Defending truth values for indicative conditionals

Philosophical Studies - There is strong disagreement about whether indicative conditionals have truth values. In this paper, I present a new argument for the conclusion that indicative conditionals...     

On the Speed Sensitivity Parameter in the Lognormal Model for Response Times and Implications for High-Stakes Measurement Practice

In high-stakes testing, often multiple test forms are used and a common time limit is enforced. Test fairness requires that ability estimates must not depend on the administration of a specific test form. Such a requirement may be violated if speededness differs between test forms. The impact of not taking speed sensitivity into account on the comparability of test forms regarding speededness and ability estimation was investigated. The lognormal measurement model for response times by van der Linden was compared with its extension by Klein Entink, van der Linden, and Fox, which includes a speed sensitivity parameter. An empirical data example was used to show that the extended model can fit the data better than the model without speed sensitivity parameters. A simulation was conducted, which showed that test forms with different average speed sensitivity yielded substantial different ability estimates for slow test takers, especially for test takers with high ability. Therefore, the use of the extended lognormal model for response times is recommended for the calibration of item pools in high-stakes testing situations. Limitations to the proposed approach and further research questions are discussed.     

Risk's Place in Decision Rules

To handle epistemic and pragmatic risks, Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982, 1988) design a decision procedure for cases in which probabilities are indeterminate. Their procedure steps outside the traditional expected utility framework. Must it do this? Can the traditional framework handle risk? This paper argues that it can. The key is a comprehensive interpretation of an option's possible outcomes. Taking possible outcomes more broadly than Gärdenfors and Sahlin do, expected utility can give risk its due. In particular, Good's (1952) decision procedure adequately handles indeterminate probabilities and the risks they generate.     

A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice

I will characterize the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice game-theoretically. That is, I will introduce games whose solutions are the utilitarian and maximin distributions respectively. Then I will compare the rules by exploring similarities and differences between these games. This method of comparison has been carried out by others. But I characterize the two rules using games that involve bargaining within power structures. This new characterization better highlights the ethical differences between the rules.     

Utility and framing

Standard principles of rational decision assume that an option’s utility is both comprehensive and accessible. These features constrain interpretations of an option’s utility. This essay presents a way of understanding utility and laws of utility. It explains the relation between an option’s utility and its outcome’s utility and argues that an option’s utility is relative to a specification of the option. Utility’s relativity explains how a decision problem’s framing affects an option’s utility and its rationality even for an agent who is cognitively perfect and lacks only empirical information. The essay rewrites standard laws of utility to accommodate relativization to propositions’ specifications. The new laws are generalizations of the standard laws and yield them as special cases.     

Collective acts

Groups of people perform acts. For example, a committee passes a resolution, a team wins a game, and an orchestra performs a symphony. These collective acts may be evaluated for rationality. Take a committee??s passing a resolution. This act may be evaluated not only for fairness but also for rationality. Did it take account of all available information? Is the resolution consistent with the committee??s past resolutions? Standards of collective rationality apply to collective acts, that is, acts that groups of people perform. What makes a collective act evaluable for rationality? What methods of evaluation apply to collective acts? This paper addresses these two questions. Collective rationality is rationality??s extension from individuals to groups. The paper??s first few sections review key points about rationality. They identify the features of an individual??s act that make it evaluable for rationality and distinguish rationality??s methods of evaluating acts directly and indirectly controlled. This preliminary work yields general principles of rationality for all agents, both individuals and groups. Applying the general principles to groups answers the paper??s two main questions about collective rationality.