Developmental levels of processing in metaphor interpretation

We outline a theory of metaphor interpretation. The theory posits varying levels of semantic processing and formalizes them in terms of kinds of semantic-mapping operators that transform properties of the metaphoric vehicle (i.e., predicate) into properties of the metaphoric topic (i.e., subject). We used cognitive-developmental theory to estimate the mental-processing complexity of the various mapping operators, and thereby to predict the timing of their emergence in childhood, and to construct a measure of the metaphoric-processing levels. Metaphor interpretations collected from children (aged 6-12 years) and adults were coded and scored according to the processing levels. In two separate developmental studies, processing score increased with age in a predictable way. Growth in a mental-attentional resource accounted for much of the developmental variance in metaphor interpretation. Possible moderating effects of knowledge and context are discussed.     

Spatial biases in peripersonal space in sighted and blind individuals revealed by a haptic line bisection paradigm

Our representation of peripersonal space does not always accurately reflect the physical world. An example of this is pseudoneglect, a phenomenon in which neurologically normal individuals bisect to the left of the veridical midpoint, reflecting an overrepresentation of the left portion of space compared with the right one. Consistent biases have also been observed in the vertical and radial planes. It is an open question whether these biases depend on normal visual experience for their occurrence. Here we systematically investigated this issue by testing blindfolded sighted and early blind individuals in a haptic line bisection task. Critically, we found a robust leftward bias in all participants. In the vertical and radial planes, sighted participants showed a consistent downward and proximal bias. Conversely, the directional bias in blind participants was dependent on the final movement direction; thus, there was no general bias in either direction. These findings are discussed in terms of different reference frames adopted by sighted and blind participants when encoding space.     

Inhibition: Mental Control Process or Mental Resource?

The current study tested 2 models of inhibition in 45 children with language impairment and 45 children with normally developing language; children were aged 7 to 12 years. Of interest was whether a model of inhibition as a mental-control process (i.e., executive function) or as a mental resource would more accurately reflect the relations among mental-attentional (M) capacity, inhibition, updating, shifting, and language competence. Children completed measures of M-capacity (in the verbal and nonverbal domains), inhibition, updating, shifting, and language. Path analyses showed the data provided a poor fit to the model of inhibition as a mental-control process but a good fit to the model of inhibition as a mental resource. Results are consistent with the theory of constructive operators and suggest inhibition is a mental resource rather than a mental-control process.     

Mental Attention, Consciousness, and the Progressive Emergence of Wisdom

I discuss the mental–attentional mechanisms of consciousness, meditation, and the emergence of wisdom. A developmental (neoPiagetian), dynamic flash-light model of mental attention is used. I model the initial stages of consciousness in infancy, showing that the growth of consciousness is influenced by the number of schemes that attention can coordinate. I discuss ordinary consciousness in adults and the stages/levels of adult development in consciousness. Wisdom is defined as an expectable but often missed outcome of adult development. To accelerate access to wisdom, two complementary paths are mentioned: a natural life-experience path and a meditation path. Maturational organismic factors and the role of mental attentional mechanisms in these two paths are discussed, and a constructivist neuropsychological model of what happens in the brain during meditation, and in higher consciousness, is sketched. Processes involved in higher stages of consciousness are then examined from this perspective.     

The Occipital Cortex in the Blind

ABSTRACT— Studying the brains of blind individuals provides a unique opportunity to investigate how the brain changes and adapts in response to afferent (input) and efferent (output) demands. We discuss evidence suggesting that regions of the brain normally associated with the processing of visual information undergo remarkable dynamic change in response to blindness. These neuroplastic changes implicate not only processing carried out by the remaining senses but also higher cognitive functions such as language and memory. A strong emphasis is placed on evidence obtained from advanced neuroimaging techniques that allow researchers to identify areas of human brain activity, as well as from lesion approaches (both reversible and irreversible) to address the functional relevance and role of these activated areas. A possible mechanism and conceptual framework for these physiological and behavioral changes is proposed.     

Overt naming fMRI pre- and post-TMS: Two nonfluent aphasia patients, with and without improved naming post-TMS

Two chronic, nonfluent aphasia patients participated in overt naming fMRI scans, pre- and post-a series of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) treatments as part of a TMS study to improve naming. Each patient received 10, 1-Hz rTMS treatments to suppress a part of R pars triangularis. P1 was a ‘good responder’ with improved naming and phrase length; P2 was a ‘poor responder’ without improved naming.Pre-TMS (10 years poststroke), P1 had significant activation in R and L sensorimotor cortex, R IFG, and in both L and R SMA during overt naming fMRI (28% pictures named). At 3 mo. post-TMS (42% named), P1 showed continued activation in R and L sensorimotor cortex, R IFG, and in R and L SMA. At 16 mo. post-TMS (58% named), he also showed significant activation in R and L sensorimotor cortex mouth and R IFG. He now showed a significant increase in activation in the L SMA compared to pre-TMS and at 3 mo. post-TMS (p < .02; p < .05, respectively). At 16 mo. there was also greater activation in L than R SMA (p < .08). At 46 mo. post-TMS (42% named), this new LH pattern of activation continued. He improved on the Boston Naming Test from 11 pictures named pre-TMS, to scores ranging from 14 to 18 pictures, post-TMS (2–43 mo. post-TMS). His longest phrase length (Cookie Theft picture) improved from three words pre-TMS, to 5–6 words post-TMS.Pre-TMS (1.5 years poststroke), P2 had significant activation in R IFG (3% pictures named). At 3 and 6 mo. post-TMS, there was no longer significant activation in R IFG, but significant activation was present in R sensorimotor cortex. On all three fMRI scans, P2 had significant activation in both the L and R SMA. There was no new, lasting perilesional LH activation across sessions for this patient. Over time, there was little or no change in his activation. His naming remained only at 1–2 pictures during all three fMRI scans. His BNT score and longest phrase length remained at one word, post-TMS.Lesion site may play a role in each patient’s fMRI activation pattern and response to TMS treatment. P2, the poor responder, had an atypical frontal lesion in the L motor and premotor cortex that extended high, near brain vertex, with deep white matter lesion near L SMA. P2 also had frontal lesion in the posterior middle frontal gyrus, an area important for naming (Duffau et al., 2003); P1 did not. Additionally, P2 had lesion inferior and posterior to Wernicke’s area, in parts of BA 21 and 37, whereas P1 did not.The fMRI data of our patient who had good response following TMS support the notion that restoration of the LH language network is linked in part, to better recovery of naming and phrase length in nonfluent aphasia.