The Scope and Multidimensionality of the Scientific Realism Debate

At stake in the classical realism-debate is the clash between realist and anti-realist positions. In recent years, the classical form of this debate has undergone a double transformation. On the one hand, the champions of realism began to pay more attention to the interpretative dimensions of scientific research. On the other hand, anti-realists of various sorts realized that the rejection of the hypostatization of a “reality out there” does not imply the denial of working out a philosophically adequate concept of reality. Against the background of this double transformation, new arguments in the realism-debate emerged. The present Introduction is an attempt at systematizing these arguments within the spectrum of doctrines between the poles of scientific realism (exposed and defended by Howard Sankey) and hermeneutic realism (advocated by Dimitri Ginev). The authors try also to demonstrate that after the classical debates the issue of scientism has to be addressed in new ways.     

Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion

This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms. It is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims. As against the epistemic relativist, it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms.     

Normative naturalism and the challenge of relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the justification of methodological principles

In Science and Values, Larry Laudan argues that rational scientific change is not restricted to scientific theory, but may also affect the methodology and axiology of science. In subsequent debate, John Worrall has raised the question of whether invariant principles of methodology are necessary in order to avoid epistemological relativism. Worrall argues that Laudan's denial of such principles leads straight to relativism. By contrast, Laudan claims that, rather than methodological invariance, what is required to escape relativism is a rational justification of such principles. In this paper, it will be argued that the normative naturalist meta‐methodology, which Laudan has developed in work subsequent to Science and Values, contains the resources needed to mount a satisfactory response to Worrall's charge of relativism.     

Reinforcement as a mediator of the perception of humans by horses (Equus caballus)

A central question in the interspecific human/animal relationship is how domestic animals perceive humans as a significant element of their environment. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that the use of positive or negative reinforcement in horse training may have consequences on the animals’ perception of humans, as a positive, negative or neutral element. Two groups of ponies were trained to walk backwards in response to a vocal order using either positive or negative reinforcement. Heart rate monitors and behavioural observations were used to assess the animals’ perception of humans on the short (just after training) and long (5 months later) terms. The results showed that the type of reinforcement had a major effect on the subsequent animals’ perception of familiar and unfamiliar humans. Negative reinforcement was rapidly associated with an increased emotional state, as revealed by heart rate measurements and behavioural observations (head movements and ears laid back position). Its use led the ponies to seek less contact with humans. On the contrary, ponies trained with positive reinforcement showed an increased interest in humans and sought contact after training. This is especially remarkable as it was reached in a maximum of 5 sessions of 1 to 3 min (i.e. 5 to 15 min) and had lasting effects (visible after 5 months). Even learning was positively influenced by positive reinforcement. Overall, horses seem capable of associating humans to particular experiences and display extended long-term memory abilities.     

Methodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism

This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory choice, but do not constitute an algorithm for such choice. The paper also explores the sceptical basis for the epistemic relativism of the original view that Kuhn proposes in Structure. It suggests that the main sceptical rationale for such relativism may be avoided by a particularist and naturalist conception of epistemic normativity. When this approach is combined with the appeal to external methodological standards endorsed by the later Kuhn and his critics, the epistemic relativism of Structure may be completely repudiated.     

How horses (Equus caballus) see the world: humans as significant “objects”

This study aimed to determine whether horses have a kind of memory of humans (based on previous interactions), leading to a general significance of humans revealed by their reactions to humans in subsequent interactions. Subjects were 59 adult horses used to interact daily with humans. Three types of behavioural tests involving an unknown experimenter evaluated three possibly different memorized types of human–animal interactions (not work-related, using work-related objects, unfamiliar working task). We also performed standardized observations of routine interactions between each horse and its familiar handler (caretaker). To get a broad overview of the horses’ reactions to humans, we recorded both investigative and aggressive behaviours during the tests, representing respectively a “positive” and a “negative” memory of the relationship. Whereas correlations between tests revealed a general perception of humans as either positive or negative, unusual tests, i.e. that are not usually performed, elicited more positive reactions. Moreover, some horses reacted positively to a motionless person in their box, but negatively when this same person approached them, for example for halter fitting. Overall, aggressive reactions were more reliable indicators of the relationship than positive reactions, both between tests and between familiar and unfamiliar humans. Our results also show generalization of the perception of humans. These results support our hypothesis that perception of humans by horses may be based on experience, i.e. repeated interactions. Altogether, our results support the hypothesis that horses can form a memory of humans that impacts their reactions in subsequent interactions.     

Taxonomic incommensurability

In a shift of position that has gone largely unnoticed by the great majority of commentators, Thomas Kuhn's version of the incommensurability thesis underwent a major transformation over the last decade and a half of his life. In his later work, Kuhn argued that incommensurability is a relation of translation failure between local subsets of interdefined theoretical terms, which encapsulate the taxonomic structure of a theory. Incommensurability arises because it is impossible to transfer the natural categories employed within one taxonomic structure into the categorial system of another such structure. Apparently on the basis of such taxonomic incommensurability, Kuhn asserted a number of antirealist theses about truth, reference and reality. In this paper, it will be argued, however, that, far from leading to antirealist consequences about the relationship between theory and reality, the taxonomic incommensurability thesis may be incorporated unproblematically within a reasonably robust scientific realist framework.