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Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian
principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes’
and Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you’re unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences
based on the indifference principle. Later you learn how the game works and discover that the odds dictate you assign the
very same credences. Examples like this show that if you initially have noreason to believe H, then intuitively E can give you reason to believe H even though Pr(H|E) ≤ Pr(H). I show that without
the principle, the objections to dogmatism fail. 相似文献
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