Ontology of early visual content

The main goal of the paper is to sketch an ontological model of visual content at the low- and medium-level of visual processing, relying on psychological conceptions of vision. It is argued that influential cognitive models contain assumptions concerning “objects of content,” that is, objects whose presence is a necessary condition of the adequacy of visual representations. Subsequently, the structure of considered objects of content is presented, and its development through the perceptual process is described. In addition, during the course of the article I present some connections between analytic metaphysics and the ontology of visual content.     

Do we need visual subjects?

It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called ‘Many Properties’ problem, that is, it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some basic elements of content as subjects, to which features are attributed by a predication-like relation. In this paper, I reconsider this solution and claim that the Many Properties problem can be solved without postulating such subjects. What is more, I argue that an alternative approach has stronger justification given the empirical data concerning human vision.     

The nonclassical mereology of olfactory experiences

Synthese - While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually experienced...     

The structure of audio–visual consciousness

Synthese - It is commonly believed that human perceptual experiences can be, and usually are, multimodal. What is more, a stronger thesis is often proposed that some perceptual multimodal...     

Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity

This paper argues that the accuracy of perceptual experiences cannot be properly characterized by using the particular notion of content without breaking one of the three plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the general notion of content is not threatened by this problem. The first assumption is that all elements of content determine the accuracy conditions of an experience. The second states that objects needed for the accuracy of experiences are physical entities that stand in a perceptual relation to a subject. According to the third assumption, common experiences do not have accuracy conditions that are impossible to satisfy. The above point is demonstrated by analysing illusions of identity in which the number of objects is represented incorrectly. In the concluding parts of the paper, I investigate how an alternative account of particular content can be developed by rejecting the first assumption.     

Perceptual Kinds as Supervening Sortals

It seems intuitive that in situations of perceptual recognition, additional properties are represented. While much has been written about the significance of such properties for perceptual phenomenology, it is still unclear (a) what the relation between recognition‐based properties and lower‐level perceptual properties is and (b) whether it is justified to classify them as kind properties. Relying on results in cognitive psychology, I argue that recognition‐based properties (I) are irreducible, high‐level properties, and (II) are kind properties by virtue of being sortal properties but (III) supervene on lower‐level properties and so are unlikely to be natural kind properties.     

Olfactory Objecthood

Philosophia - In the contemporary analytic discussions concerning human olfactory perception, it is commonly claimed that (1) olfactory experiences are representations having content and (2)...