The cognitive bases of human tool use

This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination, body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.     

The contribution of executive control to semantic cognition: Convergent evidence from semantic aphasia and executive dysfunction

Semantic cognition, as described by the controlled semantic cognition (CSC) framework (Rogers et al., 2015 , Neuropsychologia, 76, 220), involves two key components: activation of coherent, generalizable concepts within a heteromodal ‘hub’ in combination with modality‐specific features (spokes), and a constraining mechanism that manipulates and gates this knowledge to generate time‐ and task‐appropriate behaviour. Executive–semantic goal representations, largely supported by executive regions such as frontal and parietal cortex, are thought to allow the generation of non‐dominant aspects of knowledge when these are appropriate for the task or context. Semantic aphasia (SA) patients have executive–semantic deficits, and these are correlated with general executive impairment. If the CSC proposal is correct, patients with executive impairment should not only exhibit impaired semantic cognition, but should also show characteristics that align with those observed in SA. This possibility remains largely untested, as patients selected on the basis that they show executive impairment (i.e., with ‘dysexecutive syndrome’) have not been extensively tested on tasks tapping semantic control and have not been previously compared with SA cases. We explored conceptual processing in 12 patients showing symptoms consistent with dysexecutive syndrome (DYS) and 24 SA patients, using a range of multimodal semantic assessments which manipulated control demands. Patients with executive impairments, despite not being selected to show semantic impairments, nevertheless showed parallel patterns to SA cases. They showed strong effects of distractor strength, cues and miscues, and probe–target distance, plus minimal effects of word frequency on comprehension (unlike semantic dementia patients with degradation of conceptual knowledge). This supports a component process account of semantic cognition in which retrieval is shaped by control processes, and confirms that deficits in SA patients reflect difficulty controlling semantic retrieval.     

On the emergence of American analytic philosophy

This paper is concerned with the reasons for the emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy in America. It closely examines the contents of, and changing editors at, The Philosophical Review, and provides a perspective on the contents of other leading philosophy journals. It suggests that analytic philosophy emerged prior to the 1950s in an environment characterized by a rich diversity of approaches to philosophy and that it came to dominate American philosophy at least in part due to its effective promotion by The Philosophical Review’s editors. Our picture of mid-twentieth-century American philosophy is different from existing ones, including those according to which the prominence of analytic philosophy in America was basically a matter of the natural affinity between American philosophy and analytic philosophy and those according to which the political climate at the time was hostile towards non-analytic approaches. Furthermore, our reconstruction suggests a new perspective on the nature of 1950s analytic philosophy.     

Treatment Sensitivity of a Brief Rating Scale for Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Symptoms

This study examined the treatment sensitivity of the ADHD Questionnaire (ADHD-Q), which is a brief rating scale for measuring symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity in children. Parent, teacher, and child self-report data of the ADHD-Q were obtained for 17 clinically referred children with ADHD on the three occasions: (1) during the regular intake assessment, (2) just before the start of the stimulant medication (i.e., methylphenidate) intervention, and (3) four weeks after the start of the medication intervention. Results showed that ADHD-Q scores remained fairly stable in the period prior to the intervention, but then showed a substantial decline after the stimulant medication had been administered. Clearly, this finding supports the treatment sensitivity of the ADHD-Q.     

When is the ball going to hit the ground? Duration estimates, eye movements, and mental imagery of object motion

Performance in 2 versions of a computer-animated task was compared. Participants either indicated the time of arrival of a target that rolled off a horizontal surface and fell--hidden from view--onto a landing point (production task) or judged flight time on a rating scale (judgment task). As predicted, performance was significantly better in the production task (Experiment 1), in which imagery of object motion probably replaced reasoning processes. Participants who exhibited eye movements suggesting mental tracking performed particularly well in the production task (Experiment 2). There was, however, no decrement in performance when participants were asked to fixate the point where the target disappeared. For motion duration estimations, eye movements seem to be only a by-product of mental tracking.     

Modelling the truth of scientific beliefs with cultural evolutionary theory

Evolutionary anthropologists and archaeologists have been considerably successful in modelling the cumulative evolution of culture, of technological skills and knowledge in particular. Recently, one of these models has been introduced in the philosophy of science by De Cruz and De Smedt (Philos Stud 157:411–429, 2012), in an attempt to demonstrate that scientists may collectively come to hold more truth-approximating beliefs, despite the cognitive biases which they individually are known to be subject to. Here we identify a major shortcoming in that attempt: De Cruz & De Smedt’s mathematical model makes one particularly strong tractability assumption that causes the model to largely miss its target (namely, truth accumulation in science), and that moreover conflicts with empirical observations. The second, more constructive part of the paper presents an alternative, agent-based model, which allows one to much better examine the conditions for scientific progress and decline.     

Analogue Mental Transformations in 3‐Year‐Olds: Introducing a New Mental Rotation Paradigm Suitable for Young Children

Until now, a successful application of the mental rotation paradigm was restricted to children 5 years or older. By contrast, recent findings suggest that even infants can perform mental rotation. Unlike the methods used in infant studies (looking time), our new research paradigm allows for the measurement and interpretation of reaction times. Kindergartners (aged 3–6 years) were presented with a stimulus configuration on a touchscreen and asked to bring a rotated stimulus into an upright position using the shortest path. Mean reaction time (RT) increased linearly with angular disparity. The ensuing linear trend was significant not only for the entire sample but also for the youngest age group analysed separately. To exclude the possibility that linearity was due to movement planning, 3‐year‐olds had to manually rotate a stimulus about the same trajectory without the need for a corresponding mental transformation in a second experiment. Here, no linear trend was observed. These results are interpreted as evidence for an analogue mental transformation in 3‐year‐olds, equal to the transformation processes in older children's and adults' mental rotation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagery and Motor Processes — When Are They Connected? The Mental Rotation of Body Parts in Development

Motor influences on the mental transformation of body parts have been observed in both children and adults. Previous findings indicated that these influences were more pronounced in children than in adults, suggesting a stronger link between motor processes and imagery in children. The present series of two experiments casts doubt on the general validity of such an interpretation. Kindergartners' (aged 5–6 years), first graders' (aged 7 years), and adults' performance in the mental rotation of pictures of body parts was monitored for influences of internal representations of motor constraints (motor effect). In both experiments, evidence for mental rotation was obtained for each group. Unexpectedly, kindergarten boys made significantly more errors than kindergarten girls. A motor effect was only found in the second experiment, where it was least pronounced in the youngest age group. Our results suggest that mental transformations of body parts do not necessarily involve motor processes and that embodiment may become stronger with development rather than weaker with certain tasks.     

Theory of Mind and the Video Deficit Effect: Video Presentation Impairs Children’s Encoding and Understanding of False Belief

The video deficit effect (VDE) has been demonstrated in several studies on word learning, self-recognition, and imitation: Younger children (up to 3 years old) solved tasks more easily in a direct interaction with an examiner than when instructed by video (Anderson & Pempek, 2005). Older children might also be susceptible to a VDE, especially with more complex tasks; however, evidence is sparse. Furthermore, to what extent preschoolers’ understanding of others’ mental states (theory of mind) is impaired by video presentations has not been tested. We tested 174 children of 4 and 5 years of age in a traditional change of location task for false belief understanding (cf. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Children were presented with the original story, enacted by adult actors, in either a video or a live demonstration. Children watched the events in 2 live conditions, either through a 1-way mirror or directly. Our results indicate a significant VDE for 4- and 5-year-old children regarding the encoding and solution of the false belief task, respectively.     

DEWEY ON EXTENDED COGNITION AND EPISTEMOLOGY

There is a surge of attempts to draw out the epistemological consequences of views according to which cognition is deeply embedded, embodied and/or extended (e‐cog). The principal machinery used for doing so is that of analytic epistemology. Here I argue that Dewey's pragmatic epistemology may be better fit to the task. I start by pointing out the profound similarities between Dewey's view on cognition and that emerging from literature of more recent date. Crucially, the benefit of looking at Dewey is that Dewey, unlike contemporary writers, also devises a corresponding epistemology. I then identify two senses in which contemporary analytic epistemology conflicts with e‐cog—concluding from that the superiority of the Deweyian framework, at least as it concerns accommodating e‐cog.