Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring *

According to Parfit one of the main weaknesses of subjectivism is its inability to account for our intuition that future reasons have present authority. Parfit is only partly right about the contours of our intuition however he does have a point: sometimes our future reasons do have authority in current deliberation. Subjectivists who grappled with his challenge have organized themselves along two battle lines: those who think that only current desires are fundamental sources of reasons and those who think that future desires are also fundamental sources of reasons. I belong to the first camp but I believe that focusing on the question of fundamentality obscures the real issue. The key to addressing Parfit's challenge is to shift our focus to a different question. We should ask ourselves what are the best policies to adopt towards our future reasons. Using resources developed by Bratman and Raz, and building on the insight that we often fail to recognize our true current concerns, I argue that we are sometimes justified in thinking of, and therefore treating, our future reasons as having present authority.     

Perceptual integrality of sex and identity of faces: further evidence for the single-route hypothesis

According to current face-recognition models, sex (gender) and identity of faces are processed in independent routes. Using Garner's speeded-classification task, the authors provide evidence that sex and identity are processed within a single route. In 4 experiments, participants judged the sex or the familiarity of faces while the other dimension remained constant or varied randomly. The results of Experiments 1, 2, and 4 showed that participants could not selectively attend to either sex or familiarity without being influenced by the other, irrelevant dimension. Thus, identity and sex are integral dimensions. Experiment 3 provided evidence that when sex judgments are based on hairstyle heuristics, false separability can emerge. The findings support the claim that identity and sex are processed within a single route.     

The origins of levels-of-processing effects in a conceptual test: evidence for automatic influences of memory from the process-dissociation procedure

In three experiments, we explored automatic influences of memory in a conceptual memory task, as affected by a levels-of-processing (LoP) manipulation. We also explored the origins of the LoP effect by examining whether the effect emerged only when participants in the shallow condition truncated the perceptual processing (the lexical-processing hypothesis) or even when the entire word was encoded in this condition (the conceptual-processing hypothesis). Using the process-dissociation procedure and an implicit association-generation task, we found that the deep encoding condition yielded higher estimates of automatic influences than the shallow condition. In support of the conceptual processing hypothesis, the LoP effect was found even when the shallow task did not lead to truncated processing of the lexical units. We suggest that encoding for meaning is a prerequisite for automatic processing on conceptual tests of memory.     

Repetition priming for familiar and unfamiliar faces in a sex-judgment task: evidence for a common route for the processing of sex and identity

Repetition priming for faces was examined in a sex-judgment task given at test. Priming was found for edited, hair-removed photos of unfamiliar and familiar faces after a single presentation at study. Priming was also observed for the edited photos when study and test faces were different exemplars. Priming was not observed, however, when sex judgments were made at test to photos of complete, hair-included faces. These findings were interpreted by assuming that, for edited faces, internal features are attended, thereby activating face-recognition units that support performance. With complete faces, however, participants provided speeded judgments based primarily on the hairstyle. It is suggested that, for both familiar and unfamiliar faces, a common locus exists for the processing of the identity of a face and its sex. A single face-recognition model for the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces is advocated.     

Probing memory with conceptual cues at multiple retention intervals: a comparison of forgetting rates on implicit and explicit tests

The time courses for implicit and explicit conceptual tests of memory were compared in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants encoded target words by judging the apparent pleasantness of their meaning. Immediately thereafter or 48 h later, retrieval cues were presented to different groups of participants for either an implicit or an explicit free-association task. Whereas explicit test performance showed a decline over the 48-h delay, implicit test performance was statistically unaltered. In Experiment 2, memory was tested at five retention intervals, lasting up to 3 weeks. The forgetting functions of both implicit and explicit tests conformed to a logarithmic function. Despite the large conceptual priming effect, which resulted from relational encoding instructions, implicit memory performance still declined at a much slower rate than did performance on the cued-recall test. We argue that because nominal conceptual cues were held constant across the implicit and the explicit conditions, the observed dissociation in performance supports a memory systems approach.     

The conditional-recency dissociation is confounded with nominal recency: Should unitary models of memory still be devaluated?

The conditional-recency dissociation between immediate and delayed free recall FR; Farrell (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 324–347, 2010) has critical implications regarding the prolonged debate between unitary and dual-store models of memory. In immediate FR, when the availability of items is controlled for, the recency of the final list item increases across the first few output positions. No such increase is found in delayed FR, with a trend in the opposite direction. This dissociation challenges temporal context TCM; Howard & Kahana (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 46, 269–299, 2002) and distinctiveness SIMPLE; Brown, Neath, & Chater (Psychological Review, 114, 539–576, 2007) unitary models of memory and suggests the involvement of a short-term buffer in immediate FR. We show that this dissociation is confounded with the different magnitudes of nominal recency (i.e., the prevalence of the final list item) found in immediate as compared to delayed FR. By reshuffling output orders and comparing the empirical results to those of a null hypothesis of no output-order effect, we controlled for the greater prevalence of the final list item that has been observed in immediate FR. Under this control, we found no evidence for a dissociation in the tendency to recall the final list item across output positions. This finding suggests that the conditional-recency dissociation imposes no new constraint on unitary models of memory. More generally, we demonstrate how biases that influence measures of output-order tendencies (e.g., conditional recency) can be controlled for, thus yielding “purer” measures of these variables.     

On the Normative Authority of Others

Gibbard argues that we have to accord others a certain fundamental epistemic normative authority. To avoid skepticism we must accept some of our normative principles; since the influence of others was a major factor in the process that led us to adopt them, we must accord others fundamental normative authority. The argument ought to be of interest to a wide range of philosophers, since while compatible with expressivism, it does not assume expressivism. It has rarely been discussed. In this essay I analyse the argument, explain why it is not sound and make a suggestion about the real upshot of the rejection of normative skepticism.     

Yeshayahu Leibowitz's Axiology

This essay explicates and assesses Yeshayahu Leibowitz's axiology, and its relation to the value he claims halakhic (Jewish legal) practice instantiates: service of God. It argues that, while Leibowitz often affirms a relativist “polytheism of values,” he sometimes implies that the religious value is the “most valuable value.” However, this is not due to its material content, because serving God is objectively best; rather it is because, consonant with his negative theology, it most fully instantiates the formal properties of a value. The essay concludes by assessing the tenability of Leibowitz's metaethics as well as the argument for positing this contentless value as an intention and reason for halakhic practice.