SPIRITUAL INTELLIGENCE: PROCESSING DIFFERENT INFORMATION OR PROCESSING INFORMATION DIFFERENTLY?

This article introduces the concept of spiritual intelligence in terms of a natural human ability to take a different perspective on reality rather than an extraordinary ability to engage with a different/supernatural reality. From a cognitive perspective, spiritual intelligence entails a re-balancing of the two main modes of human cognition, with a prioritization of the holistic-intuitive mind over the conceptual one. From the psychological and phenomenological perspectives, it involves a different kind of engagement with information: slower, more participatory, less objectifying, and not focused entirely on problem solving. The article ends with a reflection on the theological implications of the proposed model and how such an account of spiritual intelligence as knowing differently might relate to theological anthropology and the theology of the spirit and the spiritual.     

The notion of elements in the visual field in a theory of visual attention: A reply to van der Velde and van der Heijden (1993)

Van der Velde and van der Heijden (1993) criticized the way in which the notion of elements in the visual field is used in my theory of visual attention (Bundesen, 1990) and in my reinterpretation of Nissen’s (1985) findings (Bundesen, 1991). The critique is repudiated here. Idefend the critical assumption that perceptual units (elements in the visual field), formed on the basis ofprecategorica4 sensory information, can be addressed by later processes before any perceptual categorizations have been made. I also point out that, despite the claims of van der Velde and van der Heijden, my reinterpretation of Nissen’s findings is testable.     

Is visual attention automatically attracted by one’s own name?

Subjects were presented with briefly exposed visual displays of words that were common first names with a length of four to six letters. In the main experiment, each display consisted of four words: two names shown in red and two shown in white. The subject’s task was to report the red names (targets), but ignore the white ones (distractors). On some trials the subject’s own name appeared as a display item (target or distractor). Presentation of the subject’s name as a distractor caused no more interference with report of targets than did presentation of other names as distractors. Apparently, visual attention was not automatically attracted by the subject’s own name.     

Very clever homunculus: Compound stimulus strategies for the explicit task-cuing procedure

In two experiments, subjects were given arbitrary letter cues or meaningful word cues that specified the task to be performed on a subsequent target stimulus. Letter and word cues were presented in separate blocks. There were two cues of each type for each task. Three kinds of transitions separated tasks:cue repetitions, in which both the cue and the task repeated;task repetitions, in which the cue changed but the task repeated; andtask alternations, in which both the cue and the task changed. Responses were faster for cue than for task repetitions for both cue types. With word cues, task repetitions were not reliably faster than task alternations. With letter cues, task repetitions were reliably faster than task alternations in the first block but not in the second block. The results suggest that subjects responded to the compound of the cue and the target rather than switching task set between trials.     

Depression and cognitive impairment in disability-free early multiple sclerosis

Cognitive and emotional capabilities were evaluated in 73 female patients with stable relapsing-remitting definite, and/or laboratory-supported multiple sclerosis (MS) and were compared with 32 matched healthy controls. Patients were categorized according to their score in the expanded disability status scale (EDSS) to either no (EDSS 0, n = 33) or few clinical signs (EDSS 1-2, n = 40) of MS without physical disability. Patients with EDSS > 0 were characterized by significantly (p < 0.001) higher scores on "von Zerssen's" depression scale, compared to controls. Patients with higher EDSS scores (1-2) showed significantly decreased performance with respect to the total score of Kimura's Recurring-Figures-Test (p < 0.001), in addition. Regarding visuo-constructive functioning, patients with EDSS=0 performed to a significantly lower level (p < 0.001), compared to controls. These results indicate that depression may present as an early sign in MS followed by cognitive impairment, in particular visuo-spatial short-term memory, before physical disability appears. Neuropsychological tests as mentioned here could serve as early diagnostic tools to detect subtle disease progression and to initiate and monitor disease modifying therapies.     

Neural control of voluntary eye closure: a case study and an fMRI investigation of blinking and winking

The current paper describes a rare case of a patient who suffered from unilateral apraxia of eye closure as a result of a bilateral stroke. Interestingly, the patient's ability to voluntarily close both eyelids (i.e. blinking) was not affected, indicating that different neural mechanisms control each type of eye closure. The stroke caused damage to a large part of the right frontal cortex, including the motor cortex, pre-motor cortex and the frontal eye field (FEF). The lesion in the left hemisphere was restricted to the FEF. In order to further study the neural mechanisms of eye closure, we conducted an fMRI study in a group of neurological healthy subjects. We found that all areas of the oculomotor cortex were activated by both left and right winking, including the FEF, supplementary eye field (SEF), and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). Blinking activated FEF and SEF, but not PPC. Both FEF and PPC were significantly more active during winking than blinking. Together, these results provide evidence for a critical role of the FEF in voluntary unilateral eye closure.     

Leader mistreatment,employee hostility,and deviant behaviors: Integrating self-uncertainty and thwarted needs perspectives on deviance

Integrating self-uncertainty management and thwarted needs perspectives on leader mistreatment and workplace deviance, we examine when and why leader mistreatment is associated with workplace deviance. We propose that competence uncertainty strengthens the relationship between leader mistreatment and workplace deviance and that hostility mediates this interactive effect. Four field studies and one experiment support the hypotheses. The first two studies provide evidence for the predicted interaction between leader mistreatment and competence uncertainty, and the next three studies demonstrate that hostility mediates this interactive effect. We discuss an extended social exchange explanation of workplace deviance and highlight the psychological interplay between motives, cognition, and affect in reciprocating leader mistreatment.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.