Mood effects on attitude judgments: independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration.

This study investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Experiment 1, positive or negative mood was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a good rather than in a bad mood at the time of attitude assessment. In Experiment 2, Ss exposed to a counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their reported attitudes on global evaluations.     

On-line and memory-based modification of attitudes: determinants of message recall-attitude change correspondence

Experiments investigated the impact of message elaboration on attitude change-message recall correspondence when attitude change occurs in an on-line (as attitude-relevant information is received), or memory-based (on the basis of retrieved attitude-relevant information) fashion. In 2 experiments, Ss' processing goals were manipulated to increase or inhibit on-line change and message elaboration. As predicted, Ss reported postexposure attitudes more rapidly in on-line vs memory-based conditions. Decreased message elaboration increased attitude-recall correspondence, regardless of when attitude change occurred. Increased elaboration produced elaboration-attitude judgment correspondence. Results suggest that recall of message content will best predict persuasion when message content is encoded free of elaborations, regardless of when attitude change occurs.     

Processing of persuasive in-group messages

Two studies investigated the processes mediating the persuasive impact of messages representing in-group opinions. In the 1st study, subjects read either a strong or a weak message attributed to either an in-group member or to another group. Subjects were more persuaded by a strong message from the in-group than a weak one, suggesting content-focused processing of the in-group message. Subjects were equally unpersuaded by either a strong or a weak message from the other group, and showed little sign of message processing. In the 2nd study, Ss listened to in-group or other-group messages about issues that varied in their relevance to in-group membership. When the issue was relevant to the in-group, subjects were persuaded by a strong message from the in-group, unpersuaded by a weak message from the in-group, and equally unimpressed by strong and weak messages from the other group. When the issue was irrelevant to the in-group, subjects accepted the position advocated by the in-group regardless of message quality, and again ignored messages from the other group. These results suggest that increased message processing, and not merely the impact of source persuasion cues, can underlie in-group-mediated attitude change.     

The Individuation of Actions

I argue against a view of the individuation of actions endorsed most notably by Hornsby and Davidson. This is the view that in, for example, Anscombe's case of the pumping man, we have a single action which can be described, variously, as a pumping, a poisoning and so on. I argue that, even in the area of the standard arguments against this view, such as that based on the logic of 'by' and the argument from temporal dimensions, the case against the Davidson-Hornsby view has not been made as strong as it ought to have been. I show how those standard arguments can be strengthened; and I argue that the principal considerations adduced in support of the view do not in fact lend it the support that they have been widely thought to lend it. I conclude that the view should be rejected.     

Intergroup emotions: explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context

Three studies tested the idea that when social identity is salient, group-based appraisals elicit specific emotions and action tendencies toward out-groups. Participants' group memberships were made salient and the collective support apparently enjoyed by the in-group was measured or manipulated. The authors then measured anger and fear (Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (Study 3), as well as the desire to move against or away from the out-group. Intergroup anger was distinct from intergroup fear, and the inclination to act against the out-group was distinct from the tendency to move away from it. Participants who perceived the in-group as strong were more likely to experience anger toward the out-group and to desire to take action against it. The effects of perceived in-group strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger.     

The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change

Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change.     

Animalism versus Lockeanism: No Contest

In 'Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy', The Philosophical Quarterly , 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo-Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo-Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo-Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan's new neo-Lockean proposal is inadequate.
email : david.mackie@oriel.oxford.ac.uk     

Discrete emotions elucidate the effects of crossed-categorization on prejudice

Three studies integrated crossed-categorization and discrete emotion approaches to prejudice and prejudice reduction. Study 1 made salient crossed-categorization using naturally occurring groups and examined the ability of emotions to account for prejudiced evaluations. Study 2 constructed novel crossed-categorizations in the laboratory to examine the role of appraisal-based emotions in evaluations of crossed-categories. Study 3 crossed gender and sexual orientation, for which elicited discrete emotions predict different evaluative responses than do shared and unshared group memberships alone. In all three studies, discrete emotions were able to account for the effects of crossed-categorization on evaluative measures of prejudice and revealed emotional paths to prejudice reduction which would be obscured by the evaluative measures alone. In Study 3, a discrete emotions approach better predicted evaluations than did shared and unshared group membership alone. These results converge to highlight the importance of discrete emotions in understanding the evaluative implications of crossed-categorization, especially for prejudice reduction.