Sorai and the will oftian

Conclusion My purpose has been more negative than positive. That is, I have challenged the view that Sorai understoodtian as an intentional agent. At minimum, Sorai’s philosophical views do not depend upon such a conception oftian, and he refrains from characterizingtian in such terms when he discusses the concept oftian directly. However, I do not claim to have proven that Sorai’s view oftian was completely naturalistic, or even that Sorai did not—at some level—believe thattian had intentions. I have, I hope, shown thatthe case that Sorai viewedtian as intentional has not been convincingly made. Further, something closer to a dynamic and indeterminate naturalistic view is a reasonable alternative. On my reading, Sorai steers a course between the Song Confucian view oftian as static and knowable (a view that he explicitly rejects) and a view oftian as intentional (a view he never unequivocally expresses)—indeed, he rejects the idea of personifyingtian. When Sorai speaks of thexin or “mind”of tian, he is best understood as employing a metaphor that implies complexity, mystery, activity, and perhaps moral structure, but not intentionality in the normal sense. The complexity, indeterminacy, and dynamism oftian, as these are expressed in Sorai’s writings, do not necessarily imply willful intent on the part oftian, for they are all consistent with the Xunzian interpretation oftian as a natural process, even iftian’s regularities have a moral character.     

Xunzi and the Prudence of Dao: Desire as the Motive to Become Good

Xunzi is often interpreted as offering a method for transforming our desires. This essay argues that, strictly speaking, he does not. Rather, Xunzi offers a method of developing an auxiliary motivational structure capable of overpowering our original desires, when there is a conflict. When one succeeds in transforming one’s overall character, original desires nevertheless remain and are largely satisfied. This explains why one may be motivated to follow the way even before one has developed noble intentions. On Xunzi’s view, following dao provides the best chance of satisfying one’s original desires, as well as fulfilling the more noble aspirations that arise from the process.     

Sorai and xunzi on the construction of the way1

While Sorai's intellectual debt to Xunzi is often mentioned, the similarities between their views have not often been explored at length in English².2 ?One exception is J. R. McEwan, who does spend four pages on this, if that can be considered ‘at length.’ See McEwan (1962 McEwan JR 1962 The political writings of Ogyû Sorai New York Cambridge University Press  [Google Scholar], pp. 11–14). It has been addressed more in the Japanese literature, notably in Imanaka (1992 Imanaka Kanji 1992 Sorai gaku no shiteki kenkyû [An historical study of the Sorai school] Kyoto Shibunkaku Shuppan  [Google Scholar], pp. 95–114). View all notes Further, while Maruyama Masao does compare the two thinkers in his influential monograph Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, he stresses (apparent) differences between Xunzi and Sorai, in order to hail Sorai's uniqueness. Without meaning to take anything away from Sorai as an independent thinker, I maintain that with regard to precisely those views for which Sorai is lauded as unique—that dao is a product of real people that evolved over time and continues to evolve—his position was also held by Xunzi. In addition, there is a related yet rarely highlighted aspect of Xunzi's thought that is also acknowledged by Sorai. That is, virtues acquired by participating in the way in turn qualify one to contribute to its continuous open-ended development.     

Artifice and virtue in the<Emphasis Type="Italic">Xunzi</Emphasis>

Xunzi was chronologically the third of the three great Confucian thinkers of China’s classical period, after Confucius and Mencius. Having produced the most comprehensive philosophical system of that period, he occupies a place in the development of Chinese philosophy comparable to that of Aristotle in the Western philosophical tradition. This essay reveals how Xunzi’s understanding of virtue and moral development dovetailed with his positions on ritual propriety, the attunement of names, the relation betweenli (patterns) andlei (categories), and his view ofdao (the way) in general. I have argued for a “constructivist” understanding of each of these aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy in some detail elsewhere (see Hagen 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), and so here I will just briefly review a few key points before addressing their relation to moral development.     

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Symptoms in Mothers and Fathers: Family Level Interactions in Relation to Parenting

Previous studies linking parent ADHD symptoms to parenting have typically focused on each parent individually. To provide a broader understanding of family context, in this study, levels of inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity in mothers and fathers were examined, both individually and in combination, in relation to negative parenting and child-rearing disagreements. Two-parent families of 5 to 13 year old boys (126 with ADHD and 53 typically developing) participated. Parents reported their own ADHD symptoms and their perceptions of child-rearing disagreements. Parenting was measured using self-, partner-, and child-reports as well as observations. Controlling for child ADHD symptoms, inattention symptoms in fathers predicted parenting difficulties. For mothers, inattention symptoms were linked to parenting problems only when fathers also had high levels of inattention. In contrast, parenting was most problematic for both mothers and fathers in families in which fathers had higher and mothers had lower levels hyperactivity-impulsivity symptoms. These results remained essentially unchanged when child externalizing behavior and mother depression and hostility were controlled, but father depression reduced the significance of some interactions. The results highlight the importance of the match between father and mother levels of symptoms, and point to differential relations of parenting to inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity symptoms in parents.     

A Chinese critique on Western ways of warfare

I will argue that there are two pervasive and enduring Western attitudes towards warfare: one involves the romanticism of violent conflict, the other concerns moral justification for it. These stand in sharp contrast to the traditional Chinese attitude as put forward in the Chinese classic treatises on warfare, the Sun‐tzu and Sun Pin. I will reference similar concerns articulated in the Taoist and, to a lesser extent, Confucian classics both to confirm and clarify this position. Using the combination of some of the most important and influential texts with the most relevant to our topic, I will attempt to identify and explicate what I will call “the traditional Chinese attitude toward warfare” as a critique of the two widespread Western attitudes. Finally, I will explore the implications of the West abandoning its romantic and moralistic attitudes.     

Xunzi's Use of Zhengming: Naming as a constructive project

This paper challenges the view of several interpreters of Xunzi regarding the status of names, ming. I will maintain that Xunzi's view is consistent with the activity we see not only in his own efforts to influence language, but those of Confucius as well. Based on a reconsideration of translations and interpretations of key passages, I will argue that names are regarded neither as mere labels nor as indicating a privileged taxonomy of the myriad phenomena. Rather, Xunzi conceives them as constructs designed to facilitate social goals. Finally, I will suggest an alternative to overly simplistic understandings of how appropriate names are fashioned and of who is responsible for their form.