Bootstrapping our way to samesaying

This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers?? substantive understanding of the reference. Traditional accounts of meaning have trouble simultaneously satisfying both constraints. I suggest that relationally individuated meanings provide a promising way of avoiding this tension. On relational accounts, we bootstrap our way to de jure co-reference: the subjective appearance of de jure co-reference helps make it the case that two token representations really do co-refer.     

Acceptability and Feasibility of Peer Assisted Supervision and Support for Intervention Practitioners: A Q-methodology Evaluation

Evidence-based interventions often include quality improvement methods to support fidelity and improve client outcomes. Clinical supervision is promoted as an effective way of developing practitioner confidence and competence in delivery; however, supervision is often inconsistent and embedded in hierarchical line management structures that may limit the opportunity for reflective learning. The Peer Assisted Supervision and Support (PASS) supervision model uses peer relationships to promote the self-regulatory capacity of practitioners to improve intervention delivery. The aim of the present study was to assess the acceptability and feasibility of PASS amongst parenting intervention practitioners. A Q-methodology approach was used to generate data and 30 practitioners volunteered to participate in the study. Data were analyzed and interpreted using standard Q-methodology procedures and by-person factor analysis yielded three factors. There was consensus that PASS was acceptable. Participants shared the view that PASS facilitated an environment of support where negative aspects of interpersonal relationships that might develop in supervision were not evident. Two factors represented the viewpoint that PASS was also a feasible model of supervision. However, the third factor was comprised of practitioners who reported that PASS could be time consuming and difficult to fit into existing work demands. There were differences across the three factors in the extent to which practitioners considered PASS impacted on their intervention delivery. The findings highlight the importance of organizational mechanisms that support practitioner engagement in supervision.     

Experimental philosophers,conceptual analysts,and the rest of us

Abstract

Theories of personal identity purport to specify truth conditions for sentences of the form ‘x‐at‐t_i is the same person as y‐at‐t_j. Most philosophers nowadays agree that such truth conditions are to be stated in terms of psychological continuity. However; opinions vary as to how the notion of psychological continuity is to be understood. In a recent contribution to this journal, Slors offers an account in which psychological continuity is spelled out in terms of narrative connectedness between mental states.The present paper argues that Slors’ theory either is no theory of personal identity at all or is too weak.Towards the end of the paper, it is indicated how the problem uncovered for Slors’ theory may be avoided.     

Weber and Weimar: A response to Factor and Turner

In their critique, Factor and Turner attempt to substitute one commonplace for another by merely supplying long lists of publications that mention Max Weber. While accepting their reproof that I applied the concept of „influence”︁ too narrowly, my response endeavors to map out the directions that further research in this area will need to follow if the controversy is ever to move beyond jejune polemics.     

Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Empirical Presuppositions

This note argues that Laura Schroeter's [2005] critique of David Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional semantics is not touched by a reply by Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen, and Clas Weber [2013].     

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

The Generalized Integration Challenge (GIC) is the task of providing, for a given domain of discourse, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemology and metasemantics and showing them to be so. In this paper, we focus on a metaethical position for which (GIC) seems particularly acute: the brand of normative realism which takes normative properties to be (i) mind‐independent and (ii) causally inert. The problem is that these metaphysical commitments seem to make normative knowledge impossible. We suggest that bringing metasemantics into play can help to resolve this puzzle. We propose an independently plausible metasemantic constraint on reference determination and show how it can provide a plausible response to (GIC) for this brand of normative realism.     

Keeping track of what’s right

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.