Conceptualizing and Measuring a Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence1

In response to new theoretical conceptualizations (Raven, 1992, 1993), an instrument was developed to measure 11 bases of power, the original 6 French and Raven (1959; Raven, 1965) bases of power, with 3 of these further differentiated: reward (personal, impersonal), coercion (personal. impersonal), legitimate (position, reciprocity, equity, dependence), expert, referent, and information. In Study 1, 317 American student respondents rated the likelihood that each of these power bases contributed to a supervisor successfully influencing a subordinate in a series of hypothetical situations. The internal consistency of the items which made up the 11 power bases proved adequate. Factor analysis found 7 factors and 2 categories of bases: harsh and soft. In Study 2, which used 101 Israeli health workers, the earlier findings were generally supported. In addition, job satisfaction was found to be positively related to the attribution of soft bases to the supervisor.     

Explaining essences

Philosophical Studies - This paper explores the prospects of combining two views. The first view is metaphysical rationalism (the principle of sufficient reason): all things have an explanation....     

Attesting the Aristotelian Future

Aristotelian relativism about the future (as recently defended by MacFarlane (2003)) claims that a prediction made on Monday, such as ‘It will rain’, can be indeterminate on Monday but determinate on Tuesday. A serious objection to this intuitively appealing view is that it cannot coherently be attested: for if it is attested on Monday, then our blindness to what the future holds precludes attesting that the prediction is determinate on Tuesday, and if it is attested on Tuesday (when, suppose, it rains), then the fact that it rains precludes attesting that the prediction is indeterminate on Monday. In this paper, I focus on Moruzzi and Wright (2009)’s recent development of this objection and argue that it fails. This result removes a major obstacle to defending the Aristotelian view.     

Bases of social power,leadership styles,and organizational commitment

Affective organizational commitment reflects the extent to which organizational members are loyal and willing to work toward organizational objectives (Meyer & Allen, 1997). In particular, affective organizational commitment holds very important implications at all organizational levels (e.g., turnover rates, performance, and citizenship behavior). Whereas previous research has evinced the positive influence of transformational and charismatic leadership styles on affective commitment toward the organization (Bass & Avolio, 1994), little is known with regard to the nature of this relationship. In line with the interpersonal power/interaction model, the present investigation aimed to investigate the mechanism at play between transformational leadership style and affective organizational commitment. Specifically, we hypothesized that transformational leadership style would increase affective organizational commitment through its effect on willingness to comply with soft bases of power. In two studies, we subjected the foregoing hypotheses to empirical scrutiny. In Study 1, the proposed mediation model was empirically supported with Italian employees in the public sector. Attesting to the robustness of our findings, Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 with Italian employees from the public and private sectors. In addition, Study 2 replicated Study 1 using a different measure of transformational leadership. Both Study 1 and Study 2 provided results consistent with our hypotheses. Specifically, the present paper reports empirical evidence that (1) the more participants report having a transformational leader, the more willing they become to comply with soft (but not harsh) power bases, (2) in turn, greater willingness to comply with soft (but not harsh) power bases increases one's affective organizational commitment. These findings provide additional support for the interpersonal power/interaction model and pave the way for new research directions.     

Neurological soft signs in obsessive compulsive disorder: standardised assessment and comparison with schizophrenia

While several studies have detected raised levels of neurological soft signs in patients with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), the specificity of these abnormalities remains uncertain. This study used a new standardised measure, the Cambridge Neurological Inventory (CNI), to assess soft signs in 51 subjects with OCD. Comparison was made with data on patients with schizophrenia and a non-clinical control group from a previously reported study. Individuals with OCD showed raised levels of soft signs compared with non-clinical controls in many categories of the CNI: Motor Coordination, Sensory Integration, Primitive Reflexes, Extrapyramidal Signs, and Failure of Suppression. Compared with patients with schizophrenia, the OCD group had lower levels of neurological signs in some CNI categories: Hard Signs, Motor Co-ordination, Tardive Dyskinesia, Catatonic Signs, and Extrapyramidal Signs. However, levels of soft signs in the OCD group did not significantly differ from those in the schizophrenia group in other CNI categories: Sensory Integration, Primitive Reflexes and Failure of Suppression. The significance of these patterns of findings is discussed.     

A Test of the Three-Component Model of Gender-Based Prejudices: Homophobia and Transphobia Are Affected by Raters’ and Targets’ Assigned Sex at Birth

Sex Roles - The present study tested a three-component model of homophobia and transphobia that differentiates between general and specifically gender-based social threats that motivate these...     

New work for a theory of ground*

There has been much recent interest in a distinctively metaphysical kind of determinative explanation: ground. This paper concerns various skeptical challenges to ground’s relevance to metaphysics, such as that it is an empty posit, that the work it is supposed to do is appropriated by other notions, and that it is inapt for specific issues it should serve. I argue against these challenges. My strategy is both critical and constructive. Critical because I argue that versions of these challenges raised by Elizabeth Barnes, Kathrin Koslicki, Mari Mikkola, and Jessica Wilson are not persuasive. Constructive because we may nevertheless learn from them new work for ground.