Oedipus and Cain: Brothers in arms

Abstract

It is widely known that Freud gives Oedipus a central place in both his psychoanalytic theory and praxis. Freud introduces the Oedipus myth as the crucial key for understanding the tragedy of human life. One of the most problematic issues innate to the human condition is aggression. This paper argues: (1) that Freud's insights into human aggression can at the very least be viewed as one-sided and problematic; and (2) that the heuristic potential of the Oedipus myth is, correspondingly, limited. It considers how the Hungarian psychiatrist and analyst, Lipót Szondi, tries to bridge this gap using the myth of Cain and Abel. The aim of this paper is to explore how Szondi's interpretation of this myth offers a much more subtle approach to human aggression. Szondi's alternative and distinctive look at aggressive phenomena offers an exciting and fruitful addition to Freud's interpretation as exclusively referring to sadism and/or the death instinct. This contribution wants to highlight Szondi's amendment to Freud's Oedipus and aims to show that psychoanalysis can benefit from taking into account the mythical figures of Cain and Abel.     

Perceptions of school psychology services from a staff perspective

This investigation examined how staff in an elementary school district perceived their school psychologists and how these perceptions differed across components of service and staff groups. We developed a School Psychological Service Questionnaire and then analyzed responses from regular education teachers, special education teachers, principals, and school psychologists in an urban school district. Although the findings are numerous, most noteworthy are, first, that consumer groups in the district had different perceptions than school psychologists about how school psychologists allocate their time and how this time should be allocated in the future. Second, consumer perceptions of school psychologists' knowledge generally were favorable. Third, in terms of domains appropriate for involvement by school psychologists, a factor analysis of consumer ratings revealed three relatively clear dimensions of recommended service provision — special education activities, interpersonal or school-climate activities, and administrative responsibilities. Fourth, the helpfulness of school psychologists, as perceived by consumers, related positively to frequency of contact. Fifth, differences in perception of school psychological services were evident across staff groups. Finally, comparisons between master's level and doctoral level school psychologists suggested numerous differences in how the staff perceived these service providers.     

Zu Einem Methodologischen Interpretationskonstruktionismus

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level.     

MAN OF SCIENCE,MAN OF FAITH: PIERRE DUHEM'S “PHYSIQUE DE CROYANT”

The essay “Physique de croyant” is an important statement of Pierre Duhem's position on the relation between his science and his religion. Duhem trod a difficult path, some might say an impossible one, in Republican France because he was both a physicist and a devout Catholic. In this essay, using “Physique de croyant” as a touchstone, I explore the way in which he tried to reconcile his conflicting allegiances. There are several strands in Duhem's strategy that need to be teased out. First, Duhem sought to defend his science against the charge that it was materialist and atheist. He did this with his claim, usually called the autonomy thesis, that physics and metaphysics are fundamentally different enterprises—that physics, properly conducted, has no metaphysical implications and requires no metaphysical support. This did not deny metaphysics its rightful territory. Second, Duhem used his segregationist position to defend the Roman Catholic Church against the assaults of the positivist scientism then in favor with the Republicans. Third, he also sought to protect his science against fellow Catholics who wanted to use it for polemical purposes. I develop and evaluate these lines of defense.