Reliability and validity of a twelve-minute walking test for coronary heart disease patients

This study examined the reliability and validity of a 12-min. walking test for coronary heart disease patients. CHD patients (28 men, 18 women) were recruited out of 86 CHD patients of the Martini Hospital Groningen, The Netherlands. 46 CHD patients (age M=66.0 yr., SD=6.8) participated in the reliability study and 24 (age M=62.0 yr., SD=9.2) in the validity study. A test-retest analysis showed a satisfactory Bland-Altman plot and an intraclass coefficient of .98. The Pearson correlation between the score on the test and the VO2 peak was .77. This test gives a reliable and valid assessment of cardiorespiratory fitness of CHD patients.     

Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance.     

Modeling Attitudes Toward Science: Development and Validation of the Credibility of Science Scale

We present the Credibility of Science Scale (CoSS), an efficient 6-item scale demonstrating excellent reliability and validity. CoSS scores exhibit criterion validity in predicting beliefs across a host of contemporary science topics, over and above previously documented predictors (Study 2). Further, we present evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of the instrument, which correlates as expected with several variables previously implicated in scientific belief (e.g., political ideology, religious identity, conspiracist thinking; Study 2) and also with measures of cognitive ability (Study 3). Finally, we discuss possible uses of the CoSS as a tool for understanding science-related beliefs, behavior, and communication.     

Atheism and Nonspirituality as Diversity Issues in Counseling

Counseling professionals have begun to realize that, in order to be as effective as possible, counselors must explore and understand the spiritual and religious beliefs of their clients. The literature on client belief systems and diversity, however, does not include discussion of individuals without religious or spiritual beliefs. The purpose of this article is to (a) suggest that atheism and nonspirituality should be included in the multiculturalism conversation and (b) offer ways that counselors might effectively help and nurture such clients.     

„Ist eine Allgemeine Psychotherapie notwendig, sinnvoll und machbar”?

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Generating and evaluating options for decision making: the impact of sequentially presented evidence

We examined how decision makers generate and evaluate hypotheses when data are presented sequentially. In the first 2 experiments, participants learned the relationship between data and possible causes of the data in a virtual environment. Data were then presented iteratively, and participants either generated hypotheses they thought caused the data or rated the probability of possible causes of the data. In a 3rd experiment, participants generated hypotheses and made probability judgments on the basis of previously stored general knowledge. Findings suggest that both the hypotheses one generates and the judged probability of those hypotheses are heavily influenced by the most recent evidence observed and by the diagnosticity of the evidence. Specifically, participants generated a narrow set of possible explanations when the presented evidence was diagnostic compared with when it was nondiagnostic, suggesting that nondiagnostic evidence entices participants to cast a wider net when generating hypotheses.     

Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science

Inductive logic generalizes the idea of logical entailment and provides standards for the evaluation of non-conclusive arguments. A main application of inductive logic is the generalization of observational data to theoretical models. In the empirical sciences, the mathematical theory of statistics addresses the same problem. This paper argues that there is no separable purely logical aspect of statistical inference in a variety of complex problems. Instead, statistical practice is often motivated by decision-theoretic considerations and resembles empirical science.     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.     

Reply to Rouder (2014): Good frequentist properties raise confidence

Established psychological results have been called into question by demonstrations that statistical significance is easy to achieve, even in the absence of an effect. One often-warned-against practice, choosing when to stop the experiment on the basis of the results, is guaranteed to produce significant results. In response to these demonstrations, Bayes factors have been proposed as an antidote to this practice, because they are invariant with respect to how an experiment was stopped. Should researchers only care about the resulting Bayes factor, without concern for how it was produced? Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, and Dougherty (2014) and Sanborn and Hills (2014) demonstrated that Bayes factors are sometimes strongly influenced by the stopping rules used. However, Rouder (2014) has provided a compelling demonstration that despite this influence, the evidence supplied by Bayes factors remains correct. Here we address why the ability to influence Bayes factors should still matter to researchers, despite the correctness of the evidence. We argue that good frequentist properties mean that results will more often agree with researchers’ statistical intuitions, and good frequentist properties control the number of studies that will later be refuted. Both help raise confidence in psychological results.