Radical Interpretation and Logical Pluralism

I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that bivalence may be subject matter dependent, but that distribution and the law of excluded middle can probably not be dropped whilst maintaining the standard meanings of the connectives. In discussing the ramifications of the indeterminacy of interpretation, I ask whether it forces Davidsonian interpreters to adopt Dummett’s epistemic conception of truth vis-à-vis their interpretations. And, if so, does this cohere with their attributing a nonepistemic notion of truth to their interpretees? This would be a form of logical pluralism. In addition, I discuss Davidson’s arguments against conceptual schemes. Schemes incommensurable with our own could be construed as wholesale deviant logics, or so I argue. And, if so, their possibility would yield, in turn, the possibility of a radical logical pluralism. I also address Davidson’s application of Tarski’s definition of truth.

     

On Defending Deontology

This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent-relative/agent-neutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge a value-based defence of deontology proposed by Quinn (1993), Kamm (1989, 1992), and Nagel (1995).     

The influence of gender and ethnicity on children's peer collaborations

Gender and ethnicity are important aspects of children's everyday social relationships, yet little is known about how these social categories influence children's collaborative interactions. In the present study, 322 White (Caucasian) and South Asian boys and girls (mean age, 7.5 years) collaborated in pairs on easy and difficult versions of a model completion task. As expected, girls were less assertive than boys in conversation, yet this relation held only for all‐Asian pairs (i.e., an Asian boy and girl in conversation). Also consistent with expectations, levels of conversational affiliation were lowest in cross‐ethnic interaction. The influence of gender and ethnicity on conversations did not vary in light of contrasting cognitive demands of the tasks. Results are discussed in relation to work on effective peer collaboration and the potential role of contact in promoting positive ethnic and gender group attitudes.