The role of imagery in the representation of linear orderings

Two experiments were carried out to investigate whether visual imagery was used in representing transitive linear ordering relationships. Subjects were presented with passages describing either a linear ordering or a set inclusion relationship, while being subjected to either visual or verbal interference. Performance was tested by asking subjects to judge the truth or falsity of statements concerning both the information presented in the passages and inferences that could be drawn from this information. In neither experiment was there any evidence for the linear ordering material being selectively disrupted by the visual interference task, as would have been predicted by the imagery theory. Thus it is concluded that linear orderings are probably not represented as visual images.     

A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000 Choi, I. and Nisbett, R. E. 2000. Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 890–905. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.     

Social roles and utilities in reasoning with deontic conditionals

A set of experiments is reported in which a new formulation of deontic thinking is tested. This is that people represent subjective utilities inherent in conforming to or violating deontic statements, along with the social dynamics of these statements. The experiments used Wason's selection task and tested people's understanding of conditional permission. In the first two experiments, familiar scenarios referring to family interactions were used. In the third, an imaginary business content was used. In both cases it was apparent that people's thinking depended on their representation of the utilities associated with the agent of a permission statement (the party who lays down the rule) and the actor (the party whose behaviour is its target). The results are discussed as favouring an explanation in terms of mental models, rather than the schema theories which have dominated this field hitherto.     

Subclinical delusional ideation and appreciation of sample size and heterogeneity in statistical judgment

Previous studies demonstrate that people high in delusional ideation exhibit a data‐gathering bias on inductive reasoning tasks. The current study set out to investigate the factors that may underpin such a bias by examining healthy individuals, classified as either high or low scorers on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI). More specifically, whether high PDI scorers have a relatively poor appreciation of sample size and heterogeneity when making statistical judgments. In Expt 1, high PDI scorers made higher probability estimates when generalizing from a sample of 1 with regard to the heterogeneous human property of obesity. In Expt 2, this effect was replicated and was also observed in relation to the heterogeneous property of aggression. The findings suggest that delusion‐prone individuals are less appreciative of the importance of sample size when making statistical judgments about heterogeneous properties; this may underpin the data gathering bias observed in previous studies. There was some support for the hypothesis that threatening material would exacerbate high PDI scorers' indifference to sample size.     

Causal and conditional inferences: A comment on Cummins (1995)

Cummins (1995) offers an analysis of causal and truthfunctional sufficiency and necessity to predict and explain the effects on conditional inferences of two pragmatic factors: alternative causes and disabling conditions. However, the justification of these predictions is inconsistent. This note offers a modified analysis which puts her predictions on a sounder base: it is proposed that alternative causes and disabling conditions affect judgments of argument validity under three different models for the causal conditional.     

Can subthreshold summation be observed with the Ehrenstein illusion?

Subthreshold summation between physical target lines and illusory contours induced by edges such as those produced in the Kanizsa illusion has been reported in previous studies. Here, we investigated the ability of line-induced illusory contours, using Ehrenstein figures, to produce similar subthreshold summation. In the first experiment, three stimulus conditions were presented. The target line was superimposed on the illusory contour of a four-arm Ehrenstein figure, or the target was presented between two dots (which replaced the arms of the Ehrenstein figure), or the target was presented on an otherwise blank screen (control). Detection of the target line was significantly worse when presented on the illusory contour (on the Ehrenstein figure) than when presented between two dots. This result was consistent for both curved and straight target lines, as well as for a 100 ms presentation duration and unlimited presentation duration. Performance was worst in the control condition. The results for the three stimulus conditions were replicated in a second experiment in which an eight-arm Ehrenstein figure was used to produce a stronger and less ambiguous illusory contour. In the third experiment, the target was either superimposed on the illusory contour, or was located across the central gap (illusory surface) of the Ehrenstein figure, collinear with two arms of the figure. As in the first two experiments, the target was either presented on the Ehrenstein figure, or between dots, or on a blank screen. Detection was better in the dot condition than in the Ehrenstein condition, regardless of whether the target was presented on the illusory contour or collinear with the arms of the Ehrenstein figure. These three experiments demonstrate the ability of reduced spatial uncertainty to facilitate the detection of a target line, but do not provide any evidence for subthreshold summation between a physical target line and the illusory contours produced by an Ehrenstein figure. The incongruence of these results with previous findings on Kanizsa figures is discussed.     

Working memory resources in young children with mathematical difficulties

Kyttälä, M., Aunio, P. & Hautamäki, J. (2010). Working memory resources in young children with mathematical difficulties. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51 , 1–15.
Working memory (WM) ( Baddeley, 1986, 1997 ) is argued to be one of the most important cognitive resources underlying mathematical competence ( Geary, 2004 ). Research has established close links between WM deficits and mathematical difficulties. This study investigated the possible deficits in WM, language and fluid intelligence that seem to characterize 4- to 6-year-old children with poor early mathematical skills before formal mathematics education. Children with early mathematical difficulties showed poor performance in both verbal and visuospatial WM tasks as well as on language tests and a fluid intelligence test indicating a thoroughly lower cognitive base. Poor WM performance was not moderated by fluid intelligence, but the extent of WM deficits was related to language skills. The educational implications are discussed.     

Edge-induced illusory contours and visual detection: Subthreshold summation or spatial cueing?

Findings that illusory contours can facilitate visual detection of a subthreshold real line (Dresp & Bonnet, 1995) were not replicated, when line-induced instead of edge-induced illusory contour stimuli were used (Salvano-Pardieu et al., 2006). Rather, the results of the latter study supported the importance of spatial cues. The present study was designed to investigate whether spatial cueing might also facilitate detection of targets superimposed on edge-induced illusory contours. In Experiment 1, a target line was superimposed on the illusory contour of a Kanizsa square, presented between dots with a precise or distant location to the target, or on a homogeneous field (control). Detection of the target was poorest for the control, followed by the distant-dots and Kanizsa conditions, whereas it was best for precisely cueing dots. Experiment 2 replicated the conditions in Experiment 1 (Kanizsa, precisely cueing dots, and control) with additional controls for possible luminance effects. The two new conditions matched the Kanizsa condition for overall luminance and preciseness of spatial cueing without generating illusory contours. Performance was best in the dot condition and worst in the control, but the same across the Kanizsa and matched luminance conditions. In Experiments 3 and 4, the stimuli presented were matched more closely to those used by Dresp and Bonnet, but still the results confirmed those obtained in our Experiments 1 and 2. Together, these experiments strongly suggest that detection is also facilitated by spatial cueing rather than subthreshold summation, in the case of edge-induced illusory contours.     

Subclinical delusional ideation and a self‐reference bias in everyday reasoning

Previous studies (e.g. Moller & Husby, 2000 ; Blackwood et al., 2004 ) have revealed that delusional thinking is accompanied by an exaggerated focus upon the self and upon stimuli that are perceived to be related to the self. The objective was to examine whether those high in subclinical delusional ideation exhibit a heightened tendency for self‐reference. Using a mixed design, healthy individuals, classified into high‐ and low‐scoring groups on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory ( Peters, Day, & Garety, 1996 ), were compared on everyday reasoning tasks across three experiments. High‐PDI scorers, in contrast to the low‐PDI group, rated self‐referent objections to everyday arguments as stronger than other‐referent objections and formulated more self‐referent assertion‐based objections to everyday arguments. The findings support the notion that subclinical delusional ideation is linked to a self‐reference bias, which is evident in the sort of everyday thinking that people engage in when forming or evaluating their beliefs and which may contribute to delusion formation.