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1.
Jeanne Peijnenburg 《Synthese》2012,184(1):101-107
Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the
conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation
and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed. 相似文献
2.
We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a welldefined nonzero probability, even if it is justified
by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic
regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg
has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction we investigate
what Herzberg means by solvability. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making solvability a sine qua non, and we ventilate our misgivings about Herzberg’s suggestion that the notion of solvability might help the foundationalist. 相似文献
3.
A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that
can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence
within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments.
Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more
successful in science than in philosophy.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
4.
Jeanne Peijnenburg 《Erkenntnis》2000,53(3):285-308
It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe solution captures certain intuitions of bothSocrates and Aristotle. 相似文献
5.
Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it
makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one
that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of
posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey
conditionalization. We conclude that, under particular circumstances, Reichenbach’s approach and that of the Bayesians amount
to the same thing, thereby presenting us with a new instance in which chance and credence coincide. 相似文献
6.
We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate
that neither of the objections can be maintained.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
7.
Jeanne Peijnenburg 《Metaphilosophy》2000,31(4):365-381
At its origins, analytic philosophy is an interest in language, science, logic, analysis, and a systematic rather than a historical approach to philosophical problems. Early analytic philosophers were famous for making clear conceptual distinctions and for couching them in comprehensible and lucid sentences. It is argued that this situation is changing, that analytic philosophy is turning into its mirror image and is thereby becoming more like the kind of philosophy that it used to oppose. 相似文献
8.
Despite Quine's recurrent claims to the contrary, the idea is still widespread that indeterminacy of translation is a special case of underdetermination of theories. In this paper we explain how indeterminacy differs from underdetermination, and in what ways such gifted Quine scholars as Gemes and Bergström went astray. 相似文献
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