Face to face with emotion: holistic face processing is modulated by emotional state

Negative emotions are linked with a local, rather than global, visual processing style, which may preferentially facilitate feature-based, relative to holistic, processing mechanisms. Because faces are typically processed holistically, and because social contexts are prime elicitors of emotions, we examined whether negative emotions decrease holistic processing of faces. We induced positive, negative, or neutral emotions via film clips and measured holistic processing before and after the induction: participants made judgements about cued parts of chimeric faces, and holistic processing was indexed by the interference caused by task-irrelevant face parts. Emotional state significantly modulated face-processing style, with the negative emotion induction leading to decreased holistic processing. Furthermore, self-reported change in emotional state correlated with changes in holistic processing. These results contrast with general assumptions that holistic processing of faces is automatic and immune to outside influences, and they illustrate emotion's power to modulate socially relevant aspects of visual perception.     

Functional magnetic resonance imaging activation in response to prompts of romantically disillusioning events

To differentiate romantic disillusionment from similar constructs of dissatisfaction and regret, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data obtained when romantically involved individuals (N = 39) were reminded of relationship events representing these emotions were analyzed. Whole‐brain activations suggested disillusionment‐linked processes not observed for dissatisfaction or regret. Compared to dissatisfying events, disillusioning ones showed greater activity in regions pertaining to evaluation, reflection, and reconciling conflicting information (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex). No regions showed significantly more activation for dissatisfying than disillusioning events. Compared to regret‐inducing events, disillusioning events showed greater activation in areas thought pertinent to detail processing and decision making (occipital fusiform and lingual gyrus). Regret‐inducing events activated regions suggesting the planning and thoughts of how one could have acted differently (e.g., prefrontal cortex).     

General theories of explanation: buyer beware

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!     

A warm heart and a clear head. The contingent effects of weather on mood and cognition

Prior studies on the association between weather and psychological changes have produced mixed results. In part, this inconsistency may be because weather's psychological effects are moderated by two important factors: the season and time spent outside. In two correlational studies and an experiment manipulating participants' time outdoors (total N = 605), pleasant weather (higher temperature or barometric pressure) was related to higher mood, better memory, and "broadened" cognitive style during the spring as time spent outside increased. The same relationships between mood and weather were not observed during other times of year, and indeed hotter weather was associated with lower mood in the summer. These results are consistent with findings on seasonal affective disorder, and suggest that pleasant weather improves mood and broadens cognition in the spring because people have been deprived of such weather during the winter.     

Socio-functional foundations in science: The case of measurement

We present a novel kind of “socio-functional” foundationalism rooted in the division of scientific labor. Our foundationalism is social in that it involves a socio-epistemic phenomenon we dub epistemic outsourcing, whereby claims from one group of scientists provide epistemological foundations for another group of scientists. We argue that: (1) epistemic outsourcing results in a legitimate form of epistemic foundationalism, (2) this sort of foundationalism can be used to shed light on the epistemology of measurement; and (3) epistemic outsourcing is a distinctively collective epistemic phenomenon.     

Is understanding explanatory or objectual?

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.     

Inference,explanation, and asymmetry

Explanation is asymmetric: if A explains B, then B does not explain A. Traditionally, the asymmetry of explanation was thought to favor causal accounts of explanation over their rivals, such as those that take explanations to be inferences. In this paper, we develop a new inferential approach to explanation that outperforms causal approaches in accounting for the asymmetry of explanation.

     

Emotional memory processing in post-traumatic stress disorder affected Colombian youth

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a neuropsychological condition caused by exposure to chronic stressors and extreme trauma. In past decades, Colombia (South America) has experienced high levels of armed conflict, which created an environment of chronic stress, resulting in an increased incidence of PTSD in children. Limited research exists on the effects of PTSD on emotional memory functioning of these Colombian youth living in chronically stressful environments. In the present study, 23 PTSD affected youth and 26 controls were asked to recall items from a memorised word list, as well as remembering details from a short emotional story. Although no significant differences were found for word list memory, deficits for emotional story content were found in the PTSD youth, particularly for facts involving negative emotional details. The latter may suggest a deficit in executive functioning for the integration of emotionally laden stimuli, perhaps induced as a by-product of their traumatic experiences.     

"We all look the same to me": positive emotions eliminate the own-race in face recognition

Extrapolating from the broaden-and-build theory, we hypothesized that positive emotion may reduce the own-race bias in facial recognition. In Experiments 1 and 2, Caucasian participants (N = 89) viewed Black and White faces for a recognition task. They viewed videos eliciting joy, fear, or neutrality before the learning (Experiment 1) or testing (Experiment 2) stages of the task. Results reliably supported the hypothesis. Relative to fear or a neutral state, joy experienced before either stage improved recognition of Black faces and significantly reduced the own-race bias. Discussion centers on possible mechanisms for this reduction of the own-race bias, including improvements in holistic processing and promotion of a common in-group identity due to positive emotions.