Intrinsic Properties Defined

Philosophical Studies -     

Duration of failure,causal attributions for failure,and subsequent reactions

Subjects were given a preliminary problem solving task of either short or long duration, and were told that they could shorten the duration of aversive noise bursts by correctly solving the problems. They were then given false feedback that they had done either well or poorly on the problems. Two groups of failing subjects were given information designed to lead them to attribute failure to either lack of ability or a difficult task. Two additional groups received “success” or “failure” feedback without any attributional cues. Failure-induced stress was reported to be greater under short duration conditions than under long duration conditions, and increased to the extent that subjects were led to believe they were personally responsible for failure. Following the preliminary failure period, task performance in the same situation and task performance and persistence in a different situation were assessed. In each case, performance and persistence decreased (a) following short-duration failure when subjects were led to attribute failure to a difficult task, and (b) following long-duration failure when subjects were led to attribute failure to lack of ability. These results are discussed within a framework that emphasizes the role of casual attributions in mediating the effects of failure.     

Standard Decision Theory Corrected

Where there are infinitely many possible basic states of the world, a standard probability function must assign zero probability to each state – since any finite probability would sum to over one. This generates problems for any decision theory that appeals to expected utility or related notions. For it leads to the view that a situation in which one wins a million dollars if any of a thousand of the equally probable states is realized has an expected value of zero (since each such state has probability zero). But such a situation dominates the situation in which one wins nothing no matter what (which also has an expected value of zero), and so surely is more desirable. I formulate and defend some principles for evaluating options where standard probability functions cannot strictly represent probability – and in particular for where there is an infinitely spread, uniform distribution of probability. The principles appeal to standard probability functions, but overcome at least some of their limitations in such cases.     

Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals

Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most humans to mice. This view, however, seems crazy. I explore this problem and propose a solution.     

Two types of moral dilemmas

In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much stronger case can be made against the conceptual possibility of obligation dilemmas than against the conceptual possibility of prohibition dilemmas.