ON THE NATURE OF THE PERCEPTUAL SPEED FACTOR

W erdelin , I. & S tjernberg , G. On the nature of the perceptual speed factor. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1969, 10, 185–192.–149 subjects, about 15 years old, were given 25 psychological tests. Some of these defined the reference factors R, S, N , and P , others were designed to study the nature of the P factor. It was found that certain visual tests showed successively higher loadings in the P and N factors the more they were practiced. This effect of practice is probably restricted to tests of a certain kind. Very simple visual tests showed high loadings in the P factor. Hypotheses as to the nature of the P factor are suggested.     

When Structure and Meaning Break DownTaking Responsibility in Downsizing

Based on knowledge about individual stress, identity, and psychological dynamics in crisis situations, social responsibility in downsizing is discussed. The concepts of ethics and perceived fairness are discussed, based on four case studies. The richness of the empirical situations points to a need for a holistic view on downsizing and social responsibility, covering individual as well as organizational aspects. Taking interactional justice into account together with a more critical view of the principles used is suggested. Finally, the idea of time and timing is elaborated in relation to justice.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFICULTY AND FACTOR LOADINGS OF SOME VISUAL-PERCEPTUAL TESTS

WERDELIN, I. & STJERNBERG, G. The relationship between difficulty and factor loadings of some visual-perceptual tests. Scand. J. Psychol. , 1971, 12, 21–28. – The study aimed at investigating whether it is possible to change factor loadings by varying the difficulty and complexity of the same visual-perceptual tests. 171 sixth grade pupils were given 27 tests. Some of these defined reference factors, others were differently difficult versions of four tests from separate parts of the visual-perceptual field. Data were treated by factor analysis, yielding the four factors R, S, N and P. It was found that the more difficult the test the higher its loadings on the S and R factors, and the easier the test the higher its loadings on the N and particularly the P factor.     

Restricting factiveness

In discussions of Fitch’s paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, the other is that the usual arguments for factiveness are not as compelling as is commonly thought. There may in fact be some kinds of contexts, where factiveness doesn’t hold for knowledge—the usual arguments for factiveness don’t suffice to support the claim that knowledge is unrestrictedly factive. Perhaps all that can be shown is that knowledge is at times factive, or that it is default factive, as it were: this doesn’t show that there can’t be counterexamples, however. Certain aspects of knowledge without unrestricted factiveness are examined briefly.