Breathing New Life Into the World‐Soul? Revisiting an Old Doctrine Through the Lens of Current Debates on Special Divine Action

Nicholas Saunders’ 2002 book Divine Action and Modern Science remains among the most significant and widely‐cited recent contributions to the literature on special divine action (SDA). One of the tasks he takes up in that work is to critique a wide assortment of models of SDA, including that of Grace Jantzen. Her account employs the panentheistic notion that the physical universe is related to God in a manner closely analogous to the way in which a human body is related to the human mind—that is, the cosmos is God’s body. And just as we humans can exercise basic actions on and with our bodies without violating the laws of nature, God can exercise basic action on parts of the cosmos without such violations, thereby providing a workable non‐interventionist model of SDA. Saunders critiques this model on both philosophical and theological grounds, and moves on to consider another: the idea that God never acts directly on the cosmos, but instead interacts with the world by influencing human minds, which influence needn’t involve the violation of laws. This model too comes in for heavy criticism. In this essay I suggest a way of retaining important aspects of both of these accounts while sidestepping the criticisms levelled by Saunders. This can be done by reviving an idea sympathetically entertained by such notables as Plato, several early Church fathers (including Augustine), and Isaac Newton: that of a World‐Soul distinct from God.     

NIMBYism and Legitimate Expectations

An increasing portion of contemporary politics revolves around a set of claims made by those (typically derisively) referred to as NIMBYs. Despite its practical significance, NIMBYism has not received significant attention in academic philosophy. I attempt a charitable but limited reconstruction of NIMBYism in terms of legitimate expectations. I argue that, despite NIMBY expectations being somewhat vague and at least moderately unjust, they may be legitimate. This does not imply that they are decisive, or entail a conclusion about their overall normative force. I close by developing some tentative details in institutional design, focusing on the possibility of monetary compensation as a way of recognizing, but limiting the force of, NIMBY expectations.     

Aggression-consistent, -inconsistent,and -irrelevant priming effects on selective exposure to media violence

Priming with aggressive concepts increases males' attraction to media violence. It was hypothesized that priming with schema-irrelevant concepts would decrease interest relative to the effects of schema-relevant concepts, whether or not the schema-relevant concepts were also schema-consistent. Thirty male undergraduates used lists including aggressive (schema-consistent and schema-relevant), positive or prosocial (schema-inconsistent yet relevant), or entirely neutral (schema-irrelevant) words to write short stories (priming task), then received an opportunity to select videotaped film clips for viewing. Subjects primed by aggressive word lists included more aggression, anger, fear, and violence in their stories than did those in the aggression-inconsistent and aggression-irrelevant conditions, whereas aggression-inconsistent priming yielded more fun, helping, and joy than did other conditions. Aggressively primed subjects expressed more interest in films containing violence and hostility than did neutrally primed subjects, whereas aggression-inconsistent priming did not differ significantly from either aggressive (schema-consistent) or neutral (schema-irrelevant) priming. Findings indicate that the aggressive priming activates aggressive concepts that make violence and hostility more salient to individuals. Because male undergraduates typically express interest in violence, enhanced salience leads to increased interest. © 1992 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Understanding all inconsistency compensation as a palliative response to violated expectations

It has been repeatedly shown that, when people have experiences that are inconsistent with their expectations, they engage in a variety of compensatory efforts. Although there have been many superficially different accounts for these behaviors, a potentially unifying inconsistency compensation perspective is currently coalescing. Following from a common prediction error/conflict monitoring mechanism, any given inconsistency is understood as evoking a common syndrome of aversive arousal. In turn, this aversive arousal is understood to motivate palliative efforts, which manifest as the analogous compensation behaviors reported within different psychological literatures. Based on this perspective, compensation efforts following both 'high-level' (e.g., attitudinal dissonance) and 'low-level' (e.g., Stroop task color/word mismatches) inconsistencies can now be understood in terms of a common motivational account.