Emergence in physics

In this paper we intend to examine whether there are examples for emergence to be found in physics. The answer depends on the concept of emergence one invokes. We distinguish two such concepts, those of Broad and Kim. We will argue that it is unlikely that there will be examples with respect to the former because it runs counter to an explanatory strategy that is both well entrenched in physical practice and to a certain degree flexible. On the other hand we will argue that all those physical systems that provide an example for supervenience are at the same time examples for emergence - at least if one defines emergence the way Kim does.     

Extended emotion

Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g., Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2006; Wilson, 2000, 2004) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.     

Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me,is it the group or are we all to blame?

According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally, perhaps morally, and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration.     

The impact of experiential avoidance on the relations between illness representations,pain catastrophising and pain interference in chronic pain

Objective: The aim of this study was to examine the effects of experiential avoidance (EA) on the indirect relationship of chronic pain patients’ illness representations to pain interference, through pain catastrophising

Design and main outcome measure: The sample consisted of 162 patients diagnosed with an arthritis-related or a musculoskeletal disorder. The effects of EA on the pathway between illness representations, pain catastrophising and pain interference were examined with PROCESS, a computational tool for SPSS

Results: After controlling for patient and illness-related variables and pain severity, the ‘illness representations–pain catastrophising–pain interference’ pathway was interrupted at the higher levels of EA. The reason was that, at the high levels of EA, either the relation of illness representations to pain catastrophising or the relation of pain catastrophising to pain interference was not statistically significant.

Conclusion: The findings indicate that EA is not a generalised negative response to highly aversive conditions, at least as far as the factors examined in this study are concerned. EA may rather reflect a coping reaction, the impact of which depends on its specific interactions with the other aspects of the self-regulation mechanism. At least in chronic pain, EA should become the focus of potential intervention only when its interaction with the illness-related self-regulation mechanism results in negative outcomes.     

Five‐year outcomes of ADHD diagnosed in adulthood

There is a dearth of long‐term follow‐up studies of adults diagnosed with ADHD. Here, the aim was to evaluate long‐term outcomes in a group of ADHD patients diagnosed in adulthood and receiving routine psychiatric health care. Adults diagnosed with any type of ADHD (n = 52) and healthy controls (n = 73) were assessed at baseline and at a 5‐year follow‐up, using Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF), Clinical Global Impression (CGI), Brown ADD Scale (BADDS) and Adult ADHD Self‐Report Scale (ASRS). A multivariate regression method was used to identify factors predicting 5‐year outcomes, including baseline ratings, medication intensity, comorbidity, intelligence quotient (IQ), age, and sex. After 5 years, ADHD patients reported fewer and/or less severe symptoms compared to baseline, but remained at clinically significant symptom levels and with functional deficits. Baseline self‐reports of ADHD symptoms predicted their own 5‐year outcome and low baseline functioning level predicted improved global functioning at follow‐up. Factors previously reported to predict short‐term outcomes (i.e., medication, comorbidity, IQ, age, and sex) did not anticipate long‐term outcomes in present study.     

Epistemic presentism

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds.     

Social machines: a philosophical engineering

In Weaving the Web (2000), Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain” (201–202). The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear definition of what a Social Machine is, which has in turn resulted in several calls for a “philosophical engineering” (Halpin 2013; Hendler & Berners-Lee 2010); Halpin et al. 2010). This paper is a first attempt to respond to this call, by combining contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science with epistemology. The idea of philosophical engineering implies that a sufficiently good conception of Social Machines should be of both theoretical and practical advantage. To demonstrate how the present approach can satisfy both objectives it will be used in order to address one of Wikipedia’s (the most famous Social Machine to date) most worrying concerns—i.e., the current and ongoing decline in the number of its active contributors (Halfacker et al. 2012).     

Is Time Perspective a Predictor of Anxiety and Perceived Stress? Some Preliminary Results from Greece

In the current studies, we explore the relationship between anxiety / perceived stress and time perspectives. Study 1 tested the relationship between the dimensions of the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI) and anxiety in a male sample. Study 2 examined the relationship between time perspectives and perceived stress in a sample of students. Both studies considered the Deviation of the Balanced Time Perspective (DBTP). In Study 1 psychiatrists of the Mental Health Centre of the Armed Forces in Athens diagnosed generalised anxiety in a number of male participants of the overall sample (n?=?204). All participants completed a validated Greek translation of the ZTPI. In Study 2 a sample of students (n?=?71) of Panteion University completed the Greek translations of the ZTPI and the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-14 items). In Study 1 a negative correlation between Future orientation and anxiety was found. The DBTP was higher in persons with anxiety. In Study 2 the Past Negative and Present Fatalistic orientations correlated with high-perceived stress as assumed. Furthermore, high-perceived stress was associated with a higher DBTP. The ZTPI is particularly important for the explanation of perceived stress. DBTP, Past Negative and Present Fatalistic perspectives are important factors of influence. The measurement of anxiety should be re-examined.