Suppression of visual observing by rhesus monkeys produced by conditioned aversive visual stimuli.

Nine rhesus monkeys were tested in a visual observing situation to determine the influence of conditioned aversive visual stimulation. A set of meaningless visual stimuli was selected on the basis of cumulative frequency and cumulative duration of observing during a pretest phase of the experiment. Three subsets of stimuli (low, medium, high) were formed indicating level of observing during pretesting. A portion of the "medium" category of slides then served as conditioned stimuli in a classical conditioning procedure by being paired with electric shock. Following conditioning the entire set of stimuli was again presented in a visual observing situation. The results showed a significant decrease in both frequency and duration of observing of the slides with conditioned aversive qualities, relative to non-shock control slides. These findings support an aversion-produced suppression of observing relatively unconfounded by methodological, procedural, and other differences existing among previous reports on the role of fear or anxiety in this context.     

The Rescorla-Wagner model: losses in associative strength in compound conditioned stimuli

This series of experiments demonstrated that compound conditioned stimuli (CSs) highly conditioned in isolation lose conditioned response strength when compound-CS-unconditioned stimulus (US) pairings are given. This loss in conditioned responding was a positive function of the number of compound-CS-US pairings and was greater for the more salient stimulus. Finally, if a previously neutral stimulus was compounded with two previously conditioned cues, the neutral stimulus could acquire conditioned inhibitory properties with only compound-CS-US pairings. These results provide support for some aspects of the Rescorla-Wagner model.     

Effect of posttrial episodes on conditioning in compound conditioned stimuli

The effect of signaled and nonsignaled posttrial episodes (PTEs) on conditioning to the target CS of a preceding compound CS-US trial was examined in two conditioned emotional response (CER) experiments with rats. Experiment 1 revealed that a nonsignaled PTE, a second shock US, interfered with conditioning to the preceding target CS and that the interference effect of the PTE was greater when it occurred 5 sec as opposed to 1,800 sec after the preceding compound CS-US trial. Experiment 2 revealed that if the shock PTE was signaled by a CS, its ability to interfere with conditioning was reduced. This second study also revealed that omission of an "expected" US interfered with conditioning to the target CS. The implications of these data for information processing models of Pavlovian conditioning are discussed.     

A comparison of intra- and inter-limb relative motion information in modelling a novel motor skill

The importance of intra- and inter-limb relative motion in modelling a whole body coordination skill was examined. Participants were assigned to one of four groups: Full-Body point light model of a cricket bowler, INTRA-LIMB relative motion of the bowling arm, INTER-LIMB relative motions of the right and left wrists or NO-Relative motion, showing only the motions of the right wrist. During 60 acquisition trials, participants viewed the model five times before each 10-trial block. Retention was examined the following day. Although all groups improved on intra-limb coordination of the bowling arm, the INTRA-LIMB and FULL-BODY groups were more accurate than the INTER-LIMB group in acquisition, although these groups did not differ in retention. For inter-limb coordination, the three groups who received relative motion information performed more like the model than the NO-Relative motion group (even though the INTRA-LIMB group did not see the other limb). The amount of information within a display plays a constraining role on acquisition, perhaps more so than the type of information, such that the acquisition of coordination is more an emergent feature of observational learning, rather than a direct approximation of the model.     

How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference

In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth “its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language.” To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that a model is Thomason when there is no vicious reference in it. We extend their investigation, considering notions of nonpathologicality and senses of “no vicious reference” generated both by revision theories of truth and by fixed-point theories of truth. We show that some of the fixed-point theories have an advantage analogous to that which Gupta and Belnap claim for their approach, and that at least one revision theory does not. This calls into question the claim that the revision theories have a distinctive advantage in this regard.     

The Marriage Contract

This article is intended to serve as an introduction to the concept of the marriage contract, which has proved to be a useful clinical tool for clarification and treatment of troubled marriages. Transactional as well as intrapsychic factors are important aspects of marital dynamics. The contract concept employs both these behavioral parameters and facilitates therapeutic intervention at both levels.     

Dunn's Relevant Predication, Real Properties and Identity

We critically investigate and refine Dunn's relevant predication, his formalisation of the notion of a real property. We argue that Dunn's original dialectical moves presuppose some interpretation of relevant identity, though none is given. We then re-motivate the proposal in a broader context, considering the prospects for a classical formalisation of real properties, particularly of Geach's implicit distinction between real and 'Cambridge' properties. After arguing against these prospects, we turn to relevance logic, re-motivating relevant predication with Geach's distinction in mind. Finally we draw out some consequences of Dunn's proposal for the theory of identity in relevance logic.