Synthesizer 1.0: A varying-coefficient meta-analytic tool

Meta-analysis has become an indispensable tool for reaching accurate and representative conclusions about phenomena of interest within a research literature. However, in order for meta-analytic computations to provide accurate estimates of population parameters (e.g., a population correlation), underlying statistical models need to be both efficient and unbiased. Current fixed-effect (i.e., constant-coefficient) models that assume a common effect for all research results perform poorly under conditions of effect size heterogeneity, whereas current random-effects (i.e., random-coefficient) models require unrealistic assumptions about random sampling of observed effect sizes from a normally distributed superpopulation. This article describes a free statistical software tool that employs a varying-coefficient model recently proposed by Bonett (2008, 2009). The software (Synthesizer 1.0) employs procedures that do not require effect homogeneity or random sampling of effect sizes from a normal distribution. It may be used to meta-analyze correlations, alpha reliabilities, and standardized mean differences. The Synthesizer tool for Microsoft Excel 2007 may be downloaded from the author at www .psychology.iastate.edu/~zkrizan/Synthesizer.htm or as a supplement to the article at http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

What is implicit about implicit self-esteem?

Modern advances in implicit social cognition enabled development of novel methods for examining less conscious aspects of self-worth. The use of such “implicit” measures of self-esteem is based on the premise that because they circumvent direct self-reports, they must capture more implicit, automatic components of self-evaluation. Whether self-evaluations captured via “implicit” measures actually have these functional properties requires empirical verification, however. This investigation critically examined the evidence for such assumptions regarding the Name-Letter Test, one of the most popular implicit measures, by adopting a phenomenological approach. The results revealed that many respondents were aware of the self-relevant nature of the measure at the time of assessment. Moreover, at least some variance in the “implicit” measurement outcomes was accounted for by relevant conscious beliefs, particularly among those aware of the self-relevant nature of the task. The implications for understanding the nature and assessment of unconscious self-worth are discussed.     

Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

Implicit self-esteem in the context of trait models of personality

Although the basic dimensions of personality are strongly associated with individual differences in (explicit) self-esteem, the relations between personality and implicit self-esteem have not been systematically researched. In three studies, implicit self-evaluations (measured both with the Name-Letter Test and the self-esteem IAT) were generally independent of personality self-reports (Studies 1–3) and peer-reports (Study 3). Moreover, the implicit measures were also independent of one another. Discussion centers on the problems and promises of implicit measures as indicators of individual differences in self-esteem and their relation to personality.     

Group polarization and choice‐dilemmas: how important is self‐categorization?

Self‐categorization proponents (e.g., Turner, 1991 ) assume that group polarization occurs because discussants wish to differentiate themselves from outgroup positions and implicitly think of such groups even when they are not specifically mentioned. Ingroup/outgroup salience is thought to heighten such effects. To examine this view, we had participants discuss Choice Dilemma items either with or without explicit knowledge of outgroup positions. Contrary to a self‐categorization account, this manipulation of outgroup salience did not affect the degree of group polarization. In addition, rating measures revealed little spontaneous consideration of outgroup positions on the part of participants, nor was consideration of outgroup positions related to degree of polarization. Group members did show evidence of ingroup identification, but this identification was unrelated to participants' post‐discussion conformity to the group consensus. Taken as a whole, these results suggest distinct limits to the self‐categorization interpretation of group polarization involving Choice Dilemmas. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Envy divides the two faces of narcissism

In this article, we test psychodynamic assumptions about envy and narcissism by examining malicious envy in the context of narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability. In Study 1, students (N = 192) and community adults (N = 161) completed trait measures of narcissism, envy, and schadenfreude. In Study 2 (N = 121), participants relived an episode of envy, and cognitive‐affective components of envy were examined in the context of both self‐ and informant reports of their envy and narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 69), narcissism was linked to reports of envy covertly induced in the laboratory. Vulnerable narcissism was strongly and consistently related to dispositional envy and schadenfreude (Studies 1–2), as well as to all cognitive‐affective components of envy (Study 2). Furthermore, it facilitated envy and schadenfreude toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). Grandiose narcissism was slightly negatively related to dispositional envy (Studies 1–2), and it did not predict informant reports of envy or cognitive‐affective components of the emotion (Study 2). Finally, it did not exacerbate envy, hostility, or resentment toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). The results suggest envy is a central emotion in the lives of those with narcissistic vulnerability and imply that envy should be reconsidered as a symptom accompanying grandiose features in the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder.     

Cultural Influences on Number Preferences: Christmas and Grading Systems

People consistently prefer numbers associated with themselves (e.g., birth dates) over other numbers. We argue that such number preferences are also shaped by cultural influences, such as customs regarding the day on which Christmas is celebrated and customs regarding ranking of numerals used in national school’s grading system. Across 6 different countries (N = 657), the day on which Christmas is celebrated had an influence on the preference for the numbers 24 vs. 25, and numbers used for better grades were uniformly rated better than numbers used for poorer grades. If grading did not involve numbers (e.g., letters A to F), then no effect appeared.

     

Testing four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect: Single- and multi-item entities as comparison targets and referents

In six experiments, we tested four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect (B/WTA) by manipulating the number of items comprising the target or referent of direct comparison. A single-item target tended to be rated more extremely than a single-item or a multi-item referent (Experiments 1–3). No B/WTA was obtained, however, when a multi-item target was compared with either a single- or multi-item referent (Experiments 4 and 5). A bias favoring a multi-item target was found only if cohesiveness among the items was increased through instructions (Experiment 6). The Unique-Attributes Hypothesis generally provided the best explanation the findings; the focalism explanation also demonstrated some empirical viability. The results suggest that important preferential decision-making outcomes can be affected by both the number of items and whether items are strategically manipulated to serve as targets or referents of comparison.     

Personality and Sleep: Neuroticism and Conscientiousness Predict Behaviourally Recorded Sleep Years Later

Sleep is one key feature of people's lives that defines their daily routine and reflects overall health and well‐being. To test the relevance of personality for core aspects of sleep, we examined if personality traits across the five broad personality domains predicted behaviourally recorded, week‐long sleep characteristics up to five years later (alongside subjective sleep quality). Data from 382 participants (63% female, aged 34–82 years) were drawn from the longitudinal study on Midlife in the United States Study—Biomarker project. In terms of mean tendencies, both neuroticism and conscientiousness signalled more sleep continuity (fewer interruptions) alongside better subjective quality. In terms of intra‐individual sleep variability, neuroticism predicted more variability in sleep duration, continuity, and subjective sleep quality, while conscientiousness predicted less variability in sleep duration and sleep continuity. Extraversion, agreeableness, and openness traits did not generally foreshadow behaviourally recoded sleep, only higher ratings of subjective quality. These links were robust to the impact of demographic factors and were not moderated by the duration of time between personality and sleep assessments. The findings distinguish which personality traits foreshadow core aspects of sleep and also implicate multiple traits as predictors of variability, not just mean tendencies, in behaviourally recorded sleep. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Wishful Thinking about the Future: Does Desire Impact Optimism?

The notion that desire for an outcome inflates optimism about that outcome has been dubbed the desirability bias or wishful thinking. In this paper, we discuss the importance of distinguishing wishful thinking from the more general concept of motivated reasoning, and we explain why documenting overoptimism or correlations between preferences and optimism is not sufficient to infer a desirability bias. Then, we discuss results from a review and meta-analysis of the experimental literature on wishful thinking. These findings, in conjunction with more recent work, not only highlight important moderators and mediators of the desirability bias but also point out limitations of the empirical research on the bias. These results also reveal an important difference between how likelihood judgments and discrete outcome predictions respond to desirability of outcomes. We conclude by presenting avenues for future research useful for understanding wishful thinking's manifestation in everyday environments and its integration with related phenomena.