The simultaneous activation hypothesis: explaining recovery from deep to phonological dyslexia

Deep dyslexia evolved into phonological dyslexia in one patient. Semantic errors resolved while phonological and derivational errors persisted in reading. Nonword reading improved but remained inferior to word reading. Despite a residual semantic deficit naming improved. The Simultaneous Activation Hypothesis explains recovery from deep to phonological dyslexia and the continued dissociation between reading and naming errors. Partial recovery to all three reading routes increased constraints for word selection at the phonological output lexicon (POL) improving word reading. With recovery, the POL receives additional supportive information from the partially recovered direct oral reading route and grapheme-to-phoneme conversion (GPC) eliminating semantic errors in oral reading. Nonword reading also improved because of partial recovery to all three routes. Semantic errors in naming persisted because additional constraints were unavailable at the POL to activate a phonological entry. Phonological and derivational errors were more frequent in reading than in naming the result of incomplete GPC recovery. Residual nonword reading deficits resulted from incomplete GPC recovery, indicated by the persistence of neologisms in nonwords. The Simultaneous Activation Hypothesis readily accounts for the evolution from deep to phonological dyslexia.     

Norms and conventions

One can think of the traditional logic of blame as involving three intuitively plausible claims: (1) blame is justified only if one is deserving of blame, (2) one is deserving of blame only if one is relevantly in control of the relevant causal antecedents, and (3) one is relevantly in control only if one has libertarian freedom. While traditional compatibilism has focused on rejecting either or both of the latter two claims, an increasingly common strategy is to deny the link between blame and desert expressed in (1). While I think there is something right about many of these accounts of blame, I deny that the logic of blame can be divorced from the logic of desert. On my view, blame does have a conceptual connection to desert, but its justification is practical rather than theoretical, as the libertarian condition is a matter of adopting a stance towards a person rather than having a belief about her and the “true” causes of her action. I argue that blame fundamentally requires interacting with a person from the participant perspective and that the participant perspective, understood in terms of second-personal address, involves an ontological commitment to freedom.     

Contractualism for Us As We Are

A difficult problem for contractualists is how to provide an interpretation of the contractual situation that is both subject to appropriately stringent constraints and yet also appropriately sensitive to certain features of us as we actually are. My suggestion is that we should embrace a model of contractualism that is structurally analogous to the “advice model” of the ideal observer theory famously proposed by Michael Smith (1994, 1995). An advice model of contractualism is appealing since it promises to deliver a straightforward solution to the so‐called “conditional fallacy.” But it faces some formidable challenges. On the face of it, it seems to be straightforwardly conceptually incoherent. And it seems to deliver a solution to the conditional fallacy at the cost of being vulnerable to what I shall call “the concessional fallacy.” I shall consider how, if at all, these challenges are to be met. I shall then conclude by considering what this might mean for the so‐called “ideal/non‐ideal theory” issue.     

The motivation question

Philosophical Studies - How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the “motivation...     

Some effects of the Edinburgh Masker on stuttering during oral reading and spontaneous speech

This study assessed the effect of a voice-activated masking unit, known as the Edinburgh Masker, on the speech of four stutterers during oral reading and spontaneous speech. The results show that one stutterer reduced stuttering almost completely whenever the masker was activated. Two subjects showed either marginal or temporary reductions of stuttering during one speaking condition but showed no change in the other condition. The other subject reduced stuttering only during spontaneous speech. No reduction in stuttering was associated with reduced speech rate. A perceptual analysis procedure conducted to assess for altered speech quality during masking conditions found changes in speech quality were evident in two subjects. The clinical implications of these findings are discussed.