Improving solitary play with a typically developing preschooler

We evaluated the effects of delivering specific instructions (e.g., “Here are some puzzles. Complete two of them while I read.”) on solitary play with a typically developing 3‐year‐old. We gradually increased the response requirements described in the specific instruction and found that specific instructions improved the number of solitary play responses and the duration of engagement. During a treatment extension, improvements in solitary play were observed with the classroom teacher and a novel toy. The father, teacher, and preschool director found the treatment to be highly effective and acceptable.     

Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human?

Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states - that is, do they possess a 'theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.     

The impact of politeness and relationship on perceived quality of advice about a problem

Advice is a common but potentially problematic way to respond to someone who is distressed. Politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987) suggests advice threatens a hearer's face and predicts that the speaker‐hearer relationship and the use of politeness strategies can mitigate face threat and enhance the effectiveness of advice messages. Students (N=384) read 1 of 16 hypothetical situations that varied in speaker power and closeness of the speaker‐hearer relationship. Students then read 1 of 48 advice messages representing different politeness strategies and rated the message for regard shown for face and for effectiveness. However, neither speaker‐hearer relationship nor politeness strategies was consistently associated with perceived threat to face or perceived advice effectiveness. We suggest revisions to politeness theory and additional factors that may affect judgments of face sensitivity and advice effectiveness.     

Young children's (Homo sapiens) understanding of knowledge formation in themselves and others.

Three- and 4-year-old children (Homo sapiens) were tested for comprehension of knowledge formation. In Experiment 1, 34 subjects watched as a surprise was hidden under 1 of 4 obscured cups. The experimenter then pointed to the cup. All children searched under the correct cup, but no 3-year-olds (in contrast to most 4-year-olds) could explain how they knew where to look. Subjects then discriminated between simultaneous pointing by 2 adults, one who had hidden a surprise and one who had left the room before the surprise was hidden. Most 4-year-olds (but no 3-year-olds) showed clear discrimination between the adults. In Experiment 2, 16 subjects were tested with procedures designed to make the source of their own knowledge more obvious, but this had no effect on performance. We conclude that studies using very similar procedures with chimpanzees and rhesus macaques were measuring an ability (or inability) to understand how knowledge states form.     

Chimpanzees’ (Pan troglodytes) use of gaze cues in object-choice tasks: different methods yield different results

To assess the influence of different procedures on chimpanzees' performance in object-choice tasks, five adult chimpanzees were tested using three experimenter-given cues to food location: gazing, glancing, and pointing. These cues were delivered to the subjects in an identical fashion but were deployed within the context of two distinct meta-procedures that have been previously employed with this species with conflicting results. In one procedure, the subjects entered the test unit and approached the experimenter (who had already established the cue) on each trial. In the other procedure, the subjects stayed in the test unit throughout a session, witnessed the hiding procedure, and waited for a delay of 10 s during which the cue was provided. The subjects scored at high levels far exceeding chance in response to the gaze cue only when they approached the experimenter for each trial. They performed at chance levels when they stayed inside the test unit throughout the session. They scored at chance levels on all other cues irrespective of the procedure. These findings imply that (a) chimpanzees can immediately exploit social gaze cues, and (b) previous conflicting findings were likely due to the different meta-procedures that were used.     

So, are we the massively lucky species?

We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen's key claims. But Vaesen fails to consider or rebut the possibility that there are deep causal dependencies among the various cognitive traits he identifies as uniquely human. We argue that "higher-order relational reasoning" is one such linchpin trait in the evolution of human tool use, social intelligence, language, and culture.     

Darwin's mistake: explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as "one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.     

Exploitation of pointing as a referential gesture in young children, but not adolescent chimpanzees

The ability of adolescent chimpanzees and 2- and 3-year-old children to use pointing gestures to locate hidden surprises was examined in two experiments. The results revealed that although young 2-year-old children appeared to have no difficulty extracting referential information from a pointing gesture (independent of gaze or distance cues) and spontaneously using it to search in specific locations, adolescent chimpanzees appeared to rely on cueconfiguration and distance-based rules. Thus, although these chimpanzees were trained to respond appropriately to the pointing gestures of a human by searching in a particular location, this ability did not easily generalize to situations in which the distance between the pointing hand and the location were more distal. Furthermore, even those chimpanzees that were able to generalize in this fashion appeared to use distance-based cues, not ones based on an appreciation of the internal attentional focus or mental referent of the experimenter as indicated by his pointing gesture.     

Do chimpanzees tailor their gestural signals to fit the attentional states of others?

The use of vocalizations and tactile gestures by seven juvenile chimpanzees was experimentally investigated. The subjects interacted with an experimenter who typically handed them food rewards. In some trials, however, the experimenter waited 20 s before doing so. In these trials the experimenter’s eyes were either open or closed, or the experimenter was either looking away from the subject or looking directly at him/her inquisitively with head movements. Although the chimpanzees produced at least one of the non-visual gestures mentioned (touching/tapping the experimenter or vocalizing) in 72% of all experimental trials, these actions and vocalizations were deployed without regard to the attentional state of their potential recipient, despite evidence that the subjects noticed the postures that defined the experimenter’s attentional state. The results are discussed in the context of the distinction between the evolution of an understanding of seeing/attention as an internal mental state versus an understanding of behavioral postures alone. Recieved: 12 February 1999 / Accepted after revision: 18 August 1999