Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Max Webers Wertfreiheitspostulat und die naturalistische Begründung von Normen

Max Weber's postulate of value-neutrality and the naturalistic justification of norms. The relationship between facts and values is an essential problem in philosophy, political science and sociology. Usually it is held that there is a wide gap between what is and what ought to be, the nature of which, however, is far from clear. My purpose is to elucidate this relationship by analyzing some well-known articles of Max Weber. I first present Weber's postulate of ‘value-neutrality’ and outline the reasons he gave for it. Then I proceed by examining Weber's scientific methodology, arguing that its presuppositions contradict the existence of a hiatus irrationalis between facts and values. This conclusion is supported by some historical examples which show that facts are constituted by values and values by facts. I propose that Weber's epistemological justification of value-neutrality be discarded in favor of a pragmatic one that can also be derived from his arguments. I conclude by sketching the outline of a naturalistic approach in philosophy and related disciplines. This approach admits the continuity of facts and values and provides a realistic view of every-day normative disputes. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Stability and flexibility in preschoolers' social networks: a dynamic analysis of socially directed behavior allocation

The author studied preschoolers' social networks by investigating the allocation of children's social investment within and across time in a classroom of a French nursery school during an academic year. Observations of children's social exchanges during free play revealed that social behaviors were directed toward particular group members. After an important turnover in the peer group at the beginning of the school year, the social network became more structured. Children's strong associations were mostly same sex and small sized. Even if the stability of children's connections remained low, it increased over time. High-frequency partners as well as same-sex partners were more likely to be maintained over time. These findings as well as conceptual and methodological issues are discussed from a developmental perspective.