When intended remembering leads to unintended forgetting

As a means of clarifying the memory dynamics that underlie retrieval-induced forgetting, we explored how instructing participants either to remember or to forget a previously presented list of items influences the susceptibility of those items to inhibition. According to the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting, it is the items that interfere most with retrieval practice that should be the most susceptible to the effects of inhibition. Consistent with this prediction, items from lists that participants were told to remember suffered from significantly more retrieval-induced forgetting than did items from lists that participants were told to forget.     

Two Envelopes and Binding

This paper describes a way of defending a modification of Eckhardt's [2013] solution to the Two Envelopes Paradox. The defence is based on ideas from Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne [2004].     

Accelerated relearning after retrieval-induced forgetting: the benefit of being forgotten

Research on retrieval-induced forgetting has demonstrated that retrieving some information from memory can cause the forgetting of other information in memory. Here, the authors report research on the relearning of items that have been subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting. Participants studied a list of category- exemplar pairs, underwent a series of retrieval-practice and relearning trials, and, finally, were tested on the initially studied pairs. The final recall of non-relearned items exhibited a cumulative effect of retrieval-induced forgetting such that the size of the effect increased with each block of retrieval practice. Of most interest, and very surprising from a common-sense standpoint, items that were relearned benefited more from that relearning if they had previously been forgotten. The results offer insights into the nature and durability of retrieval-induced forgetting and provide additional evidence that forgetting is an enabler--rather than a disabler--of future learning.     

Elevated outcome-anticipation and outcome-evaluation ERPs associated with a greater preference for larger-but-delayed rewards

Although waiting for a reward reduces or discounts its value, some people have a stronger tendency to wait for larger rewards and forgo smaller-but-immediate rewards. This ability to delay gratification is captured by individual differences in so-called intertemporal choices in which individuals are asked to choose between larger-but-delayed versus smaller-but-immediate rewards. The current study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine whether enhancement in two neurocognitive processes, outcome anticipation and outcome evaluation, modulate individual variability in intertemporal responses. After completing a behavioral intertemporal choice task, 34 participants performed an ERP gambling task. From this ERP task, we separately examined individual differences in outcome anticipation (stimulus-preceding negativity; SPN), early outcome valuation (feedback-related negativity; FRN), and late outcome evaluation (P3). We observed that both elevated outcome-anticipation (SPN) and late outcome-evaluation (P3) neural processes predicted a stronger preference toward larger-but-delayed rewards. No relationship was observed between intertemporal responses and early outcome evaluation (FRN), indicating that the relationship between outcome evaluation and intertemporal responses was specific to the late outcome-evaluation processing stream. Moreover, multiple regression analyses indicated that the SPN and P3 independently modulate individual differences in intertemporal responses, suggesting separate mechanisms underlie the relationship between these two neurocognitive processes and intertemporal responses. Accordingly, we identify two potential neurocognitive modulators of individual variability in intertemporal responses. We discuss the mechanisms underlying these modulators in terms of anticipation-related processing (SPN) and a saliency bias toward gain (compared to loss) outcomes (P3).