Modeling error variance in job specification ratings: the influence of rater, job, and organization-level factors

The authors modeled sources of error variance in job specification ratings collected from 3 levels of raters across 5 organizations (N=381). Variance components models were used to estimate the variance in ratings attributable to true score (variance between knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics [KSAOs]) and error (KSAO-by-rater and residual variance). Subsequent models partitioned error variance into components related to the organization, position level, and demographic characteristics of the raters. Analyses revealed that the differential ordering of KSAOs by raters was not a function of these characteristics but rather was due to unexplained rating differences among the raters. The implications of these results for job specification and validity transportability are discussed.     

Behavioral perspectives on the neuroscience of drug addiction

Neuroscientific approaches to drug addiction traditionally have been based on the premise that addiction is a process that results from brain changes that in turn result from chronic administration of drugs of abuse. An alternative approach views drug addiction as a behavioral disorder in which drugs function as preeminent reinforcers. Although there is a fundamental discrepancy between these two approaches, the emerging neuroscience of reinforcement and choice behavior eventually may shed light on the brain mechanisms involved in excessive drug use. Behavioral scientists could assist in this understanding by devoting more attention to the assessment of differences in the reinforcing strength of drugs and by attempting to develop and validate behavioral models of addiction.     

Speeded retrieval abolishes the false-memory suppression effect: Evidence for the distinctiveness heuristic

We examined two different accounts of why studying distinctive information reduces false memories within the DRM paradigm. The impoverished relational encoding account predicts that less memorial information, such as overall familiarity, is elicited by the critical lure after distinctive encoding than after nondistinctive encoding. By contrast, the distinctiveness heuristic predicts that participants use a deliberate retrieval strategy to withhold responding to the critical lures. This retrieval strategy refers to a decision rule whereby the absence of memory for expected distinctive information is taken as evidence for an event’s nonoccurrence. We show that the typical false-recognition suppression effect only occurs when the recognition test is self paced. This suppression effect is abolished when participants make recognition decisions under time pressure, such as within 1 second of seeing the test item. These results are consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic that a time-consuming retrieval strategy is used to reduce false-recognition responses.     

Why distinctive information reduces false memories: evidence for both impoverished relational-encoding and distinctiveness heuristic accounts

Two accounts explain why studying pictures reduces false memories within the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (J. Deese, 1959; H. L. Roediger & K. B. McDermott, 1995). The impoverished relational-encoding account suggests that studying pictures interferes with the encoding of relational information, which is the primary basis for false memories in this paradigm. Alternatively, the distinctiveness heuristic assumes that critical lures are actively withheld by the use of a retrieval strategy. When participants were given inclusion recall instructions to report studied items as well as related items, they still reported critical lures less often after picture encoding than they did after word encoding. As the impoverished relational-encoding account suggests, critical lures appear less likely to come to mind after picture encoding than they do after word encoding. However, the results from a postrecall recognition test provide evidence in favor of the distinctiveness heuristic.     

Sensitivity reductions in false recognition: a measure of false memories with stronger theoretical implications

Signal detection analyses of recognition memory indicate that a bias to respond "old" is large for critical words that are centrally related with previously encoded word lists, is small for words that are less related, and is not observed for unrelated words. Also, recognition sensitivity has not been previously shown to differ between those conditions, which has focused debate over how to explain false recognition on the bias differences. In 3 experiments, critical-word sensitivity was lower than sensitivity for other word types, but related-word sensitivity was not lower than sensitivity for unrelated words. Extant models that predict reduced critical-word sensitivity also predict lower sensitivity for related words than for unrelated words. These results provide crucial new constraints on theoretical explanations of false memories.     

Dissociable Neural Subsystems Underlie Abstract and Specific Object Recognition

Participants named objects presented in the left or right visual field during a test phase, after viewing centrally presented same-exemplar objects, different-exemplar objects, and words that name objects during an initial encoding phase. In two experiments, repetition priming was exemplar-abstract yet visual when test objects were presented directly to the left cerebral hemisphere, but exemplar-specific when test objects were presented directly to the right cerebral hemisphere, contrary to predictions from single-system theories of object recognition. In two other experiments, stimulus degradation during encoding and task demands during test modulated these results in predicted ways. The results support the theory that dissociable neural subsystems operate in parallel (not in sequence) to underlie visual object recognition: An abstract-category subsystem operates more effectively than a specific-exemplar subsystem in the left hemisphere, and a specific-exemplar subsystem operates more effectively than an abstract-category subsystem in the right hemisphere.     

THE BIG FIVE PERSONALITY TRAITS, GENERAL MENTAL ABILITY, AND CAREER SUCCESS ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN

The present study investigated the relationship of traits from the 5-factor model of personality (often termed the "Big Five") and general mental ability with career success. Career success was argued to be comprised of intrinsic success (job satisfaction) and extrinsic success (income and occupational status) dimensions. Data were obtained from the Intergenerational Studies, a set of 3 studies that followed participants from early childhood to retirement. The most general findings were that conscientiousness positively predicted intrinsic and extrinsic career success, neuroticism negatively predicted extrinsic success, and general mental ability positively predicted extrinsic career success. Personality was related to career success controlling for general mental ability and, though adulthood measures of the Big Five traits were more strongly related to career success than were childhood measures, both contributed unique variance in explaining career success.     

Frequent false hearing by older adults: the role of age differences in metacognition

In two experiments testing age differences in the subjective experience of listening, which we call meta-audition, young and older adults were first trained to learn pairs of semantic associates. Following training, both groups were tested on identification of words presented in noise, with the critical manipulation being whether the target item was congruent, incongruent, or neutral with respect to prior training. Results of both experiments revealed that older adults compared to young adults were more prone to "false hearing," defined as mistaken high confidence in the accuracy of perception when a spoken word had been misperceived. These results were obtained even when performance was equated across age groups on control items by reducing the noise level for older adults. Such false hearing is shown to reflect older adults' heavier reliance on context. Findings suggest that older adults' greater ability to benefit from semantic context reflects their bias to respond consistently with the context, rather than their greater skill in using context. Procedures employed are unique in measuring the subjective experience of hearing as well as its accuracy. Both theoretical and applied implications of the findings are discussed. Convergence of results with those showing higher false memory, and false seeing are interpreted as showing that older adults are less able to constrain their processing in ways that are optimal for performance of a current task. That lessened constraint may be associated with decline in frontal-lobe functioning.     

Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation

In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.