Teaching Religious Studies to Undergraduate Non‐Majors at Seoul National University,South Korea

This essay is part of a collection of short essays solicited from authors around the globe who teach religion courses at the college level (not for professional religious training). They are published together with an introduction in Teaching Theology and Religion 18:3 (July 2015). The authors were asked to provide a brief overview of the curriculum, student learning goals, and pedagogical techniques employed in their courses.     

Dialogue in the Context of Development

Interfaith dialogue is much more than an intellectual activity of learning about and witnessing to the different religious convictions of the partners involved. Genuine dialogue often takes place in actual life situations. Thrown together into the common struggles of life, dialogue between people of different religious convictions becomes an inevitable way of life. Here is an illustration of such dialogue from Sri Lanka. In a deeply divided nation, facing many contradictions in its social and economic life, there are groups of people — Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and Muslims — committed to human development and, within that commitment, living in dialogue with one another. This is an abridged version of a paper entitled “How do we live the gospel today?” In the introductory part of the paper, not included here, the authors deal with the ashram tradition and the earlier movements in Sri Lanka for indigenization and development within the churches. The concluding sections have also been left out for reasons of space.     

Cultural differences in asymmetric beliefs of interpersonal knowledge in vertical and horizontal relationships

Previous studies have reported that our interpersonal knowledge shows an asymmetry; that is, we tend to believe that we know and understand other people's thoughts and feelings better than other people know and understand our own thoughts and feelings. In the present study, the authors compared American (114 men, 192 women) and Korean (99 men and 98 women) students to examine whether the asymmetry is greater in collectivistic than in individualistic culture in two types of relationships: horizontal (with best friends) and vertical (with parents). On all three items--Know, Understand, and Visibility--asymmetry was found for both horizontal and vertical relationships. Further, the Understand and Visibility items showed greater asymmetry for the Korean group than for the American group. It was concluded that asymmetry is greater in collectivistic than in individualistic culture. The cultural differences can be explained by self-consistency, sensitivity to social consequences, parent-child interaction, and living arrangement.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> as a Korean Culture-Bound Narcissism: Dealing with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> Through <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong</Emphasis>-Dynamics

This article explores a Korean culture-bound emotion called jeong-han, which shares similarities with narcissism and depression in terms of causes, formation processes, emotions, cognitions, and neurotic sufferings. This article has three main goals: 1) to report and describe the presence and experience of jeong-han among contemporary Koreans; 2) to compare jeong-han with narcissism and depression; and 3) to suggest an effective way of dealing with jeong-han through jeong-dynamics. In order to effectively help people with jeong-han both in counseling and ministry settings, providing jeong and facilitating jeong-dynamics in a small group or community setting can be helpful.     

The Intrinsic Quantum Nature of Nash Equilibrium Mixtures

In classical game theory the idea that players randomize between their actions according to a particular optimal probability distribution has always been viewed as puzzling. In this paper, we establish a fundamental connection between n-person normal form games and quantum mechanics (QM), which eliminates the conceptual problems of these random strategies. While the two theories have been regarded as distinct, our main theorem proves that if we do not give any other piece of information to a player in a game, than the payoff matrix—the axiom of “no-supplementary data” holds—then the state of mind of a rational player is algebraically isomorphic to a pure quantum state. The “no supplementary data” axiom is captured in a Lukasiewicz’s three-valued Kripke semantics wherein statements about whether a strategy or a belief of a player is rational are initially indeterminate i.e. neither true, nor false. As a corollary, we show that in a mixed Nash equilibrium, the knowledge structure of a player implies that probabilities must verify the standard “Born rule” postulate of QM. The puzzling “indifference condition” wherein each player must be rationally indifferent between all the pure actions of the support of his equilibrium strategy is resolved by his state of mind being described by a “quantum superposition” prior a player is asked to make a definite choice in a “measurement”. Finally, these results demonstrate that there is an intrinsic limitation to the predictions of game theory, on a par with the “irreducible randomness” of quantum physics.     

Knowledge,tracking, a bell here and a whistle there: Response to Ramachandran

Ramachandran (2015) has offered a new tracking analysis of knowledge which avoids the main difficulties afflicting the original tracking analyses of Dretske (1971) and Nozick (1981). This paper examines various problem cases for the analysis. We show that modifications can be made to handle most of the cases. But even when the bells and whistles we suggest are in place, counterexamples remain.

The first section describes Ramachandran's analysis and its many advantages. The next section shows that, as stated, the analysans fails to be necessary. The third section raises a problem for one of the analysis's two sufficiency conditions, while the fourth raises a problem for the other sufficiency condition. The fifth section draws conclusions.     

A qualitative investigation of mock-jurors' theories of emotion and reason

Mock-juries' deliberations of murder/manslaughter verdicts were videotaped and analysed. It was found that jurors' deliberations incorporated their theories of emotion and of the relationship between emotion and reason. Although there was agreement among jurors that emotions can overwhelm persons' rational faculties, there was disagreement between jurors voting for murder and for manslaughter as to the relationship of emotion and reason. Jurors voting for murder suggested emotion and reason are interdependent and that persons can simultaneously act from emotion as well as reason, whereas jurors voting for manslaughter suggested the two are independent and that they cannot operate simultaneously. The import of jurors' folk concepts of emotion and reason to the legal system, as well as to our understanding of emotions themselves, is discussed.