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Many neuroscientists and philosophers endorse a view about the explanatory reach of neuroscience (which we will call the neuron doctrine) to the effect that the framework for understanding the mind will be developed by neuroscience; or, as we will put it, that a successful theory of the mind will be solely neuroscientific. It is a consequence of this view that the sciences of the mind that cannot be expressed by means of neuroscientific concepts alone count as indirect sciences that will be discarded as neuroscience matures. This consequence is what makes the doctrine substantive, indeed, radical. We ask, first, what the neuron doctrine means and, second, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we distinguish two versions of the doctrine. One version, the trivial neuron doctrine, turns out to be uncontroversial but unsubstantive because it fails to have the consequence that the nonneuroscientific sciences of the mind will eventually be discarded. A second version, the radical neuron doctrine, does have this consequence, but, unlike the first doctrine, is highly controversial. We argue that the neuron doctrine appears to be both substantive and uncontroversial only as a result of a conflation of these two versions. We then consider whether the radical doctrine is true. We present and evaluate three arguments for it, based either on general scientific and philosophical considerations or on the details of neuroscience itself, arguing that all three fail. We conclude that the evidence fails to support the radical neuron doctrine. 相似文献
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Daniel Stoljar 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2018,52(2):389-410
What is the connection between being in a conscious mental state and believing that you yourself are currently in that state? On the one hand, it is natural to think that this connection is, or involves, a necessary connection of some sort. On the other hand, it is hard to know what the nature of this necessary connection is. For there are plausible arguments according to which this connection is not metaphysically necessary, not rationally necessary, and not merely naturally necessary. If these arguments are correct, and if these options are exhaustive, while there is a necessary connection between a conscious state and the belief that you are in it, there is apparently no necessary connection it could be! This paper sets out this problem—the necessary connection problem, I will call it—and defends and explores a novel proposal about how to solve it. 相似文献
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Daniel Stoljar 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(1-2):247-270
This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. My first line of argument focuses on the impact of intentionalism
on the ‚hard problem’ of phenomenal character. If intentionalism is true, the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional. Furthermore,
if physicalism about the intentional is also true, the intentional supervenes on the physical. Therefore, if intentionalism
and physicalism are both true, then, by transitivity of supervenience, physicalism about the phenomenal is true. I argue that
this transitivity argument is not persuasive, because on any interpretation of its central terms, at least one of its premises
is as controversial as its conclusion already is. My second line of argument is about the consequences of intentionalism for
the error theory of color perception. I suggest that if intentionalism is true, projectivism must be true also, because under
this condition there is no single concept of color that can be used for the qualification of objects as well as for the characterization
of experiences. 相似文献
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Daniel Stoljar 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):609-618
I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method
he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be
self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s
being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken. 相似文献