How to turn a hawk into a dove and vice versa: Interactions between emotions and goals in a give-some dilemma game

The present study investigated emotional influences on behavior in a one-shot, simultaneous, give-some dilemma game. In accordance with functional perspectives on the role of discrete emotions, we found fear to reduce, and guilt to increase levels of cooperation. Moreover, we showed individual differences in the effect of induced emotional states. Specifically, results indicated that inducing fear reduced cooperation only for individuals with a pro-social value orientation, and that guilt induction increased cooperation only for individuals with a pro-self value orientation. We also established that both social value orientations could be adequately described in terms of differences in chronically accessible goals (as assessed by value-importance ratings). These results, therefore, seem to support our hypothesis that individual differences in the behavioral consequences of induced emotional states are related to variation in chronic accessibility of general goals associated with a particular emotional state.     

Arm adductor with arm abduction in rotator cuff tear patients vs. healthy--design of a new measuring instrument

The incidence of (a)symptomatic rotator cuff tears is high, but etiologic mechanisms are unclear and treatment outcomes vary. A practical tool providing objective outcome measures and insight into etiology and potential patient subgroups is desirable. Symptomatic cuff tears coincide with humerus cranialization. Adductor co-activation during active arm abduction has been reported to reduce subacromial narrowing and pain in cuff patients. We present an easy-to-use method to evaluate adductor co-activation. Twenty healthy controls and twenty full-thickness cuff tear patients exerted EMG-recorded isometric arm abduction and adduction tasks. Ab- and adductor EMG's were expressed using the "Activation Ratio (AR)" (-1 ≤ AR ≤ 1), where lower values express more co-activation. Mean control AR's ranged from .7 to .9 with moderate to good test-retest reliability (ICC: .60-.74). Patients showed significantly more adductor co-activation during abduction, with adductor AR's ranging between .3 (teres major) and .5 (latissimus dorsi). In conclusion, the introduced method discriminates symptomatic cuff tear patients from healthy controls, quantifies adductor co-activation in an interpretable measure, and provides the opportunity to study correlations between muscle activation and humerus cranialization in a straightforward manner. It has potential as an objective outcome measure, for distinguishing symptomatic from asymptomatic cuff tears and as a tool for surgical or therapeutic decision-making.     

Framing Posthumous Organ Donation in Terms of Reciprocity: What Are the Emotional Consequences?

Posthumous organ donation was framed in terms of reciprocity by asking young participants to respond to another person who was or was not registered as an organ donor, while simultaneously manipulating participants' own registration status. Participants were additionally required to adopt the perspective of a potential donor or recipient of organs. The influence of these variables on self-reported anger, fear, pity, guilt, gratitude, and positive self-feelings is systematically described. The results illustrate the relative independence of self-preservational and altruistic motives in organ donation. Practical implications are discussed.     

Take it or leave it for something better? Responses to fair offers in ultimatum bargaining

We investigated if responders accept a 50–50 split in a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which rejection yields a higher payoff (€7) than accepting the equal offer (€5). Therefore, the decision to accept the 50–50 split in this modified ultimatum game cannot be perceived as a self-interest act, as opposed to the standard game, in which acceptance may reflect resignation in the knowledge that the equal split is the best one can expect. A substantial proportion of responders accepts the equal split in this modified game (Study 1), which clearly establishes egalitarian preferences. Further studies show that the willingness to accept is not an artifact of indifference towards the extra payoff (Study 2), but reflects true concerns for proposers’ outcomes (Study 3).