Learning to like it: Aesthetic perception of bodies,movements and choreographic structure

Appreciating human movement can be a powerful aesthetic experience. We have used apparent biological motion to investigate the aesthetic effects of three levels of movement representation: body postures, movement transitions and choreographic structure. Symmetrical (ABCDCBA) and asymmetrical (ABCDBCA) sequences of apparent movement were created from static postures, and were presented in an artificial grammar learning paradigm. Additionally, “good” continuation of apparent movements was manipulated by changing the number of movement path reversals within a sequence. In an initial exposure phase, one group of participants saw only symmetrical sequences, while another group saw only asymmetrical sequences. In a subsequent test phase, both groups rated all sequences on an aesthetic evaluation scale. We found that posture, movement, and choreographic structure all influenced aesthetic ratings. Separate ratings for the static body postures presented individually showed that both groups preferred a posture that maximized spatial symmetry. Ratings for the experimental sequences showed that both groups gave higher ratings to symmetrical sequences with “good” continuation and lower ratings to sequences with many path reversals. Further, participants who had been initially familiarized with asymmetrical sequences showed increased liking for asymmetrical sequences, suggesting a structural mere exposure effect. Aesthetic preferences thus depend on body postures, apparent movement continuation and choreographic structure. We propose a hierarchical model of aesthetic perception of human movement with distinct processing levels for body postures, movements and choreographic structure.     

Unintentional movements induced by sequential transient perturbations in a multi-joint positional task

We explored the phenomenon of unintentional movements of a multi-joint effector produced by multiple transient changes in the external force. The subjects performed a position-holding task against a constant bias force produced by a robot and were instructed not to intervene voluntarily with arm movements produced by changes in the robot force. The robot produced a smooth force increase leading to hand movement from the trunk, followed by a dwell time. Then, the force dropped to its initial value leading to hand movement toward the initial position but with an undershot. Such perturbation episodes were repeated four times in a row. The accumulated perturbation and undershoot distances kept increasing without saturation within the sequence of four perturbation episode. The limb apparent stiffness before dwell time increased over sequential perturbations while apparent stiffness after dwell time decreased. We interpret the results as consequences of a drift of the hand referent coordinate (RC) caused by a hypothesized RC-back-coupling mechanism and a coupled drift of the apparent stiffness. The results show that RC-back-coupling continues to lead to unintentional movements over repeated perturbations and is accompanied by a relatively slow re-setting process.     

Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy

The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.     

Perceptual and decisional contributions to audiovisual interactions in the perception of apparent motion: a signal detection study

Motion information available to different sensory modalities can interact at both perceptual and post-perceptual (i.e., decisional) stages of processing. However, to date, researchers have only been able to demonstrate the influence of one of these components at any given time, hence the relationship between them remains uncertain. We addressed the interplay between the perceptual and post-perceptual components of information processing by assessing their influence on performance within the same experimental paradigm. We used signal detection theory to discriminate changes in perceptual sensitivity (d') from shifts in response criterion (c) in performance on a detection (Experiment 1) and a classification (Experiment 2) task regarding the direction of auditory apparent motion streams presented in noise. In the critical conditions, a visual motion distractor moving either leftward or rightward was presented together with the auditory motion. The results demonstrated a significant decrease in sensitivity to the direction of the auditory targets in the crossmodal conditions as compared to the unimodal baseline conditions that was independent of the relative direction of the visual distractor. In addition, we also observed significant shifts in response criterion, which were dependent on the relative direction of the distractor apparent motion. These results support the view that the perceptual and decisional components involved in audiovisual interactions in motion processing can coexist but are largely independent of one another.     

Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one’s own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.     

Temporal binding during apparent movement of the human body

Alternating between static images of human bodies with an appropriate interstimulus interval (ISI) produces apparent biological motion. Here we investigate links between apparent biological motion and time perception. We presented two pictures of the initial and final positions of a human movement separated by six different ISIs. The shortest movement path between two positions was always biomechanically impossible. Participants performed two tasks: In an explicit task, participants judged whether they saw the longer, feasible movement path between the two postures, or the shorter, biomechanically impossible path. In an implicit task, participants judged the duration of a white square surrounding the picture sequence. At longer ISIs participants were more likely to see a longer, feasible movement path (explicit task) and underestimated the duration of body picture pairs, compared to trials displaying degraded body pictures (implicit task). We argue that perceiving apparent biological motion involves temporal binding of two static pictures into a continuous movement. Such temporal binding may be mediated by a top-down mechanism that produces a percept of biological motion in the absence of any retinal motion.     

Common mechanisms in apparent motion perception and visual pattern matching

There are close functional similarities between apparent motion perception and visual pattern matching. In particular, striking functional similarities have been demonstrated between perception of rigid objects in apparent motion and purely mental transformations of visual size and orientation used in comparisons of objects with respect to shape but regardless of size and orientation. In both cases, psychophysical data suggest that differences in visual size are resolved as differences in depth, such that transformation of size is done by translation in depth. Furthermore, the process of perceived or imagined translation appears to be stepwise additive such that a translation over a long distance consists of a sequence of smaller translations, the durations of these steps being additive. Both perceived and imagined rotation also appear to be stepwise additive, and combined transformations of size and orientation appear to be done by alternation of small steps of pure translation and small steps of pure rotation. The functional similarities suggest that common mechanisms underlie perception of apparent motion and purely mental transformations. In line with this suggestion, functional brain imaging has isolated neural structures in motion area MT used in mental transformation of size.     

Temporal structure coding with and without awareness

In order to interpret a constantly changing environment, visual events far apart in space and time must be integrated into a unified percept. While spatial properties of invisible signals are known to be encoded without awareness, the fate of temporal properties remains largely unknown. Here, we probed temporal integration for two distinct motion stimuli that were either visible or rendered invisible using continuous flash suppression. We found that when invisible, both the direction of apparent motion and the gender of point-light walkers were processed only when defined across short time periods (i.e., respectively 100 ms and 1000 ms). This limitation was not observed under full visibility. These similar findings at two different hierarchical levels of processing suggest that temporal integration windows shrink in the absence of perceptual awareness. We discuss this phenomenon as a key prediction of the global neuronal workspace and the information integration theories of consciousness.     

The relationship between apparent motion and object files

Object files (OFs) play an important role in theories of mid-level vision. On some influential views, OFs operate and persist only via spatiotemporal continuity. One open question concerns what occurs when direct spatiotemporal continuity is absent: Do OFs move in accordance with any motion correspondence ultimately resolved? Specifically, do OFs accord with apparent motion (AM) correspondences, which arise despite a lack of continuous spatiotemporal stimulation? In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with an AM display consisting of two circles that, across two frames, were seen as moving between two noncontiguous locations. The two objects were primed with two symbols and were then moved in a single step; a third symbol appeared, and could either match the symbol from the closer or the further object. We found a robust object specific preview benefit (OSPB) for the shorter path, in other words, the path along which AM was perceived. In order to control for the possibility that priming occurs at any nearby object, in Experiment 2, the original two objects never disappeared, but two new objects appeared in the would-be AM locations. No AM was perceived, and no OSPB obtained. In the third experiment the OSPB effect persisted even when motion along the shorter path included an unlikely featural transformation (circles turning into squares). In Experiment 4, which was nearly identical to Experiment 2, no OSPB obtained despite unique featural matches between the initial and new objects, seemingly because no AM was perceived. In Experiment 5, we failed to find an effect of featural priming, even when distance between the objects was equated. Finally, we extended the OSPB effect to two additional kinds of AM—line motion (Experiment 6) and phi motion (Experiment 7), supplying strong evidence that AM correspondences and OF correspondences are controlled by the same basic rules.     

Neurodynamics of time consciousness: An extensionalist explanation of apparent motion and the specious present via reentrant oscillatory multiplexing

This paper situates an original model of reentrant oscillatory multiplexing within the philosophy of time consciousness to argue for an extensionalist theory of the specious present. I develop a detailed differential latency model of apparent motion to show how the ordinality of experiential content is isomorphic to the ordinality of relevant brain processes. I argue that the theory presented has resources to account for other key features of the specious present, including the representational discreteness between successive conscious moments as well as the phenomenological continuity between them. This work not only shows the plausibility of an extensionalist philosophical theory, it also illustrates the utility of differential latency views in squaring temporal illusions with empirically supported neurodynamics.