Rational Choice Virtues

In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness.     

Obstetric Ultrasound and the Technological Mediation of Morality: A Postphenomenological Analysis

This article analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifacts and its possible role in ethical theory, by taking the postphenomenological approach that has developed around the work of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By elaborating a postphenomenological analysis of the mediating role of ultrasound in moral decisions about abortion, the article argues that technologies embody morality and help to constitute moral subjectivity. This technological mediation of the moral subject is subsequently addressed in terms of Michel Foucault’s ethical position, in which ethics is about actively co-shaping one’s moral subjectivity. Integrating Foucauldian ethics and postphenomenology, the article argues that the technological mediation of moral subjectivity should be at the heart of an ethical approach that takes the moral dimensions of technology seriously.

Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human–technology relations

This article investigates the types of intentionality involved in human–technology relations. It aims to augment Don Ihde’s analysis of the relations between human beings and technological artifacts, by analyzing a number of concrete examples at the limits of Ihde’s analysis. The article distinguishes and analyzes three types of “cyborg intentionality,” which all involve specific blends of the human and the technological. Technologically mediated intentionality occurs when human intentionality takes place “through” technological artifacts; hybrid intentionality occurs when the technological actually merges with the human; and composite intentionality is the addition of human intentionality and the intentionality of technological artifacts.

Let’s Make Things Better: A Reply to My Readers

This article is a reply to the three reviews of my book What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design (Verbeek 2005) in this symposium. It discusses the remarks made by the reviewers along five lines. The first is methodological and concerns the question of how to develop a philosophical approach to technology. The second line discusses the philosophical orientation of the book, and the relations between analytic and continental approaches. Third, I will discuss the metaphysical aspects of the book, in particular the nature and value of the non-modernist approach it aims to set out. Fourth, I will discuss the social and political relevance of the book. Fifth, this will bring me to some concluding remarks about how the postphenomenological perspective developed in the book relates to liberalism, focusing on its suggestions to deliberately design our material environment in terms of mediation.

Trusting Our Selves to Technology

Trust is a central dimension in the relation between human beings and technologies. In many discourses about technology, the relation between human beings and technologies is conceptualized as an external relation: a relation between pre-given entities that can have an impact on each other but that do not mutually constitute each other. From this perspective, relations of trust can vary between reliance, as is present for instance in technological extensionism, and suspicion, as in various precautionary approaches in ethics that focus on technological risks. Against these two interpretations of trust, this article develops a third one. Based on a more internal account of the relations between human beings and technologies, it becomes possible to see that every technological development puts at stake what it means to be a human being. Using technologies, then, implies trusting ourselves to technologies. We argue that this does not imply an uncritical subjection to technology. Rather, recognizing that technologies help to constitute human subjectivity implies that human beings can get actively involved in processes of technological mediation. Trust then has the character of confidence: deliberately trusting oneself to technology.     

Distortions in location memory

Memory for the location of a briefly presented target is often distorted in systematic ways. When people remember dot locations within a circular space, they typically show memory biases that appear to reflect a categorical strategy. However, memory for a target location can also be biased toward visible markers or landmarks. In the present study, we investigated the interaction of categorical and landmark effects by providing sectioning lines in a circular space. In the absence of lines, response biases showed categorical effects, whereas in the presence of lines, response biases suggested that participants used a landmark-based scheme. Possible relations between the strategies are discussed.     

On the Normativity of Intentions

Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy because you violate a requirement of rationality. Both these views have in common that they deny that intending to φ at t creates a reason to φ at t. The third alternative, the one I defend, claims that you often create reasons to φ by intending to φ.     

Irrational Beliefs in Employees with an Adjustment,a Depressive,or an Anxiety Disorder: a Prospective Cohort Study

It remains unclear if patients with different types of common mental disorders, such as adjustment, anxiety and depressive disorders, have the same irrational ideas. The aim of this prospective cohort study (n = 190) is to investigate differences in level and type of irrational beliefs among these groups and to examine whether a change in irrational beliefs is related to symptom recovery. Irrational beliefs (IBI) and symptoms were measured at four points in time: at baseline, after 3, 6 and 12 months. Results showed that diagnostic groups differed in their level of irrational beliefs and this effect remained over time. Highest levels of irrationality were observed in the double diagnosis group, followed by the anxiety disorder group and the depression group. Participants with adjustment disorders showed the lowest levels of irrationality, comparable to a community sample. We did not find differences in the type of irrational beliefs between diagnostic groups. The level of irrationality declined over time for all diagnostic groups. No differences in decrease were observed between diagnostic groups. The magnitude and direction of change in irrational beliefs were related to the magnitude of recovery of depressive, anxiety and stress symptoms over time. These results support the application of general cognitive interventions, especially for patients with a depressive or an anxiety disorder.     

Contributions of category and fine-grained information to location memory: When categories don't weigh in

Several studies have shown that people's memory for location can be influenced by categorical information. According to a model proposed by Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan (1991), people estimate location by combining fine-grained item-level information in memory with category-level information. When the fine-grained information is inexact, category-level information is given greater weight, which leads to biased responses. We manipulated the distribution of locations presented in order to alter the usefulness of category information, and we manipulated background texture in order to alter accuracy of fine-grained memory. The distributional information reduced bias without altering overall accuracy of responding, whereas the background texture manipulation affected accuracy without changing bias. Our results suggest that category information may weigh in only when it is actively processed.     

Poor working memory predicts false memories

Two studies investigated whether individual differences in simple span verbal working memory and complex working memory capacity are related to memory accuracy and susceptibility to false memory development. In Study 1, undergraduate students (N=60) were given two simple span working memory tests: forward and backward digit span. They also underwent a memory task that is known to elicit false memories of nonpresented words, the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Poor simple span working memory (as reflected by suboptimal backward digit span scores) was related to elevated levels of false recognition. Study 2 (N=65) replicated this finding, in that suboptimal backward digit span performance was found to be predictive of false recognition. However, complex working memory capacity (operation span) was not related to false recognition. This pattern suggests that even in a homogenous sample of undergraduates, poor working memory is associated with the susceptibility to recollect words never presented.