谈谈个人对智力落后儿童早期干预的看法

本文作者根据从事智力落后儿童的早期干预教学研究的实践经验对当今在我国开展早期干预的必要性以及早期干预的目的、设置的理由、内容、方式、对象、教师的条件、效果的评价以及开展的步骤等9个问题,提出了自己的看法。     

TOWARD A MENTALISTIC ACCOUNT OF EARLY PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONING

Recent investigations of early psychological understanding have revealed three key findings. First, young infants attribute goals and dispositions to any entity they perceive as an agent, whether human or non-human. Second, when interpreting an agent's actions in a scene, young infants take into account the agent's representation of the scene, even if this representation is less complete than their own. Third, at least by the second year of life, infants recognize that agents can hold false beliefs about a scene. Together, these findings support a system-based, mentalistic account of early psychological reasoning.     

The attribution of attention: 9-month-olds' interpretation of gaze as goal-directed action

The current study distinguishes between attributions of goal-directed perception (i.e. attention) and non-goal-directed perception to examine 9-month-olds' interpretation of others' head and eye turns. In a looking time task, 9-month-olds encoded the relationship between an actor's head and eye turns and a target object if the head and eye turns were embedded in a sequence of multiple, variable actions with equifinal outcomes, but not otherwise. This evidence supports the claim that infants of this age may attribute perception, at least goal-directed perception, to others and undermines arguments that gaze-following at this age consists only of uninterpreted reflexes. The evidence also suggests alternative interpretations of the typical errors infants make in standard gaze-following procedures. Implications for infants' understanding of perception and attention in both human and non-human agents are discussed.     

初生至三十六个月儿童智能发展的追踪研究(一)

本研究用追踪法、根据智能预测表对29名儿童从初生至三十六个月进行智能测查,并向家长作全面了解,得出:(1)初生至三十六个月儿童智能发展的规律;(2)影响智能发展的因素。 作者并对发展类型、完成认知作业的思维活动水平、个性对发展的影响及早期智能的主要指标等进行了讨论。     

弱智儿童在上课时和自由活动时的行为表现

研究了４１名弱智儿童。采用时间样本的方法收集材料,以期从动态角度了解弱智儿童在上课时和自由活动时的行为表现。按园别和智力落后程度两个方面对被试在上课时的８大类行为和自由活动时的７大类行为进行了分析。结果发现：班级人数、不同教学方法和智力落后程度与弱智儿童的行为表现有关。还对收集材料的方法、园别和智力落后程度与弱智儿童的行为表现的关系、高频率的自娱活动等,进行了讨论。最后,根据研究结果对教师提出了教学建议。     

智力落后儿童用左、右手抓物的实验研究

本研究旨在探讨智力落后儿童在实验情景下用手抓物的方式、及其与大脑侧偏化的关系。结果表明:(1)智力落后儿童混用手情况多。被试在取物时,使用左手或右手次数的比率平均约为1:2,相当于1—2岁正常儿童用左、右手取物的比率;(2)性别与年龄对落后儿童用手方式无明显影响;(3)病情等级对用手方式有明显影响:轻度智力落后儿童使用左、右手的比率大于中、重度智力落后儿童的同样比率;(4)智力落后儿童抓物的线索在四个实验中不完全相同:实验Ⅰ至Ⅲ的线索为位置(近手),实验Ⅳ为对实验用具的喜爱;(5)在混用手与大脑侧偏化(或优势脑未分化)不完善之间,可能有直接关系。此问题尚需进一步研究。     

Followers' unclear demands during the COVID-19 pandemic can undermine leaders' well-being: A moderated mediation model from an entrapment perspective

Although effective leaders are important for reducing employee stress during the COVID-19, limited studies have examined how follower behaviors can influence leader stress and well-being during the COVID-19. This study draws on defeat-entrapment theory to examine how followers' unclear demands during the COVID-19 consequently impact leaders' psychological states and well-being. We conducted a three-wave time-lagged investigation with a sample of 281 leaders in the United Kingdom and found that followers' unclear demands could generate feelings of entrapment in leaders, leading to decreased levels of well-being outcomes in leaders. Importantly, we found that leaders who have higher levels of leadership responsibility during the COVID-19 are likely to feel trapped by followers' unclear demands. They are also likely to face higher levels of feelings of entrapment and impaired well-being compared with leaders who have lower levels of leadership responsibility. We discuss the implications for theories and practices, as well as directions for future research.     

Do you see what I see? Infants’ reasoning about others’ incomplete perceptions

Twelve‐month‐olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal‐directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16‐month‐olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants’ side) but green on the back (the agent’s side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent’s perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green‐front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed.     

When the ordinary seems unexpected: evidence for incremental physical knowledge in young infants

According to a recent account of infants' acquisition of their physical knowledge, the incremental-knowledge account, infants form distinct event categories, such as occlusion, containment, support, and collision events. In each category, infants identify one or more vectors which correspond to distinct problems that must be solved. For each vector, infants acquire a sequence of variables that enables them to predict outcomes within the vector more and more accurately over time. This account predicts that infants who have acquired only a few of the variables in a sequence should err in two ways in violation-of-expectation tasks: (1) they should view impossible events consistent with their incomplete knowledge as expected (errors of omission), and (2) they should view possible events inconsistent with their incomplete knowledge as unexpected (errors of commission). Many reports have shown that infants who have not yet identified a variable in an event category produce errors of omission: they fail to view impossible events involving the variable as unexpected. However, there has been no report revealing errors of commission in infants' responses to possible events. The present research examined whether 3- and 2.5-month-old infants, whose knowledge of occlusion events is very limited, would produce errors of commission as well as errors of omission when responding to these events. At 3 months of age, infants viewed as unexpected a possible event in which a tall cylinder became visible when passing behind a tall screen with a very large opening extending from its upper edge. At 2.5 months, infants viewed as unexpected a possible event in which a tall cylinder became visible when passing behind a tall screen with a very large opening extending from its lower edge. These findings provide a new kind of evidence for the incremental-knowledge account, and more generally for the notion that infants, like older children and adults, engage in rule-based reasoning about physical events.