I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to “ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one’s own hemiparesis).     

Explicit authenticity and stimulus features interact to modulate BOLD response induced by emotional speech

Context has been found to have a profound effect on the recognition of social stimuli and correlated brain activation. The present study was designed to determine whether knowledge about emotional authenticity influences emotion recognition expressed through speech intonation. Participants classified emotionally expressive speech in an fMRI experimental design as sad, happy, angry, or fearful. For some trials, stimuli were cued as either authentic or play-acted in order to manipulate participant top-down belief about authenticity, and these labels were presented both congruently and incongruently to the emotional authenticity of the stimulus. Contrasting authentic versus play-acted stimuli during uncued trials indicated that play-acted stimuli spontaneously up-regulate activity in the auditory cortex and regions associated with emotional speech processing. In addition, a clear interaction effect of cue and stimulus authenticity showed up-regulation in the posterior superior temporal sulcus and the anterior cingulate cortex, indicating that cueing had an impact on the perception of authenticity. In particular, when a cue indicating an authentic stimulus was followed by a play-acted stimulus, additional activation occurred in the temporoparietal junction, probably pointing to increased load on perspective taking in such trials. While actual authenticity has a significant impact on brain activation, individual belief about stimulus authenticity can additionally modulate the brain response to differences in emotionally expressive speech.     

Me or not me – An optimal integration of agency cues?

Recent work has demonstrated that the sense of agency is not only determined by efference-copy-based internal predictions and internal comparator mechanisms, but by a large variety of different internal and external cues. The study by Moore and colleagues [Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Conscious and Cognition] aimed to provide further evidence for this view by demonstrating that external agency cues might outweigh or even substitute efferent signals to install a basic registration of self-agency. Although the study contains some critical points that, so we argue, are central to a proper interpretation of the data, it hints at a new perspective on agency: optimal cue integration seems to be the key to a robust sense of agency. We here argue that this framework could allow integrating the findings of Moore and colleagues and other recent agency studies into a comprehensive picture of the sense of agency and its pathological disruptions.     

The valence of action outcomes modulates the perception of one's actions

When interacting with the world, we need to distinguish whether sensory information results from external events or from our own actions. The nervous system most likely draws this distinction by comparing the actual sensory input with an internal prediction about the sensory consequences of one's actions. However, interacting with the world also requires an evaluation of the outcomes of self-action, e.g. in terms of their affective valence. Here we show that subjects' perceived pointing direction does not only depend on predictive and sensory signals related to the performed action itself, but also on the affective valence of the action outcome: subjects perceived their movements as directed towards positive and away from negative outcomes. Our findings suggest that the non-conceptual perception of the sensory consequences of self-action builds on both sensorimotor information related directly to self-action and a post hoc evaluation of the affective action outcome.     

Process as reality: Kierkegaard’s aesthetic approach to the ethical

This paper makes the point that Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning individuality cannot be understood clearly without placing them in the context of what I am calling ontological isolation. This means the radical deprivation by selfhood of every aspect of reality, to the point where not even the possibility or illusion of reality is available to the self. In this context the self is required to become itself, forming itself in and out of its own absolute nothingness, ontological destitution, or wrongness. With this form of isolation as our investigative key, we unlock what Kierkegaard means by his command to become a self, where becoming itself, in absence of prior possibility, constitutes the reality of self, and why Kierkegaard places crucial emphasis, contrary to the tradition, on the priority of negativity. By having the self originate itself in “absolute difficulty,” or that wherein the act itself, or pure doing without result, is primary, Kierkegaard now replaces metaphysics with ethics in order of priority, and places the self inseparably in a world that responds directly to that act. I show here a parallel between Kierkegaard’s approach to ethical action with that of artistic creation of a kind of world, the work of art. In doing so I reveal the inadequacy of interpretations that would impose traditional forms of isolation, social and cosmic, on Kierkegaard, as some of his critics do, or that would place Kierkegaard’s ethics within traditional developmental models, as many of his sympathizers do.     

Direct perception of action-scaled affordances: the shrinking gap problem

The aim of this study was to investigate the perception of possibilities for action (i.e., affordances) that depend on one's movement capabilities, and more specifically, the passability of a shrinking gap between converging obstacles. We introduce a new optical invariant that specifies in intrinsic units the minimum locomotor speed needed to safely pass through a shrinking gap. Detecting this information during self-motion requires recovering the component of the obstacles' local optical expansion attributable to obstacle motion, independent of self-motion. In principle, recovering the obstacle motion component could involve either visual or non-visual self-motion information. We investigated the visual and non-visual contributions in two experiments in which subjects walked through a virtual environment and made judgments about whether it was possible to pass through a shrinking gap. On a small percentage of trials, visual and non-visual self-motion information were independently manipulated by varying the speed with which subjects moved through the virtual environment. Comparisons of judgments on such catch trials with judgments on normal trials revealed both visual and non-visual contributions to the detection of information about minimum walking speed.