Hope as a Predictor of Interpersonal Suicide Risk

The current study hypothesized that (1) hope would negatively predict burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability to enact lethal injury; (2) hope would negatively predict suicidal ideation; and (3) the interpersonal suicide risk factors would predict suicidal ideation. Results indicated that hope negatively predicted burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, but positively predicted acquired capability to enact suicide. Contrary to our second hypothesis, hope did not predict suicidal ideation, but interpersonal risk factors for suicide predicted suicidal ideation. Results are discussed in terms of implications for hope theory and Joiner's (2005) interpersonal risk factors for suicide, and for clinical practice.     

Working memory theory of hippocampal function needs qualification

To compare the predictive value of "cognitive map" and "working memory" theories of hippocampal function, the performance of rats with dorsal hippocampal lesions was compared to that of control rats in a series of experiments. In Experiment I, experimental rats learned a spatial alternation task with normal ease, but in Experiment II, they were significantly impaired on an elevated 8-arm radial maze. In Experiment III, the performance of the same experimental and control rats was compared on two versions of a 16-arm enclosed radial maze. In the first version, carpet inserts served as cues to mark eight unbaited arms and each of the remaining arms contained one food pellet. While both experimental and control rats successfully avoided the set of cued arms, experimental rats reentered uncued baited arms more frequently than did control rats. In the second version no intramaze cues were provided, but the spatial distribution of baited and unbaited arms remained the same as that used in the first version. In this uncued version, experimental rats both entered unbaited arms and reentered baited arms more frequently than did control rats, i.e., they were impaired in both "reference" and "working" memory. These findings are compatible with the hypothesis that hippocampal lesions result in an impaired capacity to form cognitive maps but they are not compatible with the working memory hypothesis. Furthermore, twelve separate evaluators classed experimental rats as using fewer mapping and more orientation strategies than control rats in the 8-arm maze.     

Specification of direction and duration during programming of discrete sliding movements

Summary Two experiments on duration programming of a discrete sliding movement in choice reactions are reported. In the first experiment it was examined whether duration of movement might be preprogrammed when varied across sessions. The result suggested that programming of movement duration is dependent on direction uncertainty. Experiment 2 used the movement precue technique in an attempt to further examine programming of movement duration and direction. Movement duration, movement direction, movement form and foreperiod duration were manipulated. When duration was not precued, a duration effect was found, while precueing resulted in disappearance of the duration effect, demonstrating that duration of sliding movements can be preprogrammed. Moreover, (pre)programming duration was independent of direction uncertainty, supporting an independent order notion of programming of these response variables. Evidence that motor preparation comprises different processing stages was derived from the additive effects of foreperiod duration and of the movement variables duration and direction.     

An interview on energy,Christian theology,and ethics with Larry Rasmussen

An interview with Larry Rasmussen on his and others' work on Christian energy ethics. The introduction to the interview gives a brief outline of Christian energy ethics. Rasmussen then reflects on this body of scholarship, where it has been, where it needs to go, and what perspectives or methods it should draw on.     

Radical parochialism about reference

We can use radically different reference-schemes to generate the same truth-conditions for the sentences of a language. In this paper, we do three things. (1) Distinguish two arguments that deploy this observation to derive different conclusions. The first argues that reference is radically indeterminate: there is no fact of the matter what ordinary terms refer to. This threat is taken seriously and most contemporary metasemantic theories come with resources intended to rebut it. The second argues for radical parochialism about reference: it's a reflection of our parochial interests, rather than the nature of the subject matter, that our theorizing about language appeals to reference rather than another relation that generates the same truth-conditions. Rebuttals of the first argument cut no ice against the second, because radical parochialism is compatible with reference being determinate. (2) Argue that radical parochialism, like radical indeterminacy, would be shocking if true. (3) Argue that the case for radical parochialism turns on the explanatory purposes of “reference”-talk: on relatively “thin” conceptions, the argument goes through, and radical parochialism is (shockingly!) true; on richer conceptions, the argument can be blocked. We conclude that non-revisionists must endorse, and justify, a relatively rich conception of the explanatory purposes of “reference”-talk.     

Book reviews

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

BRIDGING PHYSIOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

R asmussen , E. T ranekjær . Bridging physiology and phenomenology in dynamic psychology. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1961, 2, 161–166.—It is important to distinguish between the immediately experienced (the phenomenological) and the physiological-neurological basis for the phenomenological world, e.g. between beta needs (subjectively experienced states of needing or wanting) and alpha needs (objectively defined, physiological needs). The concept of psychon is introduced and defined as a necessary and sufficient condition in the physiological-neurological system for the existence of a subjective experience; psychon bridges the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological world.