recognition of pictures and nouns

Children at four age levels (4, 6, 8, and 10 years) were given continuous recognition tasks using concrete noun, abstract noun, and pictorial stimuli in a 4 × 3 factorial design. Pictures were recognized significantly better than concrete and abstract nouns at the 4- and 6-year age levels and significantly better than abstract nouns at the 8- and 10-year age levels. This supported Paivio's contention that pictures are easier to remember than words because of a greater possibility of dual encoding, while Rohwer's contention that there is a shift in recognition memory development received no support. There were no significant differences between recognition of concrete and abstract nouns at any age level, which opposed the findings from adult studies and suggested that Paivio's theoretical orientation would have to be extended in order to account for developmental data. Recognition for both concrete and abstract nouns was found to be linear and increasing significantly with age, but no age trends for picture recognition were found.     

Bennett and “proxy actualism”

Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss her main arguments that the theories carry a commitment to actual entities that do not exist. We end by considering and addressing a worry that might have been the driving force behind Bennett’s claim that Linsky and Zalta’s view is not fully actualistic.

Meaning(fullness) Without Metaphysics: Another Look at Hume’s “Meaning Empiricism”

Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas.     

Reciprocal heuristics: A discussion of the relationship of the study of learned behavior in laboratory and field

At the turn of the century, the initiators of laboratory study of animal learning advocated two very different approaches to the subject matter. Willard Small favored the investigation of learning in ecological settings appropriate to individual species. E. L. Thorndike treated the process of association formation in animals as a general one, best studied in situations distant from those to which subject species were adapted. The latter view dominated laboratory study of animal learning for 80 years. The consequent absence of ecological content from laboratory investigations of animal learning, together with recent expansion in knowledge of the behavior of free-living animals, has created opportunities for ecologically sound investigations of animal learning of the type first advocated by Small. Studies of taste-aversion learning, although introducing evolutionary issues into the study of animal learning, do not exemplify such an approach. Integration of field and laboratory studies of behavioral plasticity in animals requires a change in the methods used to select phenomena for analysis. Such integration does not often lead to identification of the behavioral processes underlying the development of particular behaviors observed in nature. Rather, its results are an increase in the variety of learning processes investigated in laboratory settings and enhanced understanding of the behavioral capacities of subject species.     

Cognitive tuning and receptivity to novel information

An experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that cognitive tuning would cause receivers to be more receptive to novel than to familiar information, compared to transmitters. The information receptivity of transmitters and receivers was contrasted against a control group. The influence of the source and audience, possible limits on the influence of the tuning set, was also explored. Finally, amount of variance controlled by cognitive tuning, personality variables and information utility were examined.While the results strongly support the prediction that transmitters prefer familiar information, receivers and control group subjects did not significantly differ in preferences for novel information. The anticipated expertise of source or audience had no influence on information receptivity. Among the three sets of variables used, the greatest amount of variance was explained by information utility, followed by cognitive tuning and personality measures, though all three variables controlled a significant amount of variance.     

The logic of how-questions

Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.¹ In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.     

Two Cheers for “Closeness”: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect

Philosophers from Hart to Lewis, Johnston and Bennett have expressed various degrees of reservation concerning the doctrine of double effect. A common concern is that, with regard to many activities that double effect is traditionally thought to prohibit, what might at first look to be a directly intended bad effect is really, on closer examination, a directly intended neutral effect that is closely connected to a foreseen bad effect. This essay examines the extent to which the commonsense concept of intention supports a reasonably consistent and coherent application of double effect. Two important conclusions are these: (1) a number of traditionally proscribed activities involve a kind of “targeting” of innocents that can be taken to exhibit a direct intention to harm them; (2) a direct intention to harm need not involve a desire to harm in any ordinary sense of the latter expression. Thanks to Thomas Flint, Paul Benacerraf, Mark Johnston, Gilbert Harman, Tom Cavanaugh, Jorge Garcia, Robert Audi and an anonymous referee for useful discussion and written comments.