The salience of the self in responses to inequity

Previous research has shown that people strive to conform with the standards of significant others in distributive justice. The present research was concerned with the role of attention to the self in the same paradigm. If people are motivated to personally evaluate their own behavior as fair, then self-focus should result in heightened attempts to redress an overpayment inequity. After the subject's criterion of a fair wage was assessed, they were paid either that amount or double it. Orthogonal to this manipulation, subjects were either made objectively self-aware (OSA) or not, by the presence or absence of a mirror. Consistent with the hypothesis, overpaid OSA subjects did more work, but of a poorer quality, than overpaid not-OSA subjects. This was taken as evidence of more zealous attempts to restore a sense of equity, implicating a greater personal need to eliminate the injustice when the discrepancy between pay level and a personal standard of fairness was made more prominent to the self.     

Indirect social influence: Change in judgmental process or anticipatory conformity?

In three experiments, subjects imposed sentence in a criminal case before and after reading the harsh sentence imposed by the trial judge. They then read and imposed sentence in another case. In one experimental condition the subjects anticipated learning the judge's sentence in Case 2; in the other condition they were told not to anticipate learning the judge's sentence. Control subjects made their judgments without ever seeing the judge's sentence. Direct influence was the change in sentences within cases; indirect influence was the difference between initial sentences in Cases 1 and 2. Though direct influence was minimal and not significant, indirect influence was substantial, and was greater in the anticipation than no-anticipation than control conditions, indicating that both modification of the judgmental process and anticipatory conformity were operating. Indirect influence may then reflect a change of either type, depending on a number of methodological and other factors.     

Across-reinforcement blocking effects in a mediational test of the CS's general signaling property

Rats received Pavlovian aversive (shock) conditioning in which white noise was established for independent groups as a CS+, CSo, or CS−. Then, in an easy (light-dark) T-maze discrimination, the CS was presented either immediately following choice (Locus 1) or at the food cup in the goal (Locus 3), contingent upon either a food-reinforced (right) or nonreinforced (wrong) response. When presented at Locus 3, the CS+ facilitated and the CS− retarded learning for CS/right subjects, with these effects being exactly reversed but somewhat less pronounced for CS/wrong subjects. However, when the CS was presented at Locus 1, the CS+ and CS− effects for both response contingencies were attenuated. These findings oppose an interpretation of the CS's function as a general cue or transformed signal for the presence or absence of the new appetitive reinforcer and argue instead for across-reinforcement blocking effects: By signaling in the presence of food reinforcement an outcome (safety or shock) which is consonant with or discrepant from the “good” outcome obtained, the CS− blocks (retards) and the CS+ counterblocks (enhances) the association of food reinforcement and the S^D; conversely, in the presence of nonreinforcement (a “bad” outcome), the CS− counterblocks and the CS+ blocks inhibitory conditioning to the S^Δ. As in Kamin's (1968) original research, such effects are attenuated when the CS is presented early in the compound, distal to the reinforcer.     

A different form of agraphia: Syntactic writing errors in patients with motor speech and movement disorders

Three patients are described who displayed syntactic writing errors in combination with a motor speech disturbance and impaired motor limb function. Two of the patients had bulbar amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Agraphia appeared when verbal communication was no longer possible. Autopsy in one patient disclosed only lesions consistent with ALS. The third patient had palilalia and chorea and, although not aphasic, his written language showed persistent syntactic errors. We hypothesize that the agraphia in these patients occurred because of the combination of disordered feedback from the motor speech apparatus and limbs.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

Harry Potter and Contemporary Magic: Fantasy Literature,Popular Culture,and the Representation of Religion

This article discusses the reasons for the religious reactions to the Harry Potter novels, arguing that the books contribute to, and reflect, the reconfiguration of religion in contemporary society. The article analyses the media qualities of fantasy literature and the specific representation of magic in the novels and argues that these aspects form an important part of the reasons for the religious reactions. Fantasy literature and other popular culture that represents and mediates religious expressions and phenomena actively contribute to the reconfiguration of, and communication about, religion in contemporary society and are thus of consequence for what we understand ‘religion’ to be in the study of religions.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis>

My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the “semi” in “semicompatibilism”. I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared stalemate rather than victory. In my view, Fischer’s view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the past. FP: For any action Y, agent S and time t, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y at t. I argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer’s approach to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles.     

Collins’s incorrect depiction of Dreyfus’s critique of artificial intelligence

Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence. I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology for empirical scientific research.