The group's search for wholeness: A Jungian perspective

In attempting to address a common group concept from a Jungian perspective, this paper starts by taking competing models as all contributing to laying the foundations of a generally accepted general theory. The theory of the invisible group as elaborated by Agazarian and Peters is taken as one of the most clearly stated models of the group-as-a-whole, and Jung's more obscure concepts of the self, the archetypes, individuation and the collective unconscious are used, not as a competing theory, but as a way of enlarging and enriching what is already known. First an outline of the invisible group theory is given. The theoretical clarity of this model is then contrasted with the richness of the group's fantasies about itself, and it is suggested that these point to a group self which represents the group-as-a-whole. Seen in this way, there are many similarities with Jung's treatment of individuation at an individual level, which are drawn out. Although Jung's model is more difficult to grasp in its paradoxes, it is often nearer to the experience of the group as it continuously and progressively defines itself. Finally, the limitations of models that try to define the group-as-a-whole are examined by looking at the boundaries between the group-as-an-individual and the outside world, which parallels Jung's attempts to view the self as both being the individual and transcending the limits of the individual, so that the group can be seen to develop in its search for wholeness.     

Kant and the Pleasure of “Mere Reflection”

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.     

Your Self: did you find it or did you make it?

Abstract: In this paper ¹ 1 This is a slightly edited version of a paper that was pre‐circulated to members of the Society of Analtyical Psychology for discussion at the monthly meeting of the ‘analytic group’ on 4^th November 1991. Sub‐headings and some references have been added by the Editor, Warren Colman.
, written in draft form in 1991 and now posthumously published, the late Louis Zinkin ² 2 The late Louis Zinkin was a practising analytical psychologist and group analyst, a training analyst of the S.A.P., honorary consultant psychotherapist and senior lecturer at St George's Hospital, London, and associate of the Group‐Analytic Practice, London. He died on 13^th March 1993.
presents a constructivist view of the self. He considers some of the paradoxes in Jungian definitions of the self and compares these to Winnicott's ‘forbidden question’ regarding the transitional object: ‘Did you find it or did you make it?’. He argues that, for the purposes of a coherent scientific theory, these apparent paradoxes need to be formulated in an internally consistent way. Bemused by the many contradictions in Jung's thinking, he proposes making a fresh start by thinking in terms of people in social interaction with each other rather than as solitary subjects, as Jung did. This leads him to the view that the self comes into existence through continuing interaction with other people. Drawing on the work of Harré and Vygotsky, he suggests that the public self is prior to the private self and that one becomes real through recognition by other people in and through language and culture. The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Society of Analytical Psychology in November 1991 and an edited version of the taped discussion follows.     

Two Kinds of Feminist Philosophy

This article makes a distinction between two kinds of feminist philosophy. One looks ‘up’ to the realm of philosophy and aims to intervene in this realm in order to make it feminist. The other looks ‘down’ to the world of human experience and aims to make it feminist. This article argues that feminist philosophers’ efforts are better spent on the second kind of feminist philosophy. Feminist philosophy can better achieve its aims by applying philosophy to the critical analysis of women's lives and gender norms, rather than by attempting to change the discipline of philosophy itself.