“You’re Just Saying That.” Contingencies of self-worth, suspicion, and authenticity in the interpersonal affirmation process

A model of the role and costs of contingent self-worth in the partner-affirmation process was tested. Actors whose self-worth was contingent on appearance or intelligence claimed to have expressed their particular heightened sensitivity to their romantic partners. Suggesting a cost to these reactions, actors’ beliefs about having expressed heightened sensitivity, in turn, predicted their doubts about the authenticity of partners’ positive feedback in the domain of contingency, independently of whether partners claimed to deliver inauthentic feedback. Suggesting a cost for partners, partners of contingent actors appeared to detect actors’ expressions of sensitivity in the domain of contingency and respond by delivering inauthentic feedback to actors in the domain, which in turn predicted partners’ increased relationship anxiety and decreased satisfaction. Results suggest that contingent self-worth may undermine the functioning of the partner-affirmation process through actors discrediting partners’ positive feedback and partners behaving in an inauthentic and controlled manner.     

Is moral phenomenology unified?

In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of morality.     

They May Disapprove,but I Still Love You: Attachment Behaviors Moderate the Effect of Social Disapproval on Marital Relationship Quality

The degree of approval for a relationship from one’s social network has been shown to predict relationship outcomes. Additional research has shown that attachment can buffer the negative effects of various factors (e.g., depression) on relationships. Using an actor–partner interdependence model in an SEM framework, we research the effects of disapproval from parents and friends for one’s relationship on marital relationship quality for self and partner in a sample of 858 married couples. We also examine whether each spouse’s attachment behaviors can moderate these effects. Results indicated that one’s own attachment behaviors moderate the effects of their own parents’ and friends’ disapproval on their self-reported relationship quality for both men and women. Partner’s attachment behaviors moderate own friend’s disapproval on self-reported relationship quality for men and women; additionally, the main effect of partner’s friends’ and parents’ disapproval became nonsignificant with that test. The findings provide evidence that attachment behaviors of both partners play a role in buffering the negative effects of the social network disapproval on relationship outcomes. Clinical implications are discussed.     

The repeated insertion model for rankings: Missing link between two subset choice models

Several probabilistic models for subset choice have been proposed in the literature, for example, to explain approval voting data. We show that Marley et al.'s latent scale model is subsumed by Falmagne and Regenwetter's size-independent model, in the sense that every choice probability distribution generated by the former can also be explained by the latter. Our proof relies on the construction of a probabilistic ranking model which we label the repeated insertion model. This model is a special case of Marden's orthogonal contrast model class and, in turn, includes the classical Mallows -model as a special case. We explore its basic properties as well as its relationship to Fligner and Verducci's multistage ranking model.The authors are grateful to the National Science Foundation for grants SES98-18756 to Regenwetter and Peke, and SBR97-30076 to Regenwetter. This collaborative research was carried out in the context of the conference Random Utility 2000 held at Duke University and sponsored by NSF, the Fuqua School of Business and the Center for International Business Education and Research. We thank the editor and four referees for helpful suggestions and we are grateful to Prof. J. I. Marden for providing useful information on contrast models. We thank Moon-Ho Ho for programming and running the data analyses.     

Direct and indirect effects of parenting practices on socio‐moral approval of aggression in Polish young adults. Do all practices matter?

The purpose of this article was to determine the socialisation antecedents of socio‐moral approval of aggression (SMAA). In Study 1, we assessed factorial structure and reliability of the SMAA with a sample of 355 students who reported on the extent to which they approved of six forms of aggressive behaviour and six justifications of aggression. Two‐factor solutions were obtained with regard to forms and justifications of aggressive acts. Thus, approval of extreme and minor aggression was distinguished as well as legitimate and illegitimate justifications of aggression. In Study 2, we tested the path models of the socialisation antecedents that contributed to the high approval of minor and extreme aggressive acts as well as legitimate and illegitimate justifications of aggression. Data were collected from 173 undergraduate students. Path analyses showed that high levels of approval of extremely aggressive acts and of illegitimate justifications of aggression were preceded by a sequence of negative life events, beginning with frequent misbehaviour in childhood, corporal punishment used by parents and ending with delinquency in adolescence. The approval of minor aggression had little relation to socialisation factors apart from a detrimental effect of psychological aggression while approval of legitimate justifications of aggression had no socialisation antecedents.     

The Argumentative Structure of Persuasive Definitions

In this paper we present an analysis of persuasive definition based on argumentation schemes. Using the medieval notion of differentia and the traditional approach to topics, we explain the persuasiveness of emotive terms in persuasive definitions by applying the argumentation schemes for argument from classification and argument from values. Persuasive definitions, we hold, are persuasive because their goal is to modify the emotive meaning denotation of a persuasive term in a way that contains an implicit argument from values. However, our theory is different from Stevenson’s, a positivistic view that sees emotive meaning as subjective, and defines it as a behavioral effect. Our proposal is to treat the persuasiveness produced by the use of emotive words and persuasive definitions as due to implicit arguments that an interlocutor may not be aware of. We use congruence theory to provide the linguistic framework for connecting a term with the function it is supposed to play in a text. Our account allows us to distinguish between conflicts of values and conflicts of classifications.