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Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):227-243
The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers. 相似文献
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Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):165-178
Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their
violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons,
which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism
of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants
thereof boost it. Thus, Kamm’s account is incomplete at best. And when, to address this incompleteness, it is insisted that
our moral worth derives from specific moral statuses, the inviolability account comes to seem deficient because it begs the
question against those who are not initially persuaded that minimizing violations are impermissible.
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Kasper Lippert-RasmussenEmail: |
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