Do health beliefs about COVID-19 predict morbidity? A longitudinal study

In a highly powered (N ≈ 5000), six-months longitudinal study (December 2020-May 2021), we tested the assumption that beliefs concerning COVID-19 and the precautions against it predicted morbidity. Six months after having filled out a survey measuring beliefs about the disease and the precautions against it, participants reported if they were or had been ill with COVID-19. A lower likelihood of being or having been ill with COVID-19 was predicted by personal optimism concerning infection, perceived personal control over infection, perceived effectiveness of precautions, and self-reported personal or better-than-average adherence to the precautions. A higher likelihood of being or having been ill with COVID-19 was predicted by perceived personal control over a good outcome of an infection, egocentric impact perception concerning the impact of the disease, perceived difficulty of adherence to the precautions, and both personal and egocentric impact perception concerning the impact of the precautions. Comparative optimism did not predict morbidity, nor did personal optimism concerning severe disease or a good outcome, perceived personal control over severe disease, and moralization of the precautions. We discuss implications for public health communication.     

Further evidence for the role of inferential reasoning in forward blocking

Previous studies on human causal learning (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002) showed that secondary task difficulty (performing an easy vs. a difficult secondary task during the main causal learning task) and ceiling information (outcome occurs with a maximal vs. submaximal intensity) had an influence on forward blocking (i.e., lower causal ratings for cue T when AT+ trials are preceded by A+ trials than when no A+ trials are presented). We extended these studies by also examining self-reports of participants about the reasons behind their causal ratings. Blocking was found only for participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. Furthermore, secondary task difficulty and ceiling information influenced the number of participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. These findings point to a major impact of inferential reasoning in human causal learning.     

The odd-even effect in addition: an analysis per problem type

The odd-even effect is a well documented finding in the literature on mental arithmetic, at least for multiplication. It implies that false answers with the same parity as the correct answer are rejected more slowly than false answers with a different parity. For addition, this effect is not so well documented. The study by Krueger and Hallford (1984) is the only one that investigated odd-even effects for addition. However, they did not investigate odd-even effects per problem, even though there are indications that problem type can modulate odd-even effects for multiplication (Lemaire & Reder, 1999). Therefore, we wanted to get more insight into odd-even effects for addition by investigating odd-even effects per problem type. Our results extended the findings of Krueger and Hallford. First of all, we found an interaction between split and problem type. The most important and new result of present study, however, was a strong parity effect for E + E problems. We discuss our results in terms of two alternative explanations for odd-even effects, namely use of a parity rule on the one hand and familiarity with even outcomes on the other.     

Does imminent threat capture and hold attention?

According to models of attention and emotion, threat captures and holds attention. In behavioral tasks, robust evidence has been found for attentional holding but not for attentional capture by threat. An important explanation for the absence of attentional capture effects is that the visual stimuli used posed no genuine threat. The present study investigated whether visual cues that signal an aversive white noise can elicit attentional capture and holding effects. Cues presented in an attentional task were simultaneously provided with a threat value through an aversive conditioning procedure. Response latencies showed that threatening cues captured and held attention. These results support recent views on attention to threat, proposing that imminent threat captures attention in everyone.     

Ultimate Educational Aims, Overridingness, and Personal Well-being

Discussion regarding education??s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education??s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ??overriding?? to be explained. The second associates education??s ultimate aims with the intrinsic value of personal well-being. We advance reasons to doubt that these strategies are successful. The shortcomings of these strategies impute yet further urgency to the issue of how we are to ascertain and validate education??s ultimate aims.     

The automatic orienting of attention to goal-relevant stimuli

It is often assumed that attention is automatically allocated to stimuli relevant to one’s actual goals. However, the existing evidence for this idea is limited in several ways. We investigated whether words relevant to a person’s current goal influence the orienting of attention even when an intention to attend to the goal-relevant stimuli is not present. In two experiments, participants performed a modified spatial cueing paradigm combined with a second task that induced a goal. The results of the experiments showed that the induced goal led to the orientation of attention to goal-relevant words in the spatial cueing task. This effect was not found for words semantically related to the goal-relevant words. The results provide evidence for motivational accounts of attention, which state that the automatic allocation of attention is guided by the current goals of a person.     

Signals of threat do not capture, but prioritize, attention: a conditioning approach

Research suggests that threatening information captures attention more rapidly than neutral information. However, in most studies threat stimuli differ perceptually from neutral stimuli and are instrumental to perform the task, leaving the question unanswered whether threat is sufficient to capture attention. In experiment 1, we designed a visual search task with stimuli of equal salience (colored circles) that have the potential to lead to efficient search (10 ms/item). In experiment 2, one of the colors (conditioned stimulus, CS+) was made threatening by means of fear conditioning. Participants responded to a target presented in one of the circles. Overall, the search was faster on congruent trials (where the target was presented in the CS+) than on baseline trials (where the CS + was absent). Furthermore, the search was slower on incongruent trials (where the target was presented in another color than the CS+) than on baseline trials. The search on congruent trials was affected by set size (90 ms/item), but to a lesser extent than on baseline trials (105 ms/item). We conclude that threat prioritizes, but does not capture attention.     

Statistical contingency has a different impact on preparation judgements than on causal judgements

Previous studies on causal learning showed that judgements about the causal effect of a cue on an outcome depend on the statistical contingency between the presence of the cue and the outcome. We demonstrate that statistical contingency has a different impact on preparation judgements (i.e., judgements about the usefulness of responses that allow one to prepare for the outcome). Our results suggest that preparation judgements primarily reflect information about the outcome in prior situations that are identical to the test situation. These findings also add to previous evidence showing that people can use contingency information in a flexible manner depending on the type of test question.     

Further evidence for the role of mode-independent short-term associations in spatial Simon effects

We examined the conditions under which short-term associations between stimuli and responses can produce spatial Simon effects. On location-relevant trials, participants gave neutral responses (i.e., they uttered the nonsense syllable "bee" or "boo") on the basis of whether the presented word had the meaning of "left" or "right." On location-irrelevant trials, they gave the same responses on the basis of the color of left and right squares. Performance on the location-irrelevant trials was affected by the match between the irrelevant location information and the location to which the correct response was assigned on the location-relevant trials. Experiment 1 showed that this extrinsic Simon effect was found only when the words on the location-relevant trials came from two different languages. In Experiment 2, we found an extrinsic Simon effect even when participants only received instructions about how to respond on location-relevant trials but no such trials were actually presented. Our findings suggest that task demands determine whether short-term associations are mode specific or mode independent and confirm that such associations can be set up as the result of instructions only.