What are you dieting for? The role of lay theories in dieters' goal setting

Through a qualitative study of a sample of Weight Watchers dieters, this research provides insight about the relationship between goal setting and lay theories—people's basic assumptions about the malleability of their personal attributes. We find that dieters set very different types of superordinate and subordinate goals depending on the lay theory (entity vs. incremental) they hold. Dieters who hold entity theory, which underscores immutability of abilities, set superordinate goals focused on avoiding negative social evaluations. These dieters also seem to set subordinate goals that minimize effort in diet, physical activity, and the use of group meetings necessary for weight loss. Among dieters holding incremental theory, which emphasizes malleability of abilities through learning, weight loss is guided by superordinate goals that promote change in the self. Incremental‐theory dieters also set subordinate goals that encourage rather than limit revamping lifestyle. These findings offer contributions to lay theories and goal setting in consumer research as well as implications for developing more successful weight‐loss practices. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explanation is a Genus: An Essay on the Varieties of Scientific Explanation

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explainswithout drawing attention to causes–that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinctfrom that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes theexplanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation ofthe standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physicaltheories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals oraspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insightfor a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstoneof a new theory of scientific method.     

Anticipation of future events in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and rats (Rattus norvegicus): tests of the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis

The Bischof-Kohler hypothesis holds that nonhuman animals cannot anticipate a future event and take appropriate action when that event involves satisfaction of a need not currently experienced. Tests of the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis were performed with squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and rats (Rattus norvegicus). In experimental trials with both species, a nonthirsty animal had its water bottle removed and then chose between a smaller and larger quantity of food. Consumption of the food induced thirst. Choice of the smaller quantity led to the return of the water bottle sooner than choice of the larger quantity. Monkeys reversed their baseline preference for the larger quantity of food when the experimental contingencies were introduced, but rats continued to prefer the larger amount. Although the rat findings support the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis, the monkey findings challenge it.     

Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

When rock bottom rocks your world: Crisis of belief as a catalyst for change

An experience of severe difficulty can turn the world upside-down, causing individuals to question important beliefs with which they identify. This phenomenon, which we label as Crisis of Belief (COB), amalgamates the disparate conceptualizations of crisis that exist across several subdisciplines of psychology. Unlike existing ideas of crisis, COB distinguishes itself from stress or trauma alone, and is a clearly specified construct that lends itself to practical operationalization and study. Thus, COB addresses a key gap in literature and offers unique value for understanding how hardship that affects closely held beliefs can catalyze change. We conclude by describing the potential utility of COB as a predictor of both positive (e.g., life satisfaction) and negative (e.g., depression) outcomes and the pressing need for a validated measure.