The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.     

Reducing self-control by weakening belief in free will

Believing in free will may arise from a biological need for control. People induced to disbelieve in free will show impulsive and antisocial tendencies, suggesting a reduction of the willingness to exert self-control. We investigated whether undermining free will affects two aspects of self-control: intentional inhibition and perceived self-control. We exposed participants either to anti-free will or to neutral messages. The two groups (no-free will and control) then performed a task that required self-control to inhibit a prepotent response. No-free will participants showed less intentional inhibitions than controls, suggesting a reduction of self-control. We assessed perceived self-control by asking participants whether the response resulted from a deliberate intention or from an impulsive reaction. Perceived self-control was lower in the no-free will group than in control group. Our findings show that undermining free will can degrade self-control and provide insights into how disbelieving in free will leads to antisocial tendencies.     

Exploring social and personal relationships: The issue of measurement invariance of non‐independent observations

In social psychology, some research questions address a comparison of individuals belonging to different social or relational contexts. As measurement invariance literature has indicated, before comparing two or more groups (gender, cultures, and relationship types), the question of whether a measurement of the construct used for the comparison is invariant must be verified. Measurement invariance helps to assure the validity of the measurement and the construct equivalence across groups. However, when non‐independent data are used for comparison (the same individual provides data for his or her different relationship types), the standard multigroup analyses for testing measurement invariance are not accurate. The current study presents a modified correlated uniqueness model that may be applied in these specific cases. As an example, we analyzed the invariance of the Intimate Disclosure scale and the Conflict scale in mother–child, father–child, and romantic relationships of young adults. Results indicate a partial invariance: only configural invariance, factor loading invariance, and factor covariance invariance were found. The consequences for validity of the measurement are then discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.     

Felt obligation and the family life cycle: A study on intergenerational relationships

Since the 1990s researchers have considered as the dominant view on family obligation a set of responsibilities, duties, and obligation of care and assistance, that adult children should assume when parents are old or infirm. This concept is limited, because it assumes that family obligation is salient only in one period of life: when parents reach old age and are infirm. In contrast, a relational approach to family obligation considers family relationships as central to understanding children's duties and responsibilities. Following Stein, family obligation can be defined as felt obligation: expectations for appropriate and negotiated behaviour, perceived within the context of specific personal relationships with kin across life course. Felt obligation is conceptualized in five dimensions: a duty to maintain contact, assistance, avoidance of conflict, personal sharing, and self‐sufficiency. The purpose of the present study was to analyze perceptions of felt obligation in intergenerational relationships (parent–child and family of origin) in different phases of the family life cycle in a specific cultural context (Italy). The sample was composed of 92 parents with children of different ages (infants, school‐aged children, and young adults). The measure addressed the five dimensions of felt obligation, all assessed in various phases of family life. Results indicated differences in dimensions of felt obligation between intergenerational relationships (both parent–child and with family of origin). Some of these differences, such as self‐sufficiency and personal sharing, assumed more importance and salience in some periods of the life cycle than in others.     

Achievement emotions in elementary,middle, and high school: How do students feel about specific contexts in terms of settings and subject‐domains?

The present work investigates students' representation of achievement emotions, focusing in context‐specific situations in terms of settings and subject‐domains, as a function of grade level. We involved 527 fourth‐, seventh‐, and eleventh‐graders, who evaluated ten discrete emotions through questionnaires, with reference to verbal language and mathematics, and different settings (class, homework, tests). Confirmatory multitrait‐multimethod analyses indicated higher salience of subject‐domains rather than settings for all the emotions; however, complexity of reality was best explained when also settings were accounted for. Analyses of variance revealed higher intensity of positive emotions for younger students, and the opposite pattern for older students; significant differences for most of the emotions based on the evaluative nature of settings, moderated by class levels; more intense positive emotions for mathematics and more intense negative emotions for Italian. Results are discussed considering their theoretical and applied relevance, corroborating previous literature on domain‐specificity.     

Impact of Genetic Counseling in Women with a Family History of Breast Cancer in Italy

As the impact of breast cancer (BC) risk assessment in asymptomatic women with a family history of BC had never been explored in Italy, we performed a study on a retrospective series of women who had undergone BC risk assessment. To this aim, a semi-structured telephone interview was administered to 82 women. Most participants considered the information received as clear (96.2 %) and helpful (76.8 %). Thirty-eight (46.3 %) stated that their perceived risk of BC had changed after the counseling: for 40.2 % it had decreased, for 6.1 % increased; however, women highly overestimating their risk at the baseline (≥4-fold) failed to show improvements in risk perception accuracy. Sixty-six women (80.5 %) stated they had followed the recommended surveillance, while 19.5 % had not, mainly due to difficulties in arranging examinations. Most women (89.0 %) had shared the information with their relatives, with 57.3 % reporting other family members had undertaken the recommended surveillance. BC risk assessment was associated with high rates of satisfaction and had a favorable impact on risk perception in a subgroup of women. The impact on surveillance adhesion extended to relatives. Organized programs for identification and surveillance may help identify a larger fraction of at-risk women and overcome the reported difficulties in arranging surveillance.