“John thinks that Mary thinks that…” attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children

Understanding of second-order belief structures by 5- and 10-year-old children was assessed in acted stories in which two characters (John and Mary) were independently informed about an object's (ice-cream van's) unexpected transfer to a new location. Hence both John and Mary knew where the van was but there was a mistake in John's second-order belief about Mary's belief: “John thinks Mary thinks the van is still at the old place”. Children's understanding of this second-order belief was tested by asking “Where does John think Mary will go for ice cream?” Correct answers could only be given if John's second-order belief was represented, since all shortcut reasoning based on first-order beliefs would have led to the wrong answer. Results suggested unexpected early competence around the age of 6 and 7 years, shown under optimal conditions when inference of second-order beliefs was prompted.     

The control of social desirability in personality inventories: A study using the principal-factor deletion technique

The present study sought to investigate Paulhus' (1981) principal-factor deletion technique (PFDT), a factor analytic method for controlling for socially desirable responding. Adult subjects (N = 330) responded to both forms of the Eysenck Personality Inventory and a 32-item lie scale. Peer ratings of extraversion and neuroticism served as criterion measures. The factor deleted by PFDT more closely reflected neuroticism than impression management. Factors resulting from PFDT were considerably less valid and less content saturated than those emerging from an ordinary factor solution. The implications of these results are discussed from the perspectives of predictive and construct validity.     

Integrating velocity,time, and distance information: A developmental study

The development of understanding the relationships between velocity, time, and distance was investigated in three tasks. In each task, values of two dimensions were given, and 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults had to infer values of the third dimension. These inferences were made in all age groups. The integration rules were found to depend upon age and task. In the distance = time × velocity task, all age groups obeyed the normative multiplication rule. In the time = distance ÷ velocity task, the two older age groups obeyed the normative division rule, but the 5-year-olds shifted to a simpler subtraction rule. In the velocity = distance ÷ time task, which was the most difficult, the two older age groups simplified to use of a subtraction rule, and the 5-year-olds simplified even further to use of a distance-only rule. The knowledge level revealed for young children contrasts sharply with results from previous studies using Piagetian choice tasks, which apparently investigate selective attention to one dimension rather than conceptual understanding of relations.     

Postdecisional preference for decision-relevant information as a function of the competence of its source and the degree of familiarity with this information

Three experiments are reported concerning the determinants of postdecisional preferences for decision-relevant information. Two factors were considered: the competence of the source of the information and the degree of prior familiarity with the contents of the information. The first two experiments showed that the competence of the source of decision-supporting information affected the desirability of reading both types of information, whereas the competence of the source of decision-opposing information had very little effect on the desirability of reading either type. In the third experiment, the effects of giving subjects access to prior information supporting or opposing their view on their preferences for further information were investigated under conditions in which the number of choices of this later information were either limited or unlimited. The effects of prior information on choices of decision-supporting information were identical regardless of whether the total amount of information available was limited or unlimited: Less decision-supporting information was chosen when subjects had previously been exposed to decision-supporting information than when they had not, and this difference was greater when they had not previously been exposed to decision-opposing information. However, the choices of decision-opposing information under unlimited choice conditions increased with the amount of decision-supporting information previously read, but decreased with the amount of decision-opposing information previously read. The processes that underlie the choices of information under conditions in which several types are available are discussed.     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

A characterization of stochastic independence by association,with an application to random utility theory

A characterization of stochastic independence in terms of association of random variables is given. The result is applied to yield a simple proof of the Sattath-Tversky inequality without continuity assumptions.     

Task determinants of ear differences in melody processing

In Experiment 1 nonmusicians were presented with dichotic melodies, which differed either on all pitches or by a single note, followed by a set of four binaural melodies. They were asked to recognize among the alternatives only one member of the dichotic pair in the “single-focus” task, and both dichotic melodies in the “double-focus” task. These different attention requirements led to a LEA in the first task which contrasted with the REA observed in the other task when melodies differed by all pitches. A possible confounding (fusion of the common pitches) prevents comparison of the tasks for melodies differing by a single pitch. The role of the extent of melody differences was further investigated in a second experiment by changing melodies on one, two, or three notes. No effect of material was observed on ear asymmetries. Task demands appeared as the most critical determinant of ear differences and are discussed in terms of their particular influence on the adoption of an analytic or holistic processing mode. Male subjects were found to be more responsive than females to analytic processing suggestions.     

Habit reversal treatment: Learning an incompatible response or increasing the subject's awareness?

The elements of the Habit Reversal Treatment Package developed by Azrin and Nunn (1973) to counteract nervous habits were systematically analysed. Fifty nail biters (92% reported biting their nails for more than 5 yr) were randomly assigned to one of the following treatments: Habit Reversal, Habit Reversal and Self-Monitoring, Self-Monitoring, Self-Monitoring and Daily Graph Plotting, Waiting List control, Pictures of both hands were taken prior to the commencement of treatment and at 6 and 12 weeks after treatment termination. The results showed that the four treatment groups improved equally compared with the control subjects. Such data cast doubt on the importance of learning an incompatible response in Habit Reversal Treatment. An alternative explanation based on increasing the subject's awareness is put forward.     

Listening to speech while retaining music: What happens to the right-ear advantage?

On each trial, subjects were played a dichotic pair of syllables differing in the consonant (/ba/, /da/, /ga/) or in the vowel (/ba/, /b?/, /bi/). The pair of syllables was preceded by a melody, or a sentence, and followed by the same or a different melody, or sentence. Subjects either had to retain the first piece of additional material or were free to ignore it. The different combinations of phonemic contrast, additional material, and instruction concerning the additional material were used in different sessions. In each case, the main task of the subjects was to respond to the presence or the absence of the target /ba/ on the ear previously indicated. There was no effect of context on relative ear accuracy, but the right-ear advantage observed for consonants in response latency when subjects retained a sentence gave way to a small nonsignificant left-ear advantage when subjects retained a melody. Right-ear advantage in response latencies was also observed for vowels in the verbal context, but the contextual effect, although in the same direction as for consonants, was very slight. The implications of contextual effects for a theory of the determinants of the auditory laterality effects are discussed.     

Psychosis,symbol, affectivity 1: etiopathogenesis and treatment through analytical psychology

This is the first of two papers concerning our study into an integrated approach to psychotic disorders, conducted at the University of Palermo’s Psychiatry Unit Polyclinic over approximately 15 years. Here we will explore and reflect upon the acute psychotic condition mainly from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, while in the second paper we will explore the clinical perspective. From the point of view of psychopathology, and in the light of C.G. Jung’s conceptualization of analytical psychology, as well as calling on contributions from other authors from the systemic-relational and post-psychoanalytic field, we will clarify the ideas developed over these last few years by our team. From a more speculative perspective we will advance new interpretive hypotheses in an attempt to thoroughly understand the nature of the psychotic condition, both on a psychodynamic relational and a neuroscientific level. The paper describes how we revised our understanding of psychosis from a brain disease to a process aimed at the rearrangement of psychic functioning, as anticipated by John Weir Perry nearly 40 years ago.