Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.     

Empathy,Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz

When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in the hands of contemporary simulationists—with various accounts of empathy found in the phenomenological tradition. I discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein and Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times divergent, alternatives. I then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken up and modified by Schutz—a thinker whose contribution to the analysis of interpersonal understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent years.     

Internalism,externalism, and transcendental idealism

The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation.     

Simulation, projection and empathy

Simulationists have recently started to employ the term “empathy” when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler’s classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding—in particular the understanding of emotional expressions—that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines.     

Brain,Mind, World: Predictive Coding,Neo-Kantianism,and Transcendental Idealism

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserl’s transcendental idealism?     

胡塞尔先验哲学的交互主体性转折

在本世纪,语言哲学对古典心智哲学的批评常常被理解为哲学范式一个不可逆的决定性转向,即从主体哲学转向了交互主体性哲学。这一转向在阿佩尔和哈贝马斯的著作中不断得到认同。因此,阿佩尔鲜明地倡导先验哲学向交互主体性哲学的转折。不是单个的、自我-意识自我,而是语言共同体,即交互主体性,才应被看作为基本的先验框架。阿佩尔和哈贝马斯都认为,哲学范式的这一转变对现象学提出了一个决定性的挑战,并且,从他们的立场出发,讨论的结果经常是否定性的。他们把胡塞尔的现象学看成是古典主体哲学最后一次也许是最有力的尝试,并竭力揭示其唯我论的荒谬和困境,希望借此来显示他们自己的倾向的合理性。简而言之,他们声称,胡塞尔所运用的真理和意义概念无视其内在的交互主体性特征;胡塞尔的理论不能解释那种表征交互主体性的特定的主体-主体的对称性关联,它完全受制于一种唯我论的、定位于主体-客体的意向性概念;并且最后,胡塞尔自主的主体性概念也是不可接受的,因为自我-意识和个体性远非自我一般(sui generis),而只是那个更为基础的社会化过程的产物。     

Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality

The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.