Self-image,perception of peers' risk acceptance and risky shift

Twelve four-person female groups of subjects displaying the typical underestimation of their peers' (relative to their own) risk acceptance were compared with twelve groups of subjects who (slightly) overestimated their peers' risk acceptance. Risk level was measured by responses to a set of hypothetical decision situations known to elicit risky shift on the basis of previous research. Risky shift following group discussion was not found to be different for the two types of groups, casting doubt on the widely suggested role of peer underestimation in risky shift. Nor was risky shift affected by whether or not group members stated their individual decisions publicly at the close of discussion. Larger group risky shifts were accompanied by higher self-ratings given by group members on a number of polarity scales. In discussing the findings, we outline an explanation of group-induced shifts in risk taking, emphasizing the motivational and informational inducements provided by group discussion whereby group members come to discard their prior positions in favor of more aspired ones.     

Factors limiting the generality of the risky-shift phenomenon

While a considerable amount of research has centered on explaining the risky shift (enhancement of risk acceptance through group discussion; see, for example, Dion, Baron, and Miller, 1970), few studies have investigated the generality of the phenomenon. Three of several ways in which the laboratory context is usually lacking of reality are: (a) The decision consequences are imaginary, as in the ‘Choice-Dilemma’ situations used in most of the risky-shift research; (b) the decision consequences - even if they are real (e.g. money) - are slight; and (c) the decisions are made for oneself (whereas in real life many decisions involve agents acting on behalf of others). The present study was designed to investigate the effects of the above three factors - type of incentive, magnitude of stake and decision target - using a betting task as the decision situation.     

The notion of elements in the visual field in a theory of visual attention: A reply to van der Velde and van der Heijden (1993)

Van der Velde and van der Heijden (1993) criticized the way in which the notion of elements in the visual field is used in my theory of visual attention (Bundesen, 1990) and in my reinterpretation of Nissen’s (1985) findings (Bundesen, 1991). The critique is repudiated here. Idefend the critical assumption that perceptual units (elements in the visual field), formed on the basis ofprecategorica4 sensory information, can be addressed by later processes before any perceptual categorizations have been made. I also point out that, despite the claims of van der Velde and van der Heijden, my reinterpretation of Nissen’s findings is testable.     

Is visual attention automatically attracted by one’s own name?

Subjects were presented with briefly exposed visual displays of words that were common first names with a length of four to six letters. In the main experiment, each display consisted of four words: two names shown in red and two shown in white. The subject’s task was to report the red names (targets), but ignore the white ones (distractors). On some trials the subject’s own name appeared as a display item (target or distractor). Presentation of the subject’s name as a distractor caused no more interference with report of targets than did presentation of other names as distractors. Apparently, visual attention was not automatically attracted by the subject’s own name.     

Input integration and input weighting in decisions on allocations of gains and losses

Although the concept of relevance (or weight) of inputs plays a central role in equity theory, it has not been clearly defined. The present investigation attempts to answer the question of when, and which, inputs are taken into account in allocation decisions. Subjects were given a stimulus story in which two fictitious persons had, through joint work, produced a monetary gain or loss; further, information was provided on the relative effort (amount of time worked intensively) and /or ability (as determined by a test) that each stimulus person had contributed. Subjects were asked how they would allocate the gain or loss. Empirical evidence for the following three codeterminants of allocation decisions was obtained: (1) the type of input—personal and behavioural characteristics are [relevant] for allocation if they are perceived as (a) causallv important for outcome production, (b) variable, and (c) under the person's volitional control; (2) the type of outcome to be allocated—more equal allocations are observed when loss as opposed to gain must be allocated; and (3) the constellation of individual inputs on given dimensions—information is given on several input dimensions, a dimension which should be [irrelevant] according to criteria (a), (b), and (c) does codetermine allocations when recipients have contributed equally with respect to this dimension. The latter finding is discussed from the perspective of [cognitive algebra].     

Future orientation of institutionalized and noninstitutionalized delinquents and nondelinquents

The present study is an analysis of the relationship between delinquency, institutionalization and future orientation, based on a social-learning theoretical framework. Two hundred and forty male adolescents (institutionalized and noninstitutionalized delinquents and nondelinquents) answered open and structured questions concerning their anticipations and evaluations of the future. The data were analysed by analyses of variance and t-tests and partly confirm the hypotheses: Delinquents structure their future in a less differentiated, less extended, and more internal way than nondelinquents. This was especially true for the institutionalized delinquents. However, delinquents structured their fears concerning their personal development more extensively than nondelinquents. Future orientation varied according to the length of institutionalization in different domains of life. These results do not support the dominant assumption of the literature that delinquents have an unrealistic future orientation. Rather, it is shown here that institutionalized delinquents anticipate rather negative future events which they expect to occur shortly after the time of their release. However, the present results have to be cautiously interpreted on account of the special selection of the sample and the rather short duration of institutionalization. Also, the method of a differentiated measurement of future orientation used here is hardly practiced in the literature though such a conceptualization as a multidimensional construct seems to be theoretically fruitful.     

Very clever homunculus: Compound stimulus strategies for the explicit task-cuing procedure

In two experiments, subjects were given arbitrary letter cues or meaningful word cues that specified the task to be performed on a subsequent target stimulus. Letter and word cues were presented in separate blocks. There were two cues of each type for each task. Three kinds of transitions separated tasks:cue repetitions, in which both the cue and the task repeated;task repetitions, in which the cue changed but the task repeated; andtask alternations, in which both the cue and the task changed. Responses were faster for cue than for task repetitions for both cue types. With word cues, task repetitions were not reliably faster than task alternations. With letter cues, task repetitions were reliably faster than task alternations in the first block but not in the second block. The results suggest that subjects responded to the compound of the cue and the target rather than switching task set between trials.     

Depression and cognitive impairment in disability-free early multiple sclerosis

Cognitive and emotional capabilities were evaluated in 73 female patients with stable relapsing-remitting definite, and/or laboratory-supported multiple sclerosis (MS) and were compared with 32 matched healthy controls. Patients were categorized according to their score in the expanded disability status scale (EDSS) to either no (EDSS 0, n = 33) or few clinical signs (EDSS 1-2, n = 40) of MS without physical disability. Patients with EDSS > 0 were characterized by significantly (p < 0.001) higher scores on "von Zerssen's" depression scale, compared to controls. Patients with higher EDSS scores (1-2) showed significantly decreased performance with respect to the total score of Kimura's Recurring-Figures-Test (p < 0.001), in addition. Regarding visuo-constructive functioning, patients with EDSS=0 performed to a significantly lower level (p < 0.001), compared to controls. These results indicate that depression may present as an early sign in MS followed by cognitive impairment, in particular visuo-spatial short-term memory, before physical disability appears. Neuropsychological tests as mentioned here could serve as early diagnostic tools to detect subtle disease progression and to initiate and monitor disease modifying therapies.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.