Sur l'omniprésence du mensonge dans le discours

Three levels are proposed to explain lying as a process in discourse production, to characterize different types of lies and to distinguish them from mistakes, ignorance and forgetting as well fr from ill-timed or irrelevant utterances.

     

On the limits of the matching concept in monkeys (Cebus apella).

Two cebus monkeys, with many years of experience matching a variety of static visual stimuli (forms and colors) within a standard matching-to-sample paradigm, were trained to press a left lever when a pair of displayed static stimuli were the same and to press a right lever when they were different. After learning the same/different task, the monkeys were tested for transfer to dynamic visual stimuli (flashing versus steady green disks), with which they had no previous experience. Both failed to transfer to the dynamic stimuli. A third monkey, also with massive past experience matching static visual stimuli, was tested for transfer to the dynamic stimuli within our standard matching paradigm, and it, too, failed. All 3 subjects were unable to reach a moderate acquisition criterion despite as many as 52 sessions of training with the dynamic stimuli. These results provide further evidence that, in monkeys, the matching (or identity) concept has a very limited reach; they consequently do not support the view held by some theorists that an abstract matching concept based on physical similarity is a general endowment of animals.     

Insights into computational thinking from think-aloud interviews: A systematic review

This systematic review examines 35 empirical studies featuring the use of think-aloud interviews in computational thinking (CT) research. Findings show that think-aloud interviews (1) are typically conducted in Computer Science classrooms and with K-12 students; (2) are usually combined with other exploratory CT assessment tools; (3) have the potential to benefit learners with special needs and identify the competency gaps through involving diverse participants; (4) are conducted in the absence of cognitive models and standard procedures; and (5) display insufficient definitional and methodological rigor. Theoretically, this review presents a systematic assessment about the application of think-aloud interviews in CT studies and identifies the limitations in existing CT-related think-aloud studies. Practically, this review serves as a reference for studying the cognitive processes during CT problem-solving and provides suggestions for CT researchers who intend to incorporate think-aloud interviews in their studies.     

Context-dependent shifts in self-regulatory personality processes during COVID-19: Changes in control predict dynamic shifts in goal reengagement capacity

The ability to reengage with new attainable goals after major setbacks is a core self-regulatory trait linked to health and well-being. Yet little is known about the extent to which such goal reengagement capacities may shift over time in response to changing contextual circumstances. Using a nationally-representative sample of U.S. adults aged 18–80 (n = 293), the present 1-year study examined whether changes in opportunity to influence life circumstances (perceived control) were coupled with dynamic shifts in goal reengagement capacity for individuals who differed in their levels of control at pandemic onset. Results from multilevel models showed that within-person increases in perceived control during the pandemic predicted corresponding within-person increases in goal reengagement capacity. Moderation models showed that the positive within-person association between perceived control and goal reengagement was pronounced for individuals with lower levels of control at pandemic onset who may be particularly sensitive to periods of opportunity to pursue new attainable goals. Findings inform theories of personality and self-regulation in pointing to contextual circumstances under which goal reengagement capacity exhibits dynamic shifts in populations who differ in their perceived opportunities for control.     

WHY A BRAIN CAPABLE OF LANGUAGE EVOLVED ONLY ONCE: PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND SYMBOL LEARNING

Abstract. Language and information processes are critical issues in scientific controversies regarding the qualities that epitomize humanness. Whereas some theorists claim human mental uniqueness with regard to language, others point to successes in teaching language skills to other animals. However, although these animals may learn names for things, they show little ability to utilize a complex framework of symbolic reference. In such a framework, words or other symbols refer not only to objects and concepts but also to sequential and hierarchical relationships with other symbols. This process is essential to human mental operations, including language, mathematics, and music. In humans, these operations may have coevolved with the prefrontal area of the cerebral cortex, which is proportionately much larger in humans than in other animals and more intricately linked with other areas of the brain. Analysis of the structure and function of the prefrontal area suggests that it is centrally involved in the operation of higher-order associative relationships involving the subordination of one set of associations to another. This alternate learning strategy apparently appeared at the cost of certain sensory, motor, or limbic abilities. The payoff was symbolic thinking. Humans thus are unique among species, not just for their highly developed language ability but for their odd style of thinking and learning.     

The second offspring of General Process Learning Theory: Overt behavior as the ambassador of the mind

Wasserman suggested in a recent book review that the study of intervening cognitive processes represents a current focus of interest in animal learning and that this has led to a revitalization of comparative psychology. An examination of the volume reviewed suggests that he may have overstated the case. Most of the authors to whom he refers expressed dissatisfaction with traditional stimulus-response associationism but few argued for the extreme (information processing) sort of cognitive approach described by Wasserman.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

Practice effects on speech production planning: evidence from slips of the tongue in spontaneous vs. preplanned speech in Japanese

The present study addresses the question of how practice in expressing the content to be conveyed in a specific situation influences speech production planning processes. A comparison of slips of the tongue in Japanese collected from spontaneous everyday conversation and those collected from largely preplanned conversation in live-broadcast TV programs reveals that, although there are those aspects of speech production planning that are unaffected by practice, there are various practice effects, most of which can be explained in terms of automatization of the processing of content, resulting in shifts in the loci of errors.     

Post-decision consolidation: group members in different social settings compared to individual decision makers

Two experiments were conducted to examine how making decisions in a 3-member group affects the degree of post-decision consolidation, defined as attractiveness changes in favor of the chosen alternative. Both experiments were conducted in two sessions one week apart. In the first session (decision phase), participants estimated the importance of each of four different attributes describing two decision alternatives. They were then shown predetermined attractiveness ratings on each of the attributes and were to decide on the two alternatives, either individually or as a group. In the second session (post-decision phase), the participants were to attempt to recall the attractiveness ratings for the attributes as presented to them in session one. In both experiments, significant post-decision consolidation was found for individual decision makers but not for group members. In experiment 2, this result was replicated, no difference in consolidation being found between group members with face-to-face interaction and without.     

Individual postdecision processes in group settings

In two experiments Differentiation and Consolidation Theory (Diff Con) (Svenson, 1992) was used to investigate individual postdecision making processes in three-member groups. It was predicted that in groups in which the subjects preferred different alternatives (conflict groups), subjects would consolidate their own preferred alternative, and not the group's final decision. A second hypothesis was that no consolidation would be indicated in groups in which all members preferred the same alternative (non-conflict groups). The results showed that in conflict groups, the members who gave up their preferred alternative (minority members) consolidated their own preference, thereby significantly regretting the group decision. In contrast, members who got their own will through in the majority decision (majority members) showed no consolidation of the group decision. The corresponding pattern of results was replicated in a second experiment, using a different decision situation. The results indicated that perceptions of social support, agreement in a group and decreasing responsibility for a group's decision, could all partly substitute consolidation by attractiveness restructuring.