The role of gestures in spatial working memory and speech

Co-speech gestures traditionally have been considered communicative, but they may also serve other functions. For example, hand-arm movements seem to facilitate both spatial working memory and speech production. It has been proposed that gestures facilitate speech indirectly by sustaining spatial representations in working memory. Alternatively, gestures may affect speech production directly by activating embodied semantic representations involved in lexical search. Consistent with the first hypothesis, we found participants gestured more when describing visual objects from memory and when describing objects that were difficult to remember and encode verbally. However, they also gestured when describing a visually accessible object, and gesture restriction produced dysfluent speech even when spatial memory was untaxed, suggesting that gestures can directly affect both spatial memory and lexical retrieval.     

The subjective effort of everyday mental tasks: Attending,assessing, and choosing

Why are some mental tasks experienced as more effortful than others? Answers to this question about subjective effort have begun to be addressed by researchers investigating why some mental tasks are associated with more ‘elbow grease’ or ‘depletion’ than other tasks. It has been proposed that tasks such as sustained attention should be accompanied by more subjective effort than other tasks, such as assessing (e.g., counting a handful of items) or choosing randomly between two alternatives. In general, these proposals coincide with people’s intuitions regarding how effort should vary by mental task. However, little laboratory data have corroborated these conclusions. In two studies, we cataloged the relative amount of subjective effort associated with some basic and ubiquitous mental activities: attending (most subjective effort), assessing, and choosing (least subjective effort). Results support hypotheses about subjective effort. Because subjective effort is perceived to be experienced by a subject, we explored also the relationship between effort and the involvement of the ‘psychological self.’     

Evidence for a cascade model of lexical access in speech production

How word production unfolds remains controversial. Serial models posit that phonological encoding begins only after lexical node selection, whereas cascade models hold that it can occur before selection. Both models were evaluated by testing whether unselected lexical nodes influence phonological encoding in the picture-picture interference paradigm. English speakers were shown pairs of superimposed pictures and were instructed to name one picture and ignore another. Naming was faster when target pictures were paired with phonologically related (bed-bell) than with unrelated (bed-pin) distractors. This suggests that the unspoken distractors exerted a phonological influence on production. This finding is inconsistent with serial models but in line with cascade ones. The facilitation effect was not replicated in Italian with the same pictures, supporting the view that the effect found in English was caused by the phonological properties of the stimuli.     

Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: A new experimental paradigm for consciousness research

The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the Reflexive Imagery Task, a paradigm in which, as a function of external control, conscious content is triggered reliably and unintentionally: When instructed to not subvocalize the name of a stimulus object, participants reliably failed to suppress the set-related imagery. This stimulus-elicited content is considered ‘high-level’ content and, in terms of stages of processing, occurs late in the processing stream. We discuss the implications of this paradigm for consciousness research.     

Sources of avoidance motivation: Valence effects from physical effort and mental rotation

When reaching goals, organisms must simultaneously meet the overarching goal of conserving energy. According to the law of least effort, organisms will select the means associated with the least effort. The mechanisms underlying this bias remain unknown. One hypothesis is that organisms come to avoid situations associated with unnecessary effort by generating a negative valence toward the stimuli associated with such situations. Accordingly, merely using a dysfunctional, ‘slow’ computer mouse causes participants to dislike ambient neutral images (Study 1). In Study 2, nonsense shapes were liked less when associated with effortful processing (135° of mental rotation) versus easier processing (45° of rotation). Complementing ‘fluency’ effects found in perceptuo-semantic research, valence emerged from action-related processing in a principled fashion. The findings imply that negative valence associations may underlie avoidance motivations, and have practical implications for educational/workplace contexts in which effort and positive affect are conducive to success.     

The function of phenomenal states: supramodular interaction theory

Discovering the function of phenomenal states remains a formidable scientific challenge. Research on consciously penetrable conflicts (e.g., "pain-for-gain" scenarios) and impenetrable conflicts (as in the pupillary reflex, ventriloquism, and the McGurk effect [H. McGurk & J. MacDonald, 1976]) reveals that these states integrate diverse kinds of information to yield adaptive action. Supramodular interaction theory proposes that phenomenal states play an essential role in permitting interactions among supramodular response systems--agentic, independent, multimodal, information-processing structures defined by their concerns (e.g., instrumental action vs. certain bodily needs). Unlike unconscious processes (e.g., pupillary reflex), these processes may conflict with skeletal muscle plans, as described by the principle of parallel responses into skeletal muscle (PRISM). Without phenomenal states, these systems would be encapsulated and incapable of collectively influencing skeletomotor action.     

Pragmatic Perspectives on the Psychology of Meaning

A recurrent idea in the history of psychology is that one is conscious of outputs but not of the complex processes underlying the generation of outputs, which is evident in the out-of-the-blue, “eureka-like” experiences associated with intuition. We examine how this idea may suffer from a logical fallacy and may thus have inadvertently hindered progress on the study of the intimate liaisons among high-level central processes, intuition, and overt action. It is proposed that, for various reasons, the only undisputable output in the nervous system is overt action. Once this is accepted, the overlooked relationship between conscious central processes and overt action can be examined. A review of the evidence reveals that conscious processing is in the business of, not low-level perceptual processing, motor control, or action production per se, but of constraining a peculiar form of knowledge-based, integrated action-goal selection, which can lead to integrated actions such as holding one's breath. Unconscious processing can influence behavior indirectly, by producing these conscious constraining dimensions that modulate action-goal selection, or directly, through unintegrated actions such as reflexively inhaling or responding to a subliminal stimulus. From this standpoint, eureka-like intuitions reflect not an atypical brain process but the general nature by which unconscious machinations influence action either directly or indirectly, through the limited purview of consciousness.     

Traditional response interference effects from anticipated action outcomes: a response-effect compatibility paradigm

An act as simple as pressing a button involves various stages of processing. Each stage of action production is susceptible to interference from competing representations/processes. For example, in the Simon Effect, interference arises from an incongruence between incidental spatial information and the spatial properties of intended action; in the flanker task, interference arises when visual targets and distracters are associated with different responses (response interference [RI]). Less interference arises in the flanker task when targets and distracters are different in appearance but associated with the same response (perceptual interference [PI]). Interference also stems from the automatic activation of representations associated with the anticipated effects of an action, response-effect (R–E) compatibility (e.g., the presence of a left-pointing arrow after one presses a button on the right will increase interference in future trials). This has been explained by ideomotor theory—that the mental representation of anticipated action-effects are activated automatically by voluntary action and that such representations can cause facilitation or interference by automatically priming their associated action plans. To illuminate the nature of action production and provide additional support for ideomotor theory, we examined for the first time the effects of PI and RI in a new R–E compatibility paradigm.     

The function of phenomenal states: is there progress for the "softer problem" of consciousness?

The function of phenomenal states remains a mystery, primarily because of the prevalent, a priori view that these states serve no functional role. This note is a call to arms against this uncorroborated and counterproductive view, which continues to stifle research on the topic. It is proposed that, given what we know and can accomplish with the tools at hand, discovering the function of phenomenal states has become a tractable problem, easier than that of discovering the neural basis of these states--the "hard problem" of consciousness. A simple method that may unveil the function of phenomenal states is presented. It involves contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes.